欧洲救援行动又搞砸了

    所有这些因素在塞浦路斯导演了一出大戏。

    官方债权人对自己的整体资金贡献加以限制【100亿欧元（807亿元人民币）】，对做出巨大让步的条款则避而不谈。他们坚持说剩余资金【80亿欧元（645.6亿元人民币）】应由塞浦路斯和PSI共同承担。在官方债权人看来，塞浦路斯是一个不够严谨的离岸银行业中心，他们同时希望改变这种局面。

    塞浦路斯方面认为，短期内自己所能办到的事项有限。它同意采用PSI，但发现参与者人数不足（包括次级债券持有人）。

    塞浦路斯和欧洲官员选择了一个折中办法，那就是对银行存款征税，包括此前获得担保的存款。这种做法史无前例，它把小额存款人和外国大储户一网打尽，引发了全国性的强烈抗议，险些造成政局失控和社会动荡。这种做法还动摇了神圣的存款保险制度，可能在国际上产生不利影响，因此遭到了广泛谴责。

    目前，塞浦路斯和欧洲官员只好重头再来，设法提出一些更有条理的方案。与此同时，民众投向他们的目光变得越来越缺乏信任，他们所能使用的手段也太少，难以实现多重目标。

    预计他们将对周六所提方案中最不能让人接受的部分进行调整，但他们不会解决根本矛盾，而正是这种根本矛盾从一开始就削弱了欧洲应对政策的作用。这些矛盾基本上无人理睬，它们仍然在缓慢地蚕食着欧洲一体化进程在经济、金融、政治和社会一体化方面所取得的成果。

    理想情况下，塞浦路斯援助方案能让欧洲官员向着化解本地区危机所需要的战略决策更进一步。但包括德国和欧洲央行在内，实力最强的国家和机构似乎并不准备提出最重要的战略建议——他们要么以更小、而且更不完美的欧元区为目标，要么同意为实力较弱的欧元区成员提供远远超过以往水平的永久性补贴。

    欧洲官员很可能再次选择临时性战术折中措施。虽然他们的目的是改善当前的混乱局面，但如果出现经济停滞、政府失灵、政策工具不足以及失去民众信任的困难情形，他们还是得执行战略决策，而当初的折中就会让这最终的执行变得更加复杂。

    穆罕默德•埃尔埃利安是投资公司太平洋投资管理公司首席执行官兼联合首席投资官，还是美国全球发展委员会的负责人。（财富中文网)

    译者：Charlie

    These factors played out dramatically in Cyprus.

    Official creditors imposed an overall limit on their financial contributions (EUR 10 billion) and shied away from highly concessional terms. They insisted that the residual (EUR 8 billion) should be covered through a combination of Cypriot efforts and PSI. They also wished to change what they perceived as Cyprus's standing as a lax offshore banking center.

    Cyprus felt constrained in what it could deliver in the short term. It agreed to PSI but found that there were not enough of the usual suspects (including junior bond holders).

    Cypriot and European officials opted to reconcile all this through the use of a levy on all bank accounts, including those previously covered by deposit guarantees. This unprecedented step, which impacted small savers as well as large foreign deposit holders, provoked a massive national outcry -- risking political disorder and social unrest. It is also attracted widespread condemnation as it risks adverse international spillover effects by undermining the sanctity of deposit insurance schemes.

    Officials have now been forced to go back to the drawing board in an attempt to come up with something more coherent. They do so under the glare of an increasingly mistrusting population, and with too few instruments to meet the multiple objectives.

    Look for them to tweak the most outrageous aspects of Saturday's Cyprus package. But do not expect them to resolve the underlying inconsistencies that have undermined the European policy response from day one. Left largely unattended, these inconsistencies continue to slowly eat away at the economic, financial, political, and social integrity of the European integration project.

    In a perfect world, the bundled Cyprus rescue would bring European officials closer to making the strategic decisions needed to get ahead of the region's crisis. But the strongest players, including Germany and the ECB, do not seem in a position as yet to make the biggest strategic call of all -- either target a smaller and less imperfect eurozone, or agree to a very substantially larger and more permanent subsidization of the weaker members of the union.

    European officials are likely to again opt for temporary tactical compromises. Yet in seeking fewer disruptions upfront, they end up complicating the implementation of the strategic decisions that will ultimately be forced on them by the painful logic of economic stagnation, political dysfunction, insufficient policy instruments, and a mistrusting population.

    Mohamed El-Erian is the CEO and co-chief investment officer of PIMCO. He also heads the U.S. global development council.