“新欧盟”是欧洲最佳的修复方式

    1952年最初提出欧盟设想的时候，它只是一个经济联盟，希望在整个欧洲大陆实现商品和服务的自由流动。但在过去60年里，欧盟已经成长为一个准政治联邦，有些欧盟法律已经凌驾于国家法律之上。1999年欧元的推出使这个问题进一步复杂化——加入欧元区的欧盟成员国只同意将货币政策交给欧盟打理，但财政政策仍牢牢地掌握在成员国自己手里。.

    欧元区成员国承诺预算赤字不超过GDP的3%。只要在这个范围内，这些国家就认为开支仍算合理。不幸的是，由于没有严厉的惩罚措施，过去10年来几乎被所有成员国都曾在某个时候逾越这一红线，当中也包括德国。希腊和外围成员国发行债券，为大型项目筹资，支撑日益庞大的国家公务人员群体。德国和北欧国家利用自身经济优势，将大量的产品和服务销售到外围国家。

    但是，一旦希腊不能借到足够的资金保持这个循环继续进行，从欧元区外围国家到核心成员国的这一财富转移就被打破了。希腊的经济还没有进化到这样一个程度：既拥有高估值货币，同时又能保持经济增长。它需要举债来填补这些空缺。所有其他外围国家也不同程度地处于类似的境况。

    这种失衡只会不断加剧，直到整个欧元区土崩瓦解。希腊退出欧元将摧毁人们对这个共同货币的信心，导致欧洲大量的银行倒闭。另外一些国家也会退出，留下来的国家将构成核心欧洲，其货币之坚挺甚至将导致连德国在内的产品也将在全球市场上失去竞争力。最后，这个集团也会崩溃，欧元也将不复存在。

    现在明白了为什么没人希望希腊退出——这些核心国家将失去出口优势，而外围国家的生活水平也将骤降，苦不堪言。解决的方案是汇集债务，构建一个财政联盟，但各国政府——无论是极左翼，还是极右翼——似乎都不愿放弃手中的权力来让这个解决方案更加切实可行。

    因此，整个欧盟最大的问题是政治架构。欧盟仍在遵照为一个无共同货币的小规模联盟所设计的规章进行治理。如今的欧盟拥有27个成员国，众口难调，在欧盟要做成任何一件事情几乎都难于上青天。虽然即将于2014年生效的《里斯本条约》（Treaty of Lisbon）能够解决一些问题，但仍不足以让这些成员国具备抵御经济威胁、及时果断地做出反应的能力。

    那么，欧洲未来的出路在何方? 欧洲或许需要老的欧盟倒台，给一个更加可行的联盟让路——如果这是欧洲人真正期望的。但欧盟的倒台不必以一种暴力的方式进行，而是以一种有序的方式完成，类似于18世纪90年代美国从一个松散连接的联盟转变为一个更强大的联邦。它需要召集会议制定出需协商的细节，但需要达成共识的是，没有一个成员国将以此进行要挟。如果某个成员国不认同财政权统一，就不应该留在新欧盟里。如果不想成为欧元区的一员，就请自行离开。

    如果欧盟成员国希望继续保住这一共同货币，现在就得放弃自己的国家身份，接受欧洲身份。构建新的政治架构和可行的投票权将确保欧元得到拯救，而且组建一个经济强大的一体化欧洲的梦想也终于可以变成现实。

    译者：早稻米

    When the EU was first envisioned in 1952, it was to be solely an economic union to allow the free movement of goods and services throughout the continent. But in the past 60 years it has grown into a sort of quasi-political confederation where some EU laws now supersede national laws. The introduction of the euro in 1999 complicated matters -- the EU countries that chose to join the common currency were only willing to give up control of their monetary policy to the EU, but not their fiscal policy.

    Instead, eurozone members promised to not run budget deficits that exceeded 3% of their GDP. This way, the governments would still be able to spend as they saw fit. Unfortunately, without strong penalties, this rule was broken by nearly all the members of the euro at some point in the last decade, including Germany. Greece and the peripheral nations issued debt to fund grand projects and support and ever growing civil servant population. Germany and the northern nations used their economic advantages to flood the peripheral nations with their goods and services.

    But this transfer of wealth from the periphery to the core of the eurozone broke down when Greece was unable to borrow enough money to keep the cycle going. Greece's economy had simply not evolved enough to the point where it could have both a strong currency and economic growth. It needed debt to fill in the gaps. This, to varying degrees, is basically the same scenario in all the other peripheral countries.

    This imbalance will only continue to grow until the entire eurozone disintegrates. A Greek exit would destroy confidence in the common currency and lead to a number of bank failures across Europe. Other nations will be tossed out and what will remain will be a core Europe with a currency that is so strong that even German goods would be uncompetitive on the world markets. That group would collapse and the euro would be no more.

    It is clear now why no one wants Greece to leave -- the core countries would lose their exporting advantage while the periphery would suffer a painful decline in living standards. The solution would be the pooling of debt and the creation of a fiscal union, but national governments - whether they be far left or far right – seem unwilling to give up enough power to make this solution viable.

    Therein lays the biggest problem of the entire EU– its political structure. The EU is still governed by rules that were designed for a much smaller union without a common currency. Today, with 27 members, getting anything done in the EU is nearly impossible. While the Treaty of Lisbon, which goes into force in 2014, solves some of these problems, it still doesn't go far enough to allow member states to be able to prevent and respond to economic threats in a timely and decisive manner.

    So what's next for Europe? Europe may need the old EU to fall to make way for a more viable union – if that's what Europeans truly want. But the fall of the EU doesn't have to come about in a violent way; rather, it could be done in an orderly manner, similar to how the United States went from being a loosely knit confederation to a stronger federation in the 1790s. The calling of a conference to hammer out these details would need to be conferred but it should be understood that no one member will be able to hold the group hostage. If one member doesn't like the pooling of fiscal powers, it should be out of the new EU. If it doesn't want to be a member of the euro, it should also be out.

    The time has come for the members of the EU to give up their national identities for one that is truly European if they want to continue having a common currency. Building new political structures and workable voting rights will ensure that not only can the euro be saved, but also that the dream of a strong united Europe as an economic force can finally become reality.