人民币纳入SDR，意味没有想象的多！

中国花了大半年时间来进行货币改革，以便人民币进入国际货币基金组织（IMF）的特别提款权货币篮子。最终，中国方面得偿所愿——人民币即将成为IMF储备货币，与美元、欧元、英镑和日元这些国际性储备货币并驾齐驱。

对中国来说这是一场胜利。两年来，中国一直在努力，目的就是让人民币进入IMF的特别提款权货币篮子。特别提款权的唯一实际作用是供IMF和其他多边贷款人做账。但就象征意义而言，它则代表了全球金融市场的权利归属。

因此，人民币进入IMF货币篮子将极大提升中国在金融领域的威望，这不是因为此举会促使人们持有人民币，而是因为它表明目前中国在“制定规则”方面有了多大的话语权。自从布雷顿森林体系在1973年瓦解以来，特别提款权货币篮子一直都只接纳“可自由使用”的货币。人民币距此仍然还有很大的差距，在获取人民币方面遇到过困难的外国生意人或游客都能告诉你这一点。但人民币的市场化程度已经足够IMF在保住一些面子的同时对中国做出让步。

一年来，中国采取了多项改革措施，其中包括放宽央行对汇率的严格管理，允许外国央行无限制地投资中国债券市场，以及设立3个月政府债券市场（这是进入IMF货币篮子的技术细则提出的要求。）

成为IMF储备货币会在一定程度上提高中国政府的外交和政治威信。受工业滑坡影响，以习近平领导的本届政府在实现GDP增长目标方面遇到了困难。不过，在分析师看来，人民币进入IMF货币篮子的唯一实质性好处是，它将逐渐鼓励更多外国投资者持有人民币。在IMF接纳人民币之前，中国已经实施的改革打开了国内债券市场的大门，这将使外国央行乃至一些私人投资者能够更容易地进入这个市场。

龙洲经讯中国经济学家陈龙在北京指出：“人民币成为‘全球储备货币’确实有可能让更多央行及其他资产管理机构关注中国金融市场，特别是境内债市。但不应仅仅因为这一点，就认为其他央行将被迫购买大量人民币资产。”

大多数分析师都认为，鉴于国内经济增长放缓以及收益率下降造成私人资本外流增多，中国央行可能利用旺盛而稳定的海外需求为人民币提供一些支持。

今年夏天，中国央行曾一次性下调人民币兑美元中间价，此举放宽了汇率政策，使人民币在一天之内贬值1.8%。但从那时至今，中国央行又斥资数百亿来支撑人民币汇率。这就让之前那种“贬值是为了再次通过出口来提振经济”的说法显得有点儿站不住脚。

包括陈龙在内，很多分析师都指出，夏季的那次贬值很重要，但不是因为“下调的幅度”，而是因为从那以后中国央行不再自行确定人民币汇率，而是基于前一日收盘价设定一个波动区间。（财富中文网）

译者：Charlie

校对：詹妮

It would be wrong to think that central banks will be forced to buy substantial amounts of renminbi assets just because the currency is included in the SDR basket.

The country spent the better part of a year reforming its currency to join the International Monetary Fund’s special group of world currencies.

China finally got the news it has been lobbying for: its currency, the renminbi, is set to be included in the International Monetary Fund’s basket of top currencies alongside the world’s reserve currency, the U.S. dollar, as well as the Euro, British pound, and Japanese Yen.

It’s a win for China, which has lobbied for the past two years to be included in the club of countries whose currencies make up the ‘Special Drawing Right’. The SDR’s only practical purpose is that it’s the currency in which the IMF and other multilateral lenders draw up their accounts. But symbolically, it has always represented the balance of power in global financial markets.

As such, China’s inclusion significantly bolsters its prestige in the financial world: not because it forces people to hold the renminbi, but because it shows how far China is now dictating the rules of the game: since the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement in 1973, the SDR has only ever included ‘freely usable’ currencies. The renminbi is still far from a ‘freely usable’ currency—as any trader or visitor to China who has trouble accessing the currency from abroad will tell you —but it has been liberalized enough to allow the IMF to yield to China’s pressure while saving some face.

In the past year, China has enacted reforms that included loosening the central bank’s strict management of the exchange rate, allowing foreign central banks unlimited investment in the domestic bond market, and establishing a market for three-month government bills (a technicality for IMF inclusion).

The inclusion affords China’s government under Xi Jinping, which has struggled to meet GDP growth targets amid an industrial recession, some diplomatic and political prestige. However, the only tangible benefit analysts can point to is that the renminbi’s inclusion in SDR will encourage more foreign investors over time to hold the currency because foreign central banks and even some private investors can now more easily access China’s bond market that was opened as a result of the reforms preceding the SDR inclusion.

Says Chen Long of GavekalDragonomics in Beijing: “Granting the renminbi the status of a “global reserve currency” could indeed encourage more central banks and other asset managers to take a look at China’s financial markets, especially the onshore bond market. But it would be wrong to think that central banks will be forced to buy substantial amounts of renminbi assets just because the currency is included in the SDR basket.”

Most analysts agree that the People’s Bank of China could use some help for its currency in the form of strong, stable, foreign demand, now that lower growth and returns at home are driving more private capital abroad.

Since this summer’s “devaluation,” when the yuan fell by 1.8% in one day in response to the loosening of exchange rate rules, it’s been the Chinese central bank itself that has spent tens of billions shoring up the currency–something that gives lie to previous accusations of a fresh attempt to boost the economy through the export channel.

Analysts including Long have argued the move was important not because of the “size of the depreciation”, but rather because the central bank was no longer fixing the trading price of the yuan on its own, instead using a range based upon the previous day’s close.