市值飙升1.8万倍：巴菲特掌控伯克希尔的这50年是如何做到的？

    巴菲特称，伯克希尔市值涨幅的特点是，其“基本等于”这50年来该公司内在价值的涨幅。可惜，尽管投资者十分好奇，但上述表态并未真正打破巴菲特拒绝泄漏其对内在价值估算的传统。但由于伯克希尔的市价已巨幅增长，巴菲特的说法确实证明，该公司的内在价值同样已经大大提高。股市对此表示赞同：目前，伯克希尔的市值约3670亿美元，是美国市值第三高的企业，仅次于苹果（市值高达7700亿美元）和埃克森美孚（市值略低于3800亿美元）。

    现在，我们将注意力从高得惊人的50年总涨幅，转向巴菲特所说的“表现不错”的2014年。伯克希尔的收入在2014年上涨了6.9％，不过，同期每股收益仅上涨了2％，至1.2092万美元（最近，该公司A类股的股价在每股22.3万美元左右徘徊）。不过，当巴菲特称2014年并不完美时，他所指的肯定不是每股收益涨幅较低这一问题。巴菲特一直认为，每股收益与伯克希尔的业绩毫无相关性，因为每股收益不包含未实现的资本损益，而账面价值则包括资本损益。

    巴菲特2014年最不满意的，是伯克希尔旗下最大的非保险公司——伯灵顿北方圣达菲铁路。没错，该公司的收益略有增长。但铁路运营困难重重，导致谷物、煤炭和化肥出货延误，巴菲特称“令许多顾客失望不已”。巴菲特在回顾伯灵顿北方圣达菲铁路的问题时，流露出责备之意，这在其年度报告中很少见。他还用斜体字写道，伯灵顿北方圣达菲铁路必须“不惜一切代价”恢复一流服务。“一切代价”将包括目前正在进行的创纪录的资本支出。

    尽管存在一定问题，但被巴菲特称为伯克希尔公司非保险业务“五大引擎”的伯灵顿北方圣达菲铁路、伯克希尔-哈撒韦能源、模具制造商伊斯卡公司、化工企业路博润以及制造业巨头Marmon，税前利润增长了近15％。年报中给出了伯灵顿北方圣达菲铁路以及伯克希尔-哈撒韦能源的完整收益情况，两者的税前收益攀升了11％，但其他几家公司的利润，出于竞争方面的原因，都未披露。

    在伯克希尔的保险业务方面，“备用款”，即打算届时用于支付理赔款和开支但其间可用于其他用途的保险费，规模不断攀升，从2013年年底的770亿美元，增至840亿美元。一年前，巴菲特曾预测，备用款金额不可能持续攀升，如今看来，这一预测是错误的。巴菲特当时提出的理由是，伯克希尔账上某些再保险合同“流”，将使得“备用款”规模减小。在某种程度上，上述看法是对的，但伯克希尔其它的保险业务弥补了差额。巴菲特很高兴自己判断错了。

    备用款增加、伯克希尔旗下公司业务全面繁荣，加之没有出现巴菲特所说的“重量级”收购，截止2014年年底，伯克希尔坐拥630亿美元现金（就在一年前，该数字为480亿美元）。巴菲特将未能收购大型企业视为失败。不过，伯克希尔持有巨额现金，总归没有太大的坏处。

    在50周年报告中，巴菲特本人也谈到了现金的重要性，他写道：“在一家健康的企业里，现金有时被认为应当最小化，被视为可能拖累股本回报等数据的非生产性资产。然而，现金之于企业，就好比氧气之于个人：平时被人忘在脑后，一旦少了它，满脑子想的都是它。”

    2014年，巴菲特动用了伯克希尔的一些“氧气”，以增加对IBM的投资，IBM是伯克希尔重仓持有的企业之一。巴菲特拿出15亿美元，投资IBM股票，将伯克希尔对IBM的总投资额推高至132亿美元。其买入价几乎与伯克希尔的现有每股成本（170美元）持平。尽管如此，正如媒体所指出的那样，巴菲特对IBM的这笔投资目前处于亏损状态。日前，IBM股票报收于162美元。

    2014年，伯克希尔最大一笔新投资是迪尔公司，伯克希尔的年报显示，对迪尔公司的投资将近13亿美元。截至去年年底，迪尔公司的股票给伯克希尔带来了薄利。

    有一个人肯定对上述投资感到高兴，那就是沃伦•巴菲特之子——伯克希尔董事霍华德•巴菲特。霍华德从事农耕，是迪尔公司农用设备的忠实粉丝。霍华德（亲友们称他为“豪伊”）也是巴菲特心中伯克希尔下任董事长的候选人之一。当然，霍华德不能直接顶替其父亲的职位；待到巴菲特隐退，将由董事会决定其接替者。但是，无论如何，届时董事长一职将完全成为非行政职务。也就是说，没人能像如今的巴菲特这样，同时担任董事长和首席执行官。

    谁将接替巴菲特担任首席执行官一职，如今尚无定论（主要原因在于，巴菲特还完全没有退隐之意）。即便如此，伯克希尔公司的50年报告中，还是详细描述了巴菲特认为其接替者应该是怎样的人。巴菲特称，首席执行官的主要工作，在于配置资本、挑选并留住手下的经理人。巴菲特表示，上述职责要求首席执行官“理性、冷静、果断，对业务有着全面了解，并对人类行为有着深刻见解”。

