戴尔私有化的钱从哪里来

    戴尔公司（Dell Inc.）的主要资产——约110亿美元现金——大都没有存放在美国国内。这就意味着，如果戴尔将这些钱转回美国，或是以此为抵押进行借款，将面临数十亿美元的税单。因此，大多数人认为，戴尔这些现金没什么用，既不能为可能的收购提供融资，也无助于戴尔支付收购后的账单。

    然而，戴尔或许有办法把手头的现金做抵押，以极低的成本借款，而无需为此缴税。而且，通过这样做，它实际上将使用这些现金为自身的收购提供融资。

    这个办法由咨询公司罗伯特•威伦斯（Robert Willens）的税务专家罗伯特•威伦斯提出（其中也有我乱出主意的功劳）。做法是不以这些现金本身为抵押，而是以持有这些现金的海外子公司的股份为抵押借款。

    威伦斯表示，美国公司在本国以海外子公司的股票作抵押进行借款无需缴税，只要作为抵押品的股票在子公司的投票权不高于三分之二。

    那么，戴尔如何能以其全部现金为抵押进行借贷？详解如下：

    成立子公司时，戴尔可采用高投票权与低投票权相结合的方式。一类股票，大概是高投票权的股票，拥有该子公司三分之二的投票权，但持有子公司所有现金。然后戴尔可以用这部分股票为抵押进行借款，从而实际上以自身离岸资金进行抵押借款，而不会收到美国政府开出的税单。

    如果戴尔公司拖欠贷款，贷款方可以获得抵押的股票，从而获得戴尔的离岸资金。一旦贷款方获得抵押的股票，美国政府将开出税单，但承担税费的将是戴尔，而不是贷款方。

    因此，贷款方将获得现金，而税费将归戴尔公司承担。然而，在这种情况下，戴尔应该已经陷入财务困难，甚至可能已经申请了破产保护。因此，该税费将与其贷款方无关——他们应该已经获得偿还——而美国政府将成为戴尔的众多债权人之一。

    不过，请注意，威伦斯——我也有略尽绵力——提出的这一粗略方法可以说是纸上谈兵。他并没有说它一定能奏效。我们俩其实想说的是，上述策略或是类似的办法或许能解释，为什么很多贷款人显然巴不得以低价向看来风险颇高的戴尔收购案提供融资。

    这样的策略有许多潜在的法律陷阱，但管它呢。或许有人想出了办法，能让戴尔公司将其未向美国政府缴税的离岸资金转入美国，而无需向美国国税局支付高达35%的税费。若果真如此，那可比公司创始人迈克尔•戴尔最近的把戏有看头多了。让我们拭目以待吧。（财富中文网）

    译者：项航

    Dell Inc. has its major asset—about $11 billion of cash—located primarily outside the United States. That means that it would face a multi-billion-dollar tax bill if it repatriated the money or borrowed against it. Therefore, most people have assumed that Dell's cash is essentially useless when it comes to funding a possible buyout, or helping Dell (DELL) pay its post-buyout bills.

    However, there may be a way for Dell to borrow ultra-cheaply against its foreign cash without a tax bill. And, by doing so, it effectively would be using the cash to fund its buyout.

    The idea, suggested by tax expert Robert Willens of Robert Willens, LLC (with a bit of kibitzing from me) involves borrowing not against the cash itself, but borrowing against the stock of the foreign subsidiary that holds the cash.

    Willens says that a U.S. company can borrow in the U.S. against its overseas assets without tax consequences by pledging the stock of its foreign subsidiaries, provided that no more than two-thirds of the subsidiaries' voting power is posted as collateral.

    So how would that let Dell borrow against all its cash? Watch:

    Dell could use a high-vote, low-vote structure to set up the subsidiary. One class of stock, presumably the high-voting class, would have two-thirds of the subsidiary's voting power, but would hold all the subsidiary's cash. Dell then could borrow against that stock, effectively pledging its offshore cash without triggering a U.S. tax bill.

    If Dell defaults on its loan, the lenders could seize the pledged stock, and thus get their hands on the cash. Having the stock seized by lenders would trigger U.S. tax consequences—but the consequences would be for Dell, not for the foreclosing lenders.

    So the lenders would get the cash and Dell would incur a U.S. tax liability. However, in that case Dell would already be in financial difficulty, perhaps even in Chapter 11. Therefore, that liability wouldn't matter to its lenders -- who already would have been repaid -- and would make the U.S. government one of Dell's many creditors.

    Please note that Willens, with a little help from me, has roughed this out on the back of an envelope, so to speak. He's not saying that this would work. What he and I are saying is that this strategy or something similar might be the hidden factor explaining why so many lenders are apparently eager to provide cheap financing to a high-risk-seeming Dell buyout.

    There are many potential legal pitfalls for such a strategy, but what the Dell? Maybe someone has figured out how the Dells of the world can effectively bring their offshore, untaxed U.S. cash into the country without forking over 35% to the IRS. If that's the case, that's going to be a lot bigger story than Michael Dell's latest shenanigans. Stay tuned.