银行大救援可能压垮西班牙

    这个救助方案的一个大问题是，向FROB注资将加剧西班牙政府仍在不断加码的债务负担。如果最终需要所有1,000亿欧元，西班牙的负债/GDP比率（一个风险衡量指标）将从可以掌控的68.5%升至非常危险的77%。但主权债务交易员们指出，西班牙的负债/GDP比率还不能准确反映其风险。因为该比率没有反映资产负债表外、由西班牙政府无条件担保的几十亿欧元债务。据西班牙央行（Bank of Spain）称，加上这些表外债务，西班牙的债务/GDP比率将从68.5%增至87%。在此基础上再加1,000亿欧元，该比例将跃升至约96%。

    当然，前提是这1,000亿欧元足以拯救西班牙的银行业。但现在我们真的不知道西班牙银行业需要多少钱，这得等到6月21日左右咨询公司奥纬咨询（Oliver Wyman）和罗兰贝格（Roland Berger）公布西班牙银行业资产市值的独立评估报告后才能得到答案。

    大多数分析师和交易员们都假定，所有已开发房地产需要大幅折价50%。但更让人担心的是银行所持土地的价值。据了解状况的一位人士称，寻求购买西班牙银行资产的对冲基金和兀鹫基金愿意折价50%购买已开发房地产，但对于未开发土地，“连付2%的钱”都不愿意。西班牙银行业持有的很多土地都处于西班牙国内边远地区，如内陆省份埃斯特雷马杜拉，这一地区在不远的未来可能不会有任何开发活动。

    因此，瑞士信贷（Credit Suisse）称，如果上述两家独立审计公司最终将所有的西班牙土地估值定为零，西班牙银行业可能总计需要从FROB获得400亿欧元。还有2,600亿欧元的已开发土地也将面临估值下调。如果要用现有拨备弥补缺口，并注入足够现金，确保每家银行都拥有10%的一级资本充足率，总计将需要近1,000亿欧元。如果银行被要求持有更多资本，所需资金总额就会轻松超过1,000亿欧元。前提还是西班牙近期出现的资本和储蓄外逃将在未来停止。如果这种资金流出持续进行，西班牙银行的股东权益价值将下降，需要从FROB获得更多资金。

    这个救助方案实在是荒谬。不仅没有移除西班牙的风险，事实上欧盟反而是在让这个国家承担更多的债务。一旦市场有机会深入研究这一方案，持有西班牙债券的保费将继续处于畸高水平。因此，它基本上意味着西班牙将继续完全依赖欧洲央行（European Central Bank）来购买其债券。最终，这个体系将崩塌，迫使西班牙政府自己也要向欧盟和国际货币基金组织（IMF）求救。主权救助方案带来的紧缩政策以及信誉破产对于拉霍伊和其支持者都是无法承受的打击。

    一个更有效的救助措施本应是欧盟共同努力，通过承担部分或所有债务，降低西班牙的银行业和主权债务负担。这个方案将把风险分散到欧元区所有17个成员国，让马德里能够抽出身来，再次以合理的价格发行自己的主权债券。但目前来看，眼下的西班牙银行业救助方案只不过是这场似乎无休无止的危机中出台的又一个权宜之计。

    译者：早稻米

    The big problem with this deal is that the money being funneled to the FROB is going to be added to Spain's already burgeoning debt load. That means that if it ends up needing all 100 billion euros, Spain's official debt-to-GDP ratio, a measure of risk, would increase from a somewhat manageable 68.5% to a far more dangerous 77%. But traders who deal in sovereign debt note that Spain's official debt-to-GDP ratio doesn't give an accurate picture of its risk. That's because it doesn't take into account the billions of euros of off-balance sheet debts, which are obligations that are implicitly guaranteed by the Spanish government. Add in those off-balance sheet items and the nation's debt-to-GDP ratio jumps from 68.5% to 87%, according to the Bank of Spain. Top it off with another 100 billion euros and the ratio jumps to around 96%.

    Of course this assumes that 100 billion euros will be enough to save Spain's banks. We truly won't know how much the banks need until Oliver Wyman and Roland Berger, the consulting firms, release their independent assessment of the mark-to-market values of Spanish bank assets, which is expected around the 21st of this month.

    Most analysts and traders are assuming that all developed properties will need to be reduced by a whopping 50%. But what is frightening is the value of the land being held by the banks. Hedge funds and vulture funds seeking to buy up distressed Spanish banking assets are offering 50 cents on the dollar for developed properties, but "wouldn't even offer two cents," for undeveloped land, according to a person with knowledge of the situation. Apparently a lot of the land being held by the banks is in remote areas of the country, like the landlocked province of Extremadura, which will probably not see much development anytime in the near future.

    So if the independent auditors end up marking all Spanish land to zero, the banks would collectively need 40 billion euros from the FROB, according to Credit Suisse. That leaves 260 billion euros of developed land to mark down. When you offset that against current provisions and inject enough cash to ensure every bank has a tier one capital ratio of 10% then you are nearly at 100 billion euros. If banks are required to hold more capital, then it easily exceeds the 100 billion euro mark. This also assumes that the capital and deposit flight that Spain has seen recently comes to a halt. If it continues, the equity values of the banks would fall, requiring them to request even more money from the FROB.

    This bailout is truly an exercise in absurdity. Instead of taking risk off Spain's shoulders, the EU is actually saddling the sovereign with even more debt. Once the market has a chance to study this deal in depth, it will continue to demand a prohibitively high premium to hold Spanish bonds. As such, this almost guarantees that Spain will continue to be totally dependent on the European Central Bank to buy its debt. Eventually this system will break down, forcing the Spanish government to seek a bailout of its own from the EU and the IMF. The austerity and humiliation that would go along with a sovereign bailout may be too much for Rajoy and the rest of his cohorts to stand.

    A more effective bailout would have been one where the EU collectively worked to lower Spain's bank and sovereign debt burden by assuming all or part of it. This would spread risk among all 17-members of the euro zone and would free Madrid to once again issue its own debt at a reasonable price point. But for now, this bailout will serve as yet-another stop-gap measure in this seemingly never ending crisis.