担心意大利的14个理由
增速放缓——当一个国家的主权债务/GDP比率超过90%时,经济增速会受到很大影响。我们预计市场将继续向意大利收取较高的偿债成本,中期内10年期收益率不可能较当前的6%水平有大幅下降。意大利GDP已连续三个季度负增长,过去十年的GDP年均增长率为2%。我们预计2012年和2013年的意大利GDP增速将分别低于国际货币基金组织(IMF)预测的-1.8%和-0.3%。 庞大的到期债务——意大利未来12个月的债务展期安排非常激进,2012年余下时间将到期的债务(本金+利息)相当于GDP的70%;相比之下,法国为49%,西班牙45%,德国23%。6月14日,意大利发售3年期、7年期和8年期国债,完成45亿欧元的发行上限。但3年期平均收益率为5.3%,显著高于5月14日的3.91%,1个月上涨36%!如果欧盟官员没有什么化解危机的“火箭炮”,我们预计年底前意大利仍需通过提高收益率的方式来完成国债发售。 大到不能倒?——以现有救助机制,这个问题的答案毫无疑问是“是”。如果考虑到意大利的债务余额以及来自欧洲央行(ECB)的新增2727亿欧元借款(还没有考虑困于主权债务敞口的意大利银行可能发出的救助请求),欧洲金融稳定基金(EFSF)的剩余资金约2000亿欧元和7月1日将生效的欧洲稳定机制(ESM)(假定,特别是德国国会6月29日能批准ESM)的5000亿欧元资金加起来仍不足以救助意大利,以及意大利违约对整个地区的影响。 [EFSF担保额度:德国29.07%;法国21.83%;意大利19.18%;西班牙12.75%] 财政整合——意大利迈向财政整合的道路远远谈不上明确有序。贝卢斯科尼政府的腐败和停滞不前是显而易见的,但马里奥•蒙蒂的技术官员政府内部的分歧也清晰可见。举例来说,蒙蒂曾向市场承诺要大幅削减财政,但所有这些迄今仍未获意大利国会批准。下面是一组令人心生希望的承诺。6月15日,意大利政府批准了一个800亿欧元的刺激经济增长方案,包括出售国有资产和压缩公共支出。 经济增速落后——采购经理人指数(PMI)调查是经济增长的一个主要领先指标。正如下面两张图所示,制造业和服务业的PMI都显著低于欧元区均值,而且制造业PMI已连续10个月、服务业PMI已连续12个月低于分水岭50。50上方为扩张,下方为萎缩。 |
Growth Slowing- When a country's sovereign debt load exceeds 90% of GDP, growth is dramatically impaired. We think the market will continue to punish Italy via higher servicing costs, and we do not expect the 10-year yield to dip materially below its current level of 6% over the intermediate term. Italy has already seen three consecutive quarters of negative GDP. Over the last 10 years on an annualized basis, GDP has averaged 2%. We see Italy undershooting IMF growth forecasts of -1.8% in 2012 and -0.3% in 2013. Debt Maturities High- Italy has an extremely aggressive debt schedule to roll over in the next 12 months. The remaining 2012 debt due (Principal + interest) = 70% of GDP. This compares to 49% for France; 45% for Spain; 23% for Germany in the remainder of 2012. On June 14th Italy sold its max target of €4.5 billion of 3-7-8 year bonds, however the 3-year averaged a yield of 5.3% vs 3.91% on May 14th, or a 36% premium in one month! We'd expect a similar trend of filling demand through higher yields into year-end should we not see any "bazooka" from Eurocrats. Too Big to Fail?- The answer to this question is unequivocally YES under the present bailout facilities. If we consider Italy's outstanding debt and tack on another €272.7 billion of borrowing from the ECB -- without even mentioning the potential bailout needs for Italian lenders crippled with sovereign holdings—it's apparent that the remaining funds of the EFSF (around €200 Billion) plus the €500 billion from the ESM that is expected to come online on July 1, 2012 (assuming, in particular that Germany's Parliament signs off on it on June 29th), is undercapitalized to handle an Italian bailout, and fallout across the region from the failure Italy. [EFSF guarantees: Germany 29.07%; France 21.83%; Italy 19.18%; Spain 12.75%] Fiscal Consolidation– Italy's path forward on fiscal consolidation has been anything but clear and orderly. The corruption and standstill of the Berlusconi government was obvious; yet the technocrat government of Mario Monti is also marked by disunion. For one, while Monti has promised the market big fiscal cuts, they've yet to all be ratified by the Italian Parliament. Below we present the web of promises. On June 15th the Italian government moved forward with a package worth €80 billion to spur economic growth, including selling states assets and reducing public spending. Underperforming Growth- A major leading indicator for growth is derived from PMI surveys. As the two charts below indicate, Manufacturing and Services PMIs are well under the Eurozone averages and have been under the 50 line that divides expansion (above) and contraction (below) for more than 10 and 12 straight months, respectively. |