担心意大利的14个理由

    消费信贷放缓——随着消费信用放缓，零售额依然保持韧性，特别是年初以来。在这方面，年均以来意大利的3月均值同比好于欧元区。我们将此归因于消费信贷的黏性以及储蓄消耗。

    失业压力——另一个严峻的问题是意大利年轻人的失业率高达39%，虽然仍低于西班牙年轻人50.2%的失业率，但如果将“迷惘的一代”与意大利人口老龄化（几乎是欧洲最年长的）这一人口结构不利因素叠加，未来一些年社会服务以及债务和赤字的压力沉重。

    滞涨——我们预计2012年下半年通胀将放缓，但美元疲软环境下能源价格高企，导致滞涨挥之不去（以及实际收益率为负）已成为全球很多地区的主题。

    过去两年，风险在欧元区边缘国家之间忽来忽往（停留时间最长的是希腊），并不是什么秘密，这被称为欧债危机和银行业危机。不过，当谈到“欧猪五国”中最大的经济体——意大利的救助需求时，事实上我们要讨论的是对欧洲大陆经济体和国际经济体的风险（冲击），由此不可避免地归结到一个问题：意大利大到不能倒？

    过去几年，我们看到欧盟官员在三驾马车的支持下每每为主权国家提供了救助：希腊、爱尔兰、葡萄牙以及如今的西班牙。不幸的是我们认为意大利可能大到没法救。简单说，我们相信中期唯一的出路是德国人反对的“发行欧元债券”，但德国人不愿承担意大利的信用风险，确实也无可厚非。

    毕竟，为何德国人要让意大利用他的信用卡?

    显然，欧洲已无路可退，因为成员国不太可能为救助机制拿出更多的资金（在这里，国际货币基金组织或许需要超越日常权责，承担起更大的责任）。但我们担心的以及市场可能还没有认识到的是世上没有什么“火箭炮”或万灵丹可以一劳永逸地消除欧洲的集体主权债务危机和银行业危机。当然，意大利的威胁会给欧洲的未来增加更多不确定性，所有这些预示着欧洲资本市场的下行风险尚未在市场定价中完全得到反映。

    接下来的两年会像过去两年一样吗？我们认为，答案是有保留的“是”，但做这样的预测可能失之草率，因为欧洲的走向几乎每天都在变。目前，意大利和欧洲其他国家的命运掌握在欧盟官员的手中。摊在桌上的主要议题包括：财政协议；泛欧存款保险；欧元债券；欧洲赎回基金（European Redemption Fund）；ESM（和EFSF）获得通过的条款；以及欧洲金融交易税。要商讨的议题一大堆；我们相信欧盟官员还是希望能掌控好欧元区的秩序的。

    译者：早稻米

    Consumer Credit Drying Up – As the pace of consumer credit has slowed, retail sales have still remained resilient, especially in the year-to-date period. Here Italy has shown a positive divergence over the Eurozone since the start of the year based on a 3-month average compared to the previous year. We chalk this up the sticky levels of consumer credit, and continued draining on savings.

    Unemployment Hooking - Another grave dynamic is the underemployment across Italian youths at 39%. While short of the 50.2% for Spanish youth, combine "a lost generation" with Italy's demographic headwinds of an aging population (near oldest in Europe) and you have a cocktail that puts great pressure on social services, and the debt and deficit loads in the years ahead.

    Square Stagflation - While we expect inflation to moderate into the back half of 2012, sticky stagflation (and negative real yields) has been a theme across much of the globe as energy prices remain elevated in the weak dollar environment.

    It's no great secret that risk has shifted quite precipitously from peripheral to peripheral over the course of the last two years (with the longest stay in Greece) in what has been called Europe's sovereign debt and banking crisis. However, when we discuss the bailout needs of Italy, the largest economy of the PIIGS, we're talking about risks (disruptions) to continental and global economies that inevitably lead one to the question: Is Italy too big to bail?

    Over the last years we've seen Eurocrats, under the support of Troika, coming to aid the sovereigns at every step: Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and now Spain. Unfortunately, we think Italy is far too large to rescue. In short, we believe the only way out over the intermediate term is the issuance of Eurobonds, a position the Germans are against, and rightfully so in our eyes for they do not wish to take on Italy's credit risk.

    After all, why would a German give an Italian use of his credit card carte blanche?

    Clearly, Europe's back is against a wall, as member countries are unlikely to post more capital upfront for bailout facilities (and here the IMF may have to take on a much larger role outside of its mandate). But what we fear, and the market may not understand, is that there is no "bazooka", no panacea, to cure Europe's collective sovereign and banking risks in one shot. Surely, the threat of an Italian default leads us down a road of even higher uncertainty on Europe's future, all of which portends that the downside in European capital markets is not fully priced in.

    Could the next two years look like the last two years? We think the answer could be a qualified yes, however making such calls is reckless given that the direction of Europe changes on a nearly daily basis. For now, the fate of Italy, along with the rest of Europe, will be wrapped in the hands of Eurocrats. The main topics on the table include: a Fiscal Compact; a Pan-European Deposit Insurance; Eurobonds; a European Redemption Fund; the terms of passage of the ESM (and EFSF); and a European Financial Transactions Tax. There's obviously a lot on the table; we do believe that Eurocrats wish to maintain the exiting Eurozone fabric.