会计大师推出新盈利能力指标：COROA

    COROA是最重要的指标，它代表经营现金流占总资产的百分比。对切谢尔斯基来说，COROA是衡量公司纯粹盈利能力的最佳标尺。如果这个数字已经在一段时间内保持较高水平，而且要么保持在高点，要么继续上升，它就能充分证明这家公司的新投资带来了高额回报——这正是巴菲特要寻找的特质。

    我们不妨用COROA来检验一下一家备受推崇的综合性工业企业表现如何。切谢尔斯基把这种分析方法用于航天及控制系统制造商霍尼韦尔（Honeywell），并对这家公司最近公布的年报以及此前几年的财务报表进行了挖掘。他发现，2013年霍尼韦尔的COROA为10.8%，在这12个月中，它的平均资产规模为528亿美元，经营现金流为59亿美元。这个水平稍低于霍尼韦尔所在组别的平均现金流量创造水平，这个组的其他成员包括雷神公司（Raytheon）、联合技术公司（United Technologies）和通用动力公司（General Dynamics）。

    然而，要注意的一个重点是，2013年霍尼韦尔的COROA得到了改善，充分表明这家公司的新投资非常赚钱。在这个指标上升的同时，霍尼韦尔又进行了新的大规模投资，结果使它的资产规模在2011-2013年间上升了11%，或者说增长了50亿美元。在此期间，霍尼韦尔的经营现金流猛增了21亿美元，提升幅度为55%。这并不是说霍尼韦尔的全部新增现金流都来自新投入资产的这50亿美元。显然，这家公司在管理现有库存、研究设施和工厂以及在其中工作的员工方面一定做得极好，而后者的规模要大大超过50亿美元。不过，经营现金流的迅猛增长远远超过了资产的适度上升，表明霍尼韦尔的新投资带来了极为丰厚的利润——这同样是巴菲特考察的内容。

    切谢尔斯基甚至进行了更深入的探索，详细揭示了霍尼韦尔对高收益业务进行投资的情况。他的分析以这家公司对每年9.5亿美元资本的支出情况为基础。如果将资本支出主要用于高收益业务，经营者就算尽到了责任。如果他们对收益低于平均水平的业务给予过多支持，他们就是在浪费资金。

    正如整体数据所证明的那样，霍尼韦尔在这方面表现合格。这家公司经营着四大业务：自动化和控制、航天、特性材料和交通运输系统。航天和交通运输业务的COROA都是28%，特性材料以24%的水平屈居第三。三者的COROA都很高。自动化和控制业务的COROA为14%，排在末尾。看来，首席执行官大卫•科特把资金用对了地方。他把12%的资本支出用于交通运输，而这项业务只占总资产的5.8%，但它的涡轮增压器部门正在高速增长。显然，科特认为特性材料业务前途光明。这项业务制造计算机芯片材料并设计石油冶炼工艺，占用了17%的资产，而且获得了几乎一半的资本支出。与之相对，自动化业务占霍尼韦尔资产的一半以上，得到的资本支出也是17%，反映了自动化业务较低的盈利能力。

    这样的策略意味着交通运输和材料是重点增长领域——和自动化与控制业务相比，它们将变得更加重要。航天业务则应保持目前的发展速度，原因是它在资本支出和资产中的占比相同。

    切谢尔斯基对所有这些信息的来源爱不释手，而唯一能接触到这个信息源头的渠道就是公司年报。他说，这些财务文件包罗万象，必须读一读，“它们会告诉你所有信息，而不仅是管理层希望你看到的那些信息。不要被年报吓到。你一定能把它拿下！”（财富中文网）

    译者：Charlie

    The paramount metric is COROA, the operating cash flow as a percentage of total assets. For Ciesielski, that's the best measure of pure profitability. If the number has been high for a while, and is either staying high or improving, evidence is strong that the company is generating strong returns from its new investments. That's the quality that Buffett looks for.

    Let's examine how one highly respected industrial conglomerate is performing, measured by COROA. Ciesielski applied his analysis to aerospace and controls manufacturer Honeywell Inc. (HON) by mining its recently released 10K, as well as reports from past years. He finds that Honeywell earned a 10.8% COROA in 2013, or $5.9 billion in operating cash flow on $52.8 billion in average assets over the twelve months. That's a tad lower than the average cash generation ratio posted in its peer group, which includes Raytheon (RTN), United Technologies (UTX), and General Dynamics (GD).

    But it's important to note that Honeywell's number improved in 2013, strongly implying that its new investments are highly profitable. And it gained while Honeywell made major new investments that raised its assets by 11% from 2011 to 2013, or $5 billion. In that period, its operating cash flow rose by a remarkable $2.1 billion, or 55%. That doesn't mean that Honeywell earned all of that increase on the new $5 billion in outlays on assets. It clearly must have managed its existing, and far larger, stock of inventories, research facilities and plants, and the workforce that runs them, extremely well. But the fat increase in operating cash flow compared to the far more modest rise in assets suggests that its new investments are highly lucrative -- once again the Buffett test.

    Ciesielski probes even deeper, revealing in detail how Honeywell is investing in its highest-yielding businesses. The analysis is based on where Honeywell is putting its $950 million in annual capital expenditures. If capex is going mainly to the highest-yielding businesses, then managers are doing their job. If they're excessively supporting subpar businesses, management is wasting capital.

    As the overall numbers prove, Honeywell passes the test. It operates four major divisions: automation and control, Aerospace, performance materials and technologies, and transportation systems. Aerospace and transportation provide COROAs of 28% each, while performance materials is a close third at 24%. Those are all big numbers. Automation and control trails at 14%. It appears that CEO David Cote is investing in the right places. He's putting 12% of capex into transportation, which represents only 5.8% of total assets, but includes the fast-growing turbocharger business. He clearly sees performance materials as a comer: The unit that makes materials for computer chips and designs technologies for petroleum refining deploys 17% of the assets and gets almost half of all capex. By contrast, automation comprises over half the assets, and receives 17% of capex, reflecting its relatively modest profitability.

    That strategy means transportation and materials are the big growth areas -- they will rise in importance relative to automation and controls. The aerospace business should keep its current footprint, since it absorbs the same proportion of capex that it employs in assets.

    Ciesielski loves the source of all this information, and the only place it's available: companies' 10K filings. These documents' encyclopedic nature, he says, makes them essential reading. "They give you all the information, not just what management would like you to see," he says. "Don't be intimidated by 10Ks. You can do this!"