夸大中国经济放缓要不得

    其次，而且更重要的是，中国有政策工具，而且已经开始使用——最近的降息（无疑标志着经济增长已取代通胀成为中国人民银行的首要担忧）最为明显。高盛（Goldman Sachs）投资管理部首席投资策略师哈继铭最近的研究报告指出，中国一些省级和地方政府已开始悄悄地试图稳定楼市。有些省份的银行已开始向首次购房者提供低于现行基准利率的购房贷款（过去，购房贷款利率往往较人民银行的基准利率上浮5%-10%）。而中央政府关注的是另一面，有迹象显示楼市，特别是在北京、上海以外的二三线城市开始有反弹迹象。

    中国的消费者仍然需要住房，也想买房——而且，关键是他们买得起。虽然宏观经济放缓，实际工资增长依然强劲，因此消费态势保持良好。这也是为何国际危机加深后，中国政府并不着急的原因之一。要知道2008-2009年，中国政府在全球金融危机第一阶段后的的确确急了。看到数以万计突然失业的农民工挤满了中国东部的火车站，准备坐火车回到贫穷的内陆省份，难免令人着急。中国政府疯狂地向经济注资，只为稳定经济，他们做到了，但后果是通胀上升，以及迄今为止仍然数量不明的坏账。这次，除了放松楼市调控，中国政府迄今采取的措施都只是小打小闹，提供节能家电销售补贴，削减一些特定商业税赋，监管机构加快审批投资计划等等，从这类微调可看不出北京着急了。

    更重要的一点是如有需要，北京可以采取更多举措。悲观分析认为，中国过去10年，特别是过去四年，所有政府推动的资本投资都已结束；这造成经济过热和过度投资重工业，令如今重工业深陷产能过剩。这造成了中国经济结构的失衡，消费/GDP比率仅为39%，即便对于发展中国家也处于历史低点。简而言之，中国的增长模式难以持续，如果不迅速转变为像美国那样的消费驱动型国家，前面就是无底的深渊。看着办吧。

    Second, and more important, China has policy options that it has begun to use -- the recent interest rate cut (signaling emphatically that growth has replaced inflation as the central bank's primary concern) being only the most obvious. Quietly, as a recent research note from Jiming Ha, chief investment strategist at Goldman Sachs' investment management division in China noted, provincial and local governments have begun to try to stabilize the housing sector. Banks in a variety of provinces are now offering mortgages to first time buyers that are available at a discount to the current benchmark rate (in the past they'd have to pay a 5%-10% premium over the PBOC's benchmark rate.) The central government is looking the other way, and there are signs that housing markets, particularly in second and third-tier cities outside Beijing and Shanghai, are now rebounding a bit.

    China's consumers still want and need housing -- and, critically, they can afford it. Real wage growth remains strong, despite the macro deceleration, and that in turn means consumption has held up pretty well. This is part of the reason the central government has not panicked in the wake of the growing global crisis. Believe me, in 2008 and 2009, the central government DID panic in the wake of the first phase of the global financial crisis. The site of tens of thousands of suddenly unemployed migrant workers clogging the trains stations in eastern China, headed home to much poorer interior provinces, tends to have that effect. Beijing dumped money furiously into the economy in order to stabilize it, succeeded in doing so, and then paid the consequences down the road in terms of higher inflation and a still unknown amount of bad loans. This time, the steps it is taking, in addition to loosening controls on housing sector, are so far all little tweaks -- subsidies for the sale of energy efficient appliances, some targeted business tax cuts, quicker approval of investment plans by regulators -- the small kind of stuff that doesn't bespeak panic.

    The more important point is that Beijing can do more if needed. Part of the bearish case on China is that all of the government driven capital investment that we saw in the last decade -- and in particular in the last four years -- is now over; it resulted in excessive growth overall and too much investment in heavy industries that are now plagued by over capacity. It's resulted in a disfigured economy, with consumption comprising only 39% of GDP, a historically low figure even for developing countries. Simply put, China's growth model is supposed to be dead, and if it doesn't shortly turn into a manic consumption driven clone of the United States, well, the abyss is right over there. Proceed accordingly.