公投拒绝援助，希腊最后一次提高赌注

    希腊断然拒绝债权人最新提出的有条件援助，这本在意料之中：众所周知，到目前为止紧缩政策并不奏效，而且还带来了严重的社会问题；欧洲债权人上周的行为可能弊大于利；国际货币基金组织进行债务重组的强烈建议必然会提升希腊政府的地位；而现在也许可以看出，在任何与破产有关的谈判中，一旦人们意识到债务规模过大，谈判的天平就真的有可能向债务人倾斜。

    不过，公投的结果——61.3%反对接受新的紧缩和改革措施，38.7%的人表示接受——这确实让人深感意外。此前的民意调查显示支持票和反对票将非常接近。大多数外部人士都按非希腊人的思路来定义本次公投的意义所在，也就是是否放弃欧元。与之相反，希腊人似乎更相信他们的总理阿莱克斯•齐普拉斯宣扬的版本，那就是把公投作为谈判战术，目的是向欧元区施压，迫使后者减免希腊的债务。尽管一系列数据能清楚反映出本届希腊政府上台后的局势变化，但齐普拉斯似乎已成功地把目前的问题归咎于“外国人”。说到底，由于支持和反对派差距明显，追究细枝末节已经毫无意义。现实就是，希腊人已经受够了，他们非常希望出现实质性变化，因此不惜豪赌一场。

    可惜的是，他们不太可能看到自己希望的变化，即大举重组债务的同时还不丧失印制和使用欧元的权力。他们甚至不太可能看到一个大胆的、现代化的政府在新货币的帮助下带领希腊走进新时代，也就是所谓的次优方案。欧元区其他国家和希腊处于极为对立的状态，这让希腊被迫退出欧元区成为眼下最有可能出现的情况。相反，现在接受希腊的要求只能表明对欧元区来说希腊已成尾大不掉之势，这将对欧元区的长期信誉产生巨大危害。

    希腊的欧元现金已基本耗尽，除非欧央行放松信贷条件，否则希腊银行业将无法满足储户逾1200亿欧元的提款需求，这一点显而易见。希腊财政部长雅尼斯·瓦鲁法基斯对英国《每日电讯报》表示：“如有必要，我们将发行平行货币，并通过电子方式像加州政府那样打欠条。一周前我们就应该这样做。”（对瓦鲁法基斯持批评态度的人将指出，公投结束前希腊方面从未表达过此类意愿。）

    2009年（雷曼兄弟倒闭使市场陷入冬眠后），加州政府曾为弥补预算赤字打过欠条。这种情况2012年又出现了一次。希腊政府显然已经破产，基于它的承诺来发放短期贷款，可能不会令身为银行业监管机构的欧洲央行感冒。欧洲央行绝对有权要求希腊银行业偿还用政府抵押品取得的890亿欧元紧急贷款，只是保持金融稳定的责任使欧央行不能这样做。

    和以前一样，如果没有明确的政治保障，欧央行就不太可能令自己涉足于危机之中。为此，它需要等欧元区其他国家的财政部长在7月7日做出决定（德国总理安吉拉·默克尔和法国总统弗朗索瓦·奥朗德将于7月6日会面，为7日的财长会议奠定基调）。默克尔在政界身经百战，目前德国国内给她施加了很大压力，要求对希腊放任自流，令其自谋生路，而西班牙和爱尔兰等国家的政府也坚决反对接受为期三年的紧缩方案，以免让自己显得逆来顺受。至于欧元区是否愿意让欧央行触发危机，则取决于他们认为这样做将给自己带来多大的伤害。新建立的防火墙机制是否足以防止危机扩散？他们做的工作是否足以避免自己首先遭到外界质疑？

