摩根大通交易巨亏折射出的高管薪酬问题
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美国货币监理署（The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency，OCC）这些天来频频发声。他们在伦敦有员工，而造成摩根大通巨亏的交易员正是常住伦敦。OCC的一位发言人通过电子邮件向我解释，他们的职员会对交易数据进行每日或每周的例行检查，但“即便是强大的风险管理文化，也可能出现意外或失误，但相比银行业务，影响不应很大。”至于薪酬，“检查人员采用[稳健薪酬]指南对银行进行监管。” OCC负责人托马斯•柯瑞日前在美国参议院银行委员会讲话时，提到了“需要确保薪酬结构能平衡风险回报，并与有效的控制和风险管理相适应。” 丹尼尔•塔鲁洛代表美国联储银行行长理事会（Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve）作证。但他事先准备好的演讲稿没有提到薪酬，虽然美联储对高管薪酬有监督职责。美联储2011年10月的报告列出了，银行薪酬“到2011年底，应该基本遵守银行间指南（影响2011绩效年激励薪酬的授予），此后完全执行。”但无论是OCC，还是美联储都不愿就检查评估情况发表评论。 这种沉默，特别是美联储的沉默，令人心惊。尤其是在这些银行的薪酬调整迄今似乎只涉及一些中层管理人员，而非高管。 但高管薪酬方案非常重要，因为高管的动机会影响到他们的指示和其他经理的行为（反之则不一定成立。） 美联储2011年10月的报告指出，激励机制“是造成这场金融危机（始于2007年）的原因之一。”不作为的理由之一是，损失几十亿美元对于像摩根大通这样规模的银行可能只是毛毛雨。我不同意这样的观点。不能因为这不是百年一遇的洪水，就不用查漏堵缺。要铸下多少次大错，我们才会着手纠正？ 本文作者埃莉诺•布洛克斯汉姆是董事会咨询机构价值联盟和企业管理管理联盟（The Value Alliance and Corporate Governance Alliance）的CEO。 译者：早稻米 |
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) is getting beat up these days. They had staff in London where the J.P. Morgan traders were located. An OCC spokesperson explained to me by email that while their staffers review trading data daily or weekly, "even a strong risk management culture could have surprises or breaks, but they should not be of significant magnitude relative to the banks business." Regarding pay, "the [sound compensation] guidance stands as what the examiners are using to supervise banks." Last week, in his remarks before the banking committee, OCC head Thomas Curry mentioned"the need to ensure that incentive compensation structures balance risk and financial rewards and are compatible with effective controls and risk management." Daniel Tarullo testified on behalf of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. But his prepared remarks did not mention compensation. This, despite the fact that the Fed has oversight responsibility for top executives' pay. The Fed's October 2011 report outlines that bank pay "should achieve substantial conformance with the interagency guidance by the end of 2011 (affecting the award of incentive compensation awards for the 2011 performance year), and should fully conform thereafter." Neither the OCC nor Federal Reserve would comment, however, on their examinations and assessments. The silence, especially from the Fed, is deafening, particularly since the banks' compensation fixes seem to have been done for only some managers rather than the top executives. But pay programs for top executives matter most because their motives will influence their instructions and other managers' actions. (While the reverse is not necessarily true.) The October 2011 report by the Federal Reserve states that incentives "were a contributing factor to the financial crisis that began in 2007." The M.O. among do-nothings is that losing billions isn't necessarily concerning for a bank the size of J.P. Morgan. I don't agree. Just because this isn't the 100-year flood doesn't mean we shouldn't repair the levy. How many breaks will we tolerate until we fix it? Eleanor Bloxham is CEO of The Value Alliance and Corporate Governance Alliance (http://thevaluealliance.com), a board advisory firm. |
