美国大型律师事务所衰落启示录

    《美国律师》杂志（The American Lawyer）的统计数据显示，在美国前100大律所中，2010年，每位合伙人的平均盈利为136万美元，比2000年的741,056美元翻了一番。

    戈登认为：“合伙人费用之所以暴涨，是因为他们参与大型金融交易时发现，银行业者的工资非常高。说白了，就是嫉妒别人的高收入。他们将其称为积分榜工资。”

    莱波尔特称：“在经济衰退期间，由于对法律服务的需求减少，律所工资上涨的势头有所缓解。但合伙人却仍享受着巨额薪酬。”

    经济衰退期间，美国就业岗位减少了45,000个，一大批大型知名律所纷纷倒闭，比如豪瑞律师事务所（Howrey）、海伦律师事务所（Heller Ehrman）和思瑞律师事务所（Thelen Reid）等。原先能拿到七位数薪酬的合伙人，突然之间面临薪酬大幅缩水的境况，于是，许多人纷纷转投其他律所。而据业内专家披露，大型律所为了巩固自己的地位，疯狂从其他律所招募明星合伙人，甚至开出了接近1000万美元的年薪。结果，导致低薪酬员工与合伙人之间的薪酬差距不断扩大。

    莫顿•A•皮尔斯是杜威路博薪酬最高的律师之一，年薪高达800万美元。他曾担任该律所副总裁，是优秀的企业并购与收购专家。2007年，他的公司杜威律师事务所（Dewey Ballantine）与路博律师事务所（LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae）合并为杜威路博律师事务所。后来，他离开了合并后的律所，但对外宣称律所欠他6100万美元，其中可能包括延期未支付的薪酬、退休金和在律所的投资等。

    虽然杜威路博向合伙人开出了数额惊人的薪酬，但仍有大批合伙人转而投奔境况更好的律所，结果留下律所的管理人员、律师助理、年轻的律师和退休人员自生自灭。

    律所咨询公司Altman Weil的负责人吉姆•科特曼认为：“太多律所的老板只追求短期收入，而不注重长期投资。”他认为，律所在法学院毕业生身上进行了巨额投资，但“公司要想从合伙人身上获利要等到四年之后。而到那时，这些成长起来的毕业生们有一半已经跳槽。”

    所以，他认为“人才流动是大趋势”，因为法学院毕业生背负着沉重的债务，他们“需要偿还债务，而且希望在个人履历中增添在大律所中任职的经历，之后才会选择小一点的律所。”

    戈登以及其他法律界专家认为，大律所的问题可以追溯到上世纪七十年代末。按照戈登的话说，当年，大律所“迫不及待地达成共谋”，向《美国律师》等新成立的法律刊物提供薪酬数据。而这“宣扬的是赤裸裸的商业成功标准”。这些数字成为计算每位合伙人年均收入的基础，之后又产生了律所排名，法律行业学者认为，这使得律所进一步商业化。

    科罗拉多大学（University of Colorado）法律专业教授保罗•坎波斯认为：“它最终演变成了吹牛的游戏，而法律行业也沦落到和其他行业一样的生意，只是它到处充满了狂妄和自负。”保罗•坎波斯是博客网站《法学院骗局揭秘》（Inside the Law School Scam）的写手。

    最后，戈登得出结论称，薪酬差距的不断扩大、合伙人的加入、以及员工对律所日益下降的忠诚度和日益缩短的工龄使律所成为“松散的联盟”，而“如今的合伙人更像是自由人。”

    译者：阿龙/汪皓

    At the 100 largest U.S. law firms, profit per partner averaged $1.36 million in 2010 -- almost double the $741,056 figure in 2000, according to statistics from The American Lawyer.

    Partner fees have skyrocketed as "lawyers who were involved in big financial deals saw bankers taking big fees," says Gordon. "Salary envy is what it is," he says. "They call it scoreboard salaries."

    Soaring law firm salaries took a dip when "the demand for legal services slipped in the Great Recession," says Leipold, "but partner compensation remains strong."

    Some 45,000 jobs disappeared during the economic meltdown, and a group of large, well-known law firms, like Howrey, Heller Ehrman, and Thelen Reid collapsed. Suddenly "rainmaker" partners who made seven figures were facing a sizable drop below that, making them ripe candidates for other firms. And the salary gap between lower paid personnel and partners widened as large firms sought to shore themselves up by zealously recruiting stellar business generators from other firms with salaries for some approaching $10 million annually, according to industry experts.

    One of Dewey's highest-paid lawyers, Morton A. Pierce, the former vice chairman of the firm and a prominent mergers and acquisitions specialist, was paid as much $8 million annually. His firm, Dewey Ballantine, merged in 2007 with LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae. He has left the merged entity, called Dewey & LeBoeuf, but claims he is owed $61 million, a sum that is likely derived from deferred compensation, retirement funds, and investment in the firm.

    As Dewey frays and faces staggering sums promised to partners, a stream of partners have left for well-paid perches at flourishing law firms, leaving the firm's administrative staff, paralegals, younger lawyers, and pensioners to fend for themselves.

    "Too many law firm leaders look for short-term income, rather than long-term investment, "says Jim Cotterman, a principal at law firm consultant Altman Weil. Firms make huge investments in new law graduates, he says, but "it takes until year four for the firm to make a profit on an associate. And, by that time, half of them are gone."

    So "mobility is the trend," he says, because law school graduates have significant debt, and "they need to pay it down and get the big law firm pedigree on their resume before moving on to a smaller firm or elsewhere."

    Gordon and other legal industry experts trace Big Law's unraveling to the late 1970s when such firms "eagerly connived" -- in Gordon's words -- to provide compensation figures to newly launched legal publications like The American Lawyer. That was "flaunting purely commercial criteria of success," Gordon notes. The numbers served as the basis for calculating average profits-per-partner, which led to firm rankings, a development which further commercialized law firms, legal industry scholars say.

    "It became a bragging contest, and the legal profession became a business like any other, but with pretensions," says Paul Campos, a University of Colorado law professor and blogger at Inside the Law School Scam.

    The growing pay gaps, the insertion of lateral partners, and even less loyalty and longevity among employees have all turned firms into "loose confederations," Gordon concludes. And "partners these days are more like free agents."