欧元区改革：德国胜券在握

    德国的低利率和强劲经济增长带来了低失业率，创下两德合并以来新低5.6%。以往平平常常10%失业率这样的日子已一去不复返了——现如今，如果你在德国找不到工作，那是你不够努力。相比之下，法国失业率10%，是德国的近两倍，而西班牙高达25%，是德国的近5倍。

    为什么德国经济增长，邻国却苦苦挣扎，这里有很多结构性原因。但关键是虽然周边一团水深火热，德国在经济方面确实做得不错。因此，你会怪德国总理默克尔不尝试改变现状吗？

    由法国、西班牙和意大利牵头的一个欧元区成员国联盟正在向德国施压，希望它同意创建欧元区共同债券工具（即欧元债券），以稳定成员国借贷利率。随着法国由赞成赤字支出的社会党掌权，如今这一压力已经加大。希望是通过共同债务工具，经济疲弱的成员国能以较低利率进行借贷，为促增长项目提供资金，稳定欧元汇率。

    德国不是不同意这些观点——只是没看到执行这一计划有何好处。让我们来看看欧元债券能做些什么。首先，它们可以稳定并强化欧元汇率，但帮助外汇市场的同时会伤害德国出口行业。其次，欧元债券将使那些信用评级较差的国家更容易以较低利率进行借贷，等于是把核心成员国的优良信用延伸到了那些信用不良的外围国家。德国是欧元区两个具有AAA-评级的国家之一，另一个是芬兰。如果发行欧元债券，德国的信用评级无疑会遭下调，导致德国国内借贷成本上升。最后，欧元债券将使得法国能以较低的利率借到更多钱，为法国的预算赤字和大型项目（刺激法国疲弱而效率低下的经济）提供资金。那么，德国能得到什么好处呢？

    另一项正在布鲁塞尔讨论的、相对简单的提议是把所有的欧元区债务集合成一支共同基金，由所有成员国在25年内偿还。这个提议似乎比欧元债券更糟，因为这只解决了过去的债务问题，无助于几乎欧元区所有成员国都存在的财政低效和预算赤字问题。这是朝着终结危机 迈出的不错一步，但并不能解决问题。几年后，欧元区还会回到老问题，总的债务负担只会更加沉重，信用状况更糟。到那时，可能连德国都救不了欧元了。

    The low interest rates and the strong economy have translated to a record low unemployment rate for Germany, post-unification, of 5.6%. Gone are the days where 10% unemployment was the norm – if you don't have a job in Germany these days, you just aren't looking hard enough. Compare that with France, which has an unemployment rate that is almost double that of Germany at 10% or Spain, which is nearly five times higher at 25%.

    There are many structural reasons why Germany is experiencing economic growth while its neighbors are floundering. But the point here is that Germany, despite the fire burning around it, is doing pretty darn well economically. So would you blame chancellor Merkel for not trying to rock the boat here?

    A coalition of eurozone members - led by France, Spain and Italy - is pushing Germany to agree to the creation of a common debt instrument for the eurozone, known as a eurobond, in an effort to stabilize borrowing rates for member nations. The pressure has increased now that France is led by a socialist government in favor of deficit spending. The hope is that a common debt instrument will allow weaker members to borrow at low rates to fund projects meant to stimulate economic growth and stabilize the euro's value.

    Germany doesn't disagree with that assertion – it just doesn't see any upside in going along with the plan. Let's take a look at what eurobonds could do here. First, they would most likely stabilize and strengthen the euro against other currencies. While that would be good for the international currency markets, it would hurt Germany's export industry. Second, eurobonds would make it easier for countries with poor credit ratings to borrow at cheaper rates. This is done by extending the good credit of the core members to those on the periphery with bad credit. As one of two AAA-rated countries in the eurozone, the other being Finland, Germany will undoubtedly see a downgrade in its credit rating if eurobonds were issued, translating to higher borrowing costs at home. And lastly, eurobonds would allow France to borrow more money at lower rates, which will go to fund its budget deficit as well as grand projects to stimulate its weak and inefficient economy. Again, this benefits Germany how?

    Another, less severe, proposal that has been making the rounds in Brussels would be the pooling of all eurozone debt into a common fund, which would be paid down by all members over 25 years. This idea seems to be an even worse alternative to eurobonds as it solves the past debt problem but does nothing to fix the fiscal inefficiencies and budget deficits that plague nearly all eurozone members. This would be a good first step to ending the crisis, but it isn't the cure. In a few years the eurozone will be back just where they started, only with a larger overall debt burden and weaker credit. At that point not even Germany could save the euro.