私募公司退出正当时

    私募-私募式退出

    全部私募公司退出交易中，企业收购所占百分比当前处于10年来最低水平，而二次收购（即私募公司互售所持公司）则处于历史高点。从2011年到2013年，在全部私募公司退出交易中有41%是二次收购；而在2005-2007年的好年份，只有36%的退出是从一家基金转至另一家基金。2014年第一季度的初步数据显示，在全部私募公司退出交易中有约45%来自二次收购。随着私募所投资公司的IPO处于历史低位（去年占全部IPO的25%，2005年为40%），二次收购可能会成为定例，而非例外。

    当初私募行业建立的基本前提是，你可以购买一个家族企业，背上一些债务，然后将这家企业打理得更好、增长更快、估值更低，直到它对买家产生足够的吸引力，甘愿为它付出一个好价钱。然后，私募基金就可以向投资者提供不错的回报。但最近，私募股权行业开始看起来更像风投市场，即在新一轮融资中，新进基金会标高一家公司的估值，让原始投资者受益。大家只要看看最近的Genstar交易就能明白。Genstar以9.30亿美元向Thoma Bravo出售组合公司TravelClick，市盈率近16倍。我想像这是Genstar投资者的大胜利，但Thoma Bravo的有限合伙人一定会想在Genstar持有7年后，还会给他们留下些什么？而同时投资这两只基金的有限合伙人们又会怎么想？

    过去一年，私募股权基金尽一切可能在债务派对结束前向投资者派发股息。一个例子就是BMC Software最近向投资者派息7.50亿美元，也就是在原始收购完成7个月后回报了50%的股本权益。很多基金都选择资本重组，继续持有投资组合公司，而不是以他们认为过低的价格出售。虽然在经济衰退后的几年复苏时间里，这样的流动性感觉尚可，但基金们持续地买新不卖旧行为已经导致投资组合公司的数量越来越多。最终，它们必须卖出这些公司。

    过去六年多，私募股权公司持有的很多公司状况并不好。这些公司没有买家。为什么？或许是因为它们所处的行业不被看好。或许是受到经济衰退的冲击，而借款人不愿重新协商。或许是曾经受到经济衰退的冲击，如今有所恢复，但尚不足以给股权持有人创造任何价值。在这种情况下，大家抱着的是一种虚假的希望，希望“明年会好”。我认识的大多数私募股权经理人都是天生乐观的人，他们很难会放弃。

    那么，这些投资组合中的好公司呢？这些公司为什么不卖？哦，它们必须“补贴”那些差公司，直到私募股权基金能产生附带利益。要知道，很多这些基金都必须先为有限合伙人实现8%的复合回报率，然后才能分享利润（附带利益）。因此，这些老基金需要将好公司持有稍微长一点的时间，弥补差公司的亏空。

    另外还有一点，出售一家公司，意味着收取的管理和监督费用将减少，这会缩减基金收入，增加成本压力。因此，现有的僵尸基金除非不得已，出售意愿极低。

    有很多私募持有的公司必须在未来几年内出售，但即便退出量大幅增长，超过历史水平，即便不算上每年几千宗收购，当前的投资组合公司可能也需要花上10年时间来消化。别指望IPO市场或企业买家会在这个过程中一马当先。随着今年所有新资金涌回私募股权融资，同时基金募集的资金池规模越来越大，私募股权基金将加速资产互换速度，但这些资产的持有人依然是有限合伙人们。（财富中文网）

    本文德文•马修斯是Chicago Growth Partners的管理合伙人。

    译者：早稻米

    The rise of PE-to-PE exits

    Corporate acquisitions as a percentage of all private equity-owned company exits are at the lowest levels in a decade, while secondary buyouts (in which private equity firms sell companies to each other) are at an all-time high. From 2011 through 2013, 41% of all PE company exits were secondary buyouts, while in the boom years of 2005 through 2007, just 36% were passed from one fund to the next. Preliminary data from the first quarter of 2014 show about 45% of all PE exits coming from secondary buyouts. And with PE-backed company IPOs at historically low levels -- they accounted for 25% of all IPOs last year, compared to 40% in 2005 -- secondary buyouts will likely become the rule rather than the exception.

    The PE industry was built on the premise that you could buy a family-owned business, sprinkle in a little debt, and then run it better, faster, and cheaper until it was attractive enough to a buyer, who would pay a nice price for it. The PE fund could then deliver a solid return to its investors. Lately, though, the PE industry is starting to look more like the venture capital market, where a new fund marks up a company's valuation to benefit the original investors in a new financing round. All you need to do is look at Genstar's recent sale of portfolio company TravelClick to Thoma Bravo for $930 million, at nearly 16 times its earnings. I imagine this is a great win for Genstar's investors, but Thoma Bravo's limited partners must be wondering what's left for them to do after seven years under Genstar's ownership. And what are the LPs who are invested in both funds thinking?

    In the last year, PE funds are recapitalizing everything that's not nailed down to pay dividends to their investors before the debt party stops. BMC Software's recent $750 million dividend to its investors, paying off 50% of the equity just seven months after the original acquisition closed, is a case in point. Lots of funds are choosing to recapitalize and hold instead of selling companies at a price they deem too low. While this liquidity feels really good after years of recession-era wound licking, funds are piling up the portfolio companies as they keep old ones and buy new ones. But they will eventually have to sell these companies.

    Many companies held by PE firms for more than six years aren't doing well. There are no buyers for them. Why? Maybe they are in an industry that is out of favor. Maybe the downturn hit them and the lenders won't renegotiate. Or maybe the downturn hit them and they have come back by some measure, but not enough to create any value to the equity holders. In this case, you're holding onto the false hope that "next year is going to be the year." Most PE executives that I know are naturally optimistic and it's really hard for them to capitulate.

    But what about the good companies in these portfolios? Why not sell those? Well, they have to "make up" for the losers before the PE fund can generate carried interest. And remember that many of these funds have to achieve a compounded 8% return to their LPs before they get to share in the profits (their carried interest). So the winners get held a little longer in these old funds to make up for the losers.

    And don't forget, when you sell a company, you lose the management and monitoring fees you were charging, so it hurts your fund's revenue and puts pressure on costs. So, at the zombie funds out there, the incentives to sell before you absolutely have to are low.

    There are a lot of PE-owned companies that must be sold in the next few years, but even if exit volumes increase dramatically beyond historical levels, it could take 10 years for the current crop of companies to liquidate, not even counting the thousands of buyouts that close each year. Don't expect the IPO market or corporate buyers to lead the parade. With all the new money pouring back into private equity fundraising this year and with funds raising increasingly larger pools of capital, PE funds will accelerate their pace of asset swapping and the LPs will be left holding the assets.

    Devin Mathews is a managing partner at Chicago Growth Partners.