    上周的情况似乎一直是希腊在虚张声势。周日的公投结果令人吃惊，这是希腊人在最后一刻下注，从而使希腊政府能在最后摊牌前提高赌注。但欧元区手里的牌仍然更好一些，筹码也更大。除非完全丧失信心，否则这场牌局仍然只会有一种结果。最大的问题在于，如果希腊退出欧元区，德国等国家愿意为前者的政治稳定付出多少努力。（财富中文网）

    译者：Charlie

    校对：詹妮

    It ought to be no surprise that Greece has have voted so emphatically against its creditors’ latest word on conditional aid: the failure of the policy so far, and the social disaster it has caused, are well known; the behavior of the European creditors in the last week probably hindered their cause more than helped it; the IMF’s strong call for debt restructuring certainly bolstered the government’s position; and, as may now become clear, the balance of of power in any bankruptcy negotiation really can shift in the debtor’s favor the minute that its debts are realized as too large.

    And yet the referendum result–a crushing 61.3%-38.7% vote against new austerity and reform measures, is just that–a big surprise. The polls suggested a very close vote. Most people outside Greece saw the vote in the terms that non-Greeks had framed it: whether or not to abandon the euro. Instead, it seems Greeks believed the version their Prime Minister had sold them: it was just a negotiating tactic that would call the Eurozone’s bluff and force it into relieving Greece’s debts. It seems that Alexis Tsipras successfully deflected blame for the current situation onto ‘the foreigners’, despite a host of data that trace a clear line back to the day his government took power. But ultimately, the size of the winning margin makes nuanced analysis superfluous: Greeks have had enough and want real change so badly that they’ll take a huge gamble to get it.

    Sadly for them, they are unlikely to get the change they want–a radical restructuring of their debt without the loss of their privileges to print and spend euros. They’re not even likely to get the second-best alternative: a bold, modernising government that can drag the country into the modern age with the help of a new currency. The rest of the Eurozone is so set against Greece that the country’s being forced out of the currency union is now by far the likeliest outcome. By contrast, a surrender to Greek demands at this point would only prove that the Greek tail is waving the Eurozone dog, with serious consequences for its long-term credibility.

    With virtually no euro cash reserves left, it’s clear that Greece’s banks cannot honor depositors’ claims of over €120 billion unless the European Central Bank relaxes the credit straitjacket. Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis told the U.K.’s Daily Telegraph that: “If necessary, we will issue parallel liquidity and California-style IOU’s, in an electronic form. We should have done it a week ago.” (Varoufakis’ critics will note there was no talk of that sort before the polls had already closed.)

    California had issued IOUs to bridge its budget gap in 2009 (after the collapse of Lehman Brothers froze markets), and again in 2012. The ECB, in its role as the banks’ supervisor, is likely to take a dim view of giving short-term loans against the promise of a government that is now obviously bankrupt. It would have every right to call in the €89 billion in emergency loans to Greek banks against government collateral, and only its duty to preserve financial stability argues against doing so.

    As before, the ECB is unlikely to precipitate a crisis without explicit political cover. For that, it needs the conclusions of yet another group of Eurozone finance ministers on Tuesday (a meeting that will in turn take its cue from a meeting Monday between Germany’s Angela Merkel and France’s Francois Hollande). Merkel, the great political survivor, is under the most domestic pressure to cut the Greeks adrift, but others, such as the governments of Spain and Ireland, are also bitterly opposed to any policy that would make them look like patsies for accepting harsh austerity medicine lying down for three years. Whether or not the Eurozone allows the ECB to trigger a crisis depends on how much damage they think they will do themselves by doing so. Are the new institutional firebreaks strong enough to stop contagion? Have we done enough to deter people speculating against us in the first place?

    All of last week, it seemed that Greece was bluffing. Sunday’s stunning vote result is a last-minute buy-in that that allows it to raise the stakes just one more time before the final showdown. But it is still the Eurozone that has the better cards, and the bigger stack. Unless it loses its nerve completely, this game of poker is still going to end only one way. The biggest question is how far Berlin and others will go to keep Greece politically stable as it leaves the Eurozone.