    显然，上述描述简直就是巴菲特的“自画像”。作为巴菲特多年的老友，我能证明他本人完全符合上述描述。

    不过，我要补充说明一点：假如打桥牌时他的搭档（比如在下）犯了低级错误，他可一点都不冷静。（财富中文网）

    本文作者Carol Loomis曾是《财富》杂志资深自由编辑，去年从《财富》退休。

    译者：Hunter

    审稿：李翔

    A characteristic of that rise, Buffett says, is that it is “roughly equal” to the 50-year rise of Berkshire’s intrinsic value. Unfortunately for the curiosity of investors, that declaration doesn’t exactly undo Buffett’s longstanding refusal to divulge his estimates of intrinsic value. But since Berkshire’s market price has unquestionably grown enormously, his statement does certify that intrinsic value has done likewise. The stock market agrees: It currently accords Berkshire a market cap of about $367 billion, third-highest in the U.S., after Apple (at a commanding $770 billion) and Exxon (at just under $380 billion).

    And now switch your mind from the gigantic figures of the 50-year panorama to what Buffett called the “good year” of 2014. Berkshire’s revenues for the year were up 6.9%; its earnings per share, though, rose by only 2%, to $12,092 (against Class A shares that have recently been hovering above $223,000). Even so, that small rise in earnings certainly wasn’t what Buffett had in mind when he said 2014 had its problems. He has always rejected earnings-per-share as having any relevance to Berkshire’s results, since they do not include unrealized capital gains and losses, which book value does include.

    The core of Buffett’s dissatisfactions in 2014 was Berkshire’s biggest non-insurance company, railroad BNSF. It managed, yes, to increase earnings by a bit. But BNSF ran into countless operating difficulties that delayed grain, coal, and fertilizer shipments and, says Buffett, “disappointed many of its customers.” Buffett’s review of BNSF’s problems had a scolding tone, unusual for his annual report. He also resorted to italics to declare that BNSF must do “whatever it takes” to restore top-grade service. “Whatever it takes” will include record capital expenditures, now underway. (For more on BNSF, click here.)

    Despite BNSF’s troubles, what Buffett calls Berkshire’s non-insurance “Powerhouse Five”—the railroad, Berkshire Hathaway Energy (BHE), toolmaker Iscar, chemical company Lubrizol, and manufacturing conglomerate Marmon—raised their pretax profits by nearly 15%. A complete earnings picture for BNSF and BHE is given in the annual report—their combined pretax earnings climbed by 11%—but the profits of the other companies are not, for competitive reasons, disclosed.

    On the insurance side of Berkshire, “float”—insurance premiums intended to in time cover claims and expenses, but that in the interim are usable for other purposes—kept climbing, from $77 billion at the end of 2013 to $84 billion. That leaves Buffett wrong in his prediction a year ago that continuing gains in float were unlikely; he reasoned then that float would be diminished by certain “run-off” reinsurance contracts that Berkshire had on its books. He was right to an extent, but other parts of Berkshire’s insurance businesses picked up the slack. Buffett is happy to have been wrong.

    The gains in float, Berkshire’s general prosperity, and the non-appearance of what Buffett sometimes calls an “elephant” acquisition left the company holding $63 billion in cash at the end of the year (up from $48 billion a year earlier). Buffett would class his failure to bag an elephant as just that, a failure. Still, it is hard to think of Berkshire’s huge holdings of cash as disastrous.

    Buffett himself speaks of the importance of cash in the 50-year report, writing, “At a healthy business, cash is sometimes thought of as something to be minimized—as an unproductive asset that acts as a drag of such markers as return on equity. Cash, though, is to a business as oxygen is to an individual: never thought about when it is present, the only thing in mind when it is absent.”

    In 2014, Buffett used some of Berkshire’s “oxygen” to increase its investment in one of its big holdings, IBM. He put an additional $1.5 billion into the stock, raising Berkshire’s total IBM investment to $13.2 billion. He also bought at prices that left Berkshire’s existing cost-per-share, $170, virtually unchanged. Still, his investment in IBM has so far left him in the hole—as the media has wasted no time pointing out. Yesterday, IBM closed at $162.

    Berkshire’s biggest new investment in 2014 was Deere & Co., in which Berkshire’s annual report shows the company to have put nearly $1.3 billion. By year-end, Berkshire had accumulated a small profit in the stock.

    One person sure to be pleased by the Deere investment is Warren Buffett’s son, Berkshire director Howard Buffett, who is a working farmer and a big admirer of Deere’s farm equipment. Howard (known to family and friends as “Howie”) is also his father’s candidate to become the next chairman of Berkshire when Warren can no longer fill the job. That doesn’t make Howard’s ascension automatic; the board of directors will decide who gets the job. But the chairmanship will then, in any event, strictly be a non-executive position. That is, one person will not be chairman and CEO, as Warren Buffett is today.

    The question of who will follow Buffett as CEO remains uncertain (if, for no other reason, because this is not a man even remotely thinking about leaving). Even so, Berkshire’s new 50-year report has a fascinating description of what kind of person Buffett thinks should succeed him. Describing the CEO’s job as primarily one of capital allocation and the selection and retention of managers beneath him, Buffett says these duties also require the CEO “to be a rational, calm and decisive individual who has a broad understanding of business and good insights into human behavior.”

    Obviously, this is Buffett doing a verbal “selfie.” As a long-time friend of his, I can testify that he fits that description.

    I will qualify that just a bit: If his bridge partner—I’ve been there—makes a really ridiculous mistake, he has been known to abandon his calm.

    Until she retired from Fortune last year, Carol Loomis was a senior editor-at-large on the magazine’s staff.