大公司的创新困境

    维塞尔引用的另一个例子是施乐公司（Xerox）的帕洛阿尔托研究所（PARC），也就是这家知名复印机公司的研发部门。正是它在20世纪70年代开发了个人电脑、图形用户界面、鼠标和以太网，后来却无一继续开发，均告流产。将该部门的总部放在美国大陆的另一侧——加州的帕罗阿托实属明智之举，因为这样就能免得公司总部那些斤斤计较的管理人员对它过度关注。而且施乐非常富有远见地预见到了即将到来的信息革命。维塞尔借此表达了一个主要观点：“如果贵公司内部已经有了那些准备摧毁任何新尝试的抗体，你就需要走出公司去克服它们的消极影响。”

    但是到了需要为自己的个人电脑阿尔托（Alto）开展营销时，施乐却只是简单地把产品往已有的销售渠道里一塞了事。它没有向公司高管和私营企业主（或是家庭市场）去推销，而是试着把阿尔托卖给那些购买施乐复印机的中层管理者。结果导致一败涂地。

    但是，像施乐这么专注、创新和聪明的公司，怎么会在推销自己的新技术时三次都宣告失败呢？正是因为有抗体作祟。就在个人电脑行将推向市场之际，施乐在复印机市场上正面临来自佳能公司（Canon）和其他公司的激烈竞争，使公司的盈利预期压力倍增。面对那些高声叫嚷着要攫取利润的投资者，施乐只得将阿尔托匆匆推向市场以取悦他们。维塞尔称，如果施乐采取了“谨慎的试验性方法”，（这段话出现在该文最让人沮丧的段落）“避开投资者的注意的话”，结果很可能会截然不同。

    但是“谨慎的方法”能催生出同样的创新成果吗？维塞尔并未就此给出案例。而且很明显，避开自己的投资者去做生意总不能算是理想的做法。

    而至少在某些情况下，更好的方法似乎是对投资者直言相告：我们关注的是长期收益，如果你们只对短期利润感兴趣，也许应该去选择利率互换产品或其他类似的金融产品。

    对那些取得过重大创新成果的大公司来说，它们至少有一次对自己那些投资者的短期获利欲望是不予理睬的：苹果公司（Apple），联邦快递（FedEx），美国电话电报公司（AT&T）（通过贝尔实验室），丰田汽车（Toyota），通用电气（General Electric），索尼公司（Sony）。还有很多，不胜枚举。这并不是说，投资开展创新毫无风险，或者应该对其一味放任，对投资者也不管不顾。但是，当考虑股东的感受成了头等大事时，创新基本上无从谈起。

    译者：清远

    Another example he cites is Xerox PARC, the copier-maker's famous research division, which in the '70s developed a personal computer, the graphical user interface, the mouse, and Ethernet, and proceeded to capitalize on none of them. It was a great idea to situate the division's headquarters a continent away in Palo Alto, Calif., to prevent the bean-counters at corporate HQ from paying too much attention. And Xerox (XRX) was truly visionary in anticipating the coming information revolution. This is one of Wessel's main points: "If antibodies already exist within your organization to destroy new endeavors, you need to go outside of the organization to overcome them."

    But when it came time to market its PC, the Alto, Xerox simply jammed the thing into its existing sales channels. Rather than marketing to corporate executives and self-employed entrepreneurs (or possibly the home market), Xerox tried to sell the Alto to the same mid-level decision-makers who bought the company's copiers. Massive fail.

    But why, given how committed, innovative and smart Xerox clearly was, did it fail on all three counts when it came time to sell its new technology? The antibodies. Just as the PC was being readied for market, Xerox was facing all kinds of competition in the copier market from Canon (CAJ) and others, putting pressure on margins. Xerox rushed the Alto to market to appease investors who were clamoring for profits.

    Wessel says Xerox would have done better to employ a "lean approach to experimentation" that would (in the essay's most depressing phrase) "fly under the radar of investors."

    But would a "lean approach" have yielded the same innovations? Wessel doesn't make a case that it would have. And clearly, hiding from your own investors isn't an ideal way to do business.

    A better approach, in at least some cases, seems to be to tell investors that you're in it for the long haul, and if they're interested only in short-term profits, maybe they should check out interest-rate swaps, or something.

    One need only look at the list of big companies that have, at least at one time or another, implemented major innovations, often despite the short-term wishes of their own investors: Apple (AAPL), FedEx (FDX), AT&T (T) (via Bell Labs), Toyota (TM), General Electric (GE), Sony (SNE). Many more. Which is not to say that investing in innovation is risk-free or should be undertaken with wild abandon and zero thought for investors. But innovation rarely arises when shareholder sentiment is the primary consideration.