西班牙应当让小银行倒闭

    在失业率如此高的情况下，西班牙的保守政府继续推行合并政策，无异于蛮干。据加拿大皇家银行资本市场（RBC Capital Markets）的数据，房地产泡沫带来的银行损失预计将在760-1,530亿欧元之间。若采用这一估算值，加上银行业每年成本约290亿欧元，即便它们不知以何种方式将每年的成本削减40%（约120亿欧元）达到30%的、一流的成本收入比，也需要7-14年的时间来消化所有坏账的潜在损失。而且，鉴于当初分析师们给出的Bankia贷款损失估算值过低，你可以相当确信，最终的损失还会高很多。

    但更麻烦的是这些Caja的合并还给西班牙政府新增了一个“大得不能倒”的问题。让Bankia以现有规模倒闭对西班牙经济的冲击，就像在水里扔了一块大石头一样，冲击力将远远超出7块小石头分不同时间落下。西班牙政府将一堆行将就木的小银行拼凑成一个庞然大物后，却发现不能承受让其倒下的后果。

    有鉴于此，允许Ibercaja、Liberbank和Caja3实施合并是不负责任的，这会再增添一个任性的庞然大物。事实上，西班牙政府应当采取行动，阻止更多合并，并承担更为积极的角色向银行注资，让它们再次开始放贷。如果正如一家欧盟机构上周建议的那样，欧洲央行不愿为所有的西班牙银行存款提供担保，那么西班牙政府将需要私人资金来重振人们对银行业的信心。

    西班牙银行业需要私人投资者的注资，其资本金缺口多半已达西班牙GDP的25-30%。虽然西班牙的债务/GDP比率相对较低，约为68%，但即便以当今的高利率，它也借不到足够多的资金，既能向银行注资，又能弥补潜在损失。

    一个可能的解决方案是结合私人和公共资金，借鉴20世纪90年代瑞典全国银行业重组和当今爱尔兰正在进行的银行重组。西班牙政府需要首先全面评估其银行业，估算潜在损失。其次，它应当让一些资不抵债的中小银行干脆倒闭。

    与此同时，偿付能力较好的银行和Caja就可以从资产负债表中将大部分坏账以当前市值剥离，移入一个特殊用途投资基金中。然后，西班牙政府可以让公众投资这个基金，帮助抵消坏账的已实现损失。西班牙政府可以吸引私人资本进行投资，有可能的话，承担它们前10%，甚至20%的损失。

    For the conservative government to continue this merger policy with its unemployment rate so high would be nothing less than foolhardy. Bank losses emanating from the property bubble are estimated to be anywhere between 76 billion euros on the low end to as much as 153 billion euros on the high end, according to RBC Capital Markets. Using that estimate and given that the banking sector's costs run at around 29 billion euros a year, even if they somehow achieved a top-notch cost-to-income ratio of 30% by reducing their costs by 40% a year, or 12 billion euros, it would take seven to 14 years to absorb all the potential losses from the bad loans. And given the low-ball loan loss estimates analysts ascribed to Bankia, you can pretty much be sure that it is going to be a much bigger loss at the end of the day.

    But even more troubling, the merging of the cajas has also created a "too big to fail" problem for the Spanish government. Like throwing a big stone in the water, allowing Bankia to collapse in its current form would create a much bigger splash to the Spanish economy than what would have been the case if seven smaller pebbles hit the water at various times. Cobbling a bunch of zombie banks together has in a way created a monster that the Spanish government cannot afford to kill.

    Given all this, it would be irresponsible to allow Ibercaja, Liberbank and Caja3 to actually go through with their merger as it would again create yet another unruly zombie. Instead, the government should move to block further mergers and take a more active role in recapitalizing its banks so they can start lending again. If the ECB is unwilling to guarantee all Spanish bank deposits, as what was recommended by an EU body this week, then the Spanish government will need private funding to restore confidence in its banking sector.

    Investor cash is needed because the capital shortfall at the banks is easily 25% to 30% of Spain's GDP. While the country has a relatively low debt-to-GDP ratio of around 68%, it cannot borrow enough money at today's current high interest rates to both recapitalize its banks as well as cover potential losses.

    One possible solution would involve a mix of both private and public funds, using features from Sweden's national banking reorganization in the 1990s and Ireland's banking reorganization that going on today. The government needs to first do a thorough assessment of its banking sector and make an estimate as to the potential losses. It should then let the smaller, insolvent cajas and banks to simply fail.

    Meanwhile, the more solvent banks and cajas would have the majority of their bad loans taken off their balance sheets at current market value and moved into a special purpose investment fund. It would then allow the public to invest in that fund, which would help offset the realized losses in the bad loans. The Spanish government can entice private capital to invest by possibly guaranteeing the first 10% or even 20% of their losses.