硅谷创新大师：创业者是疯子

    白日梦是你有想法，但还没有经过检验，不知道它们是不是瞎想。创业者成功的要素之一是，不仅有远见，还知道如何实现和创造。创造过程就是优胜劣汰的过程。顿悟发生在你搜集了大量数据，但还没有用某种分析方式来思考这个问题。顿悟就像是某一天突然茅塞顿开。顿悟非常少见；闭门造车是不会获得顿悟的。它通常是因为一个人的头脑里一直在处理（大量）数据，有一天它们终于融会贯通了。顿悟不能设计，但肯定可以营造适当的环境。

    对于新公司，保持灵活性和理解“关键转折”含义有多么重要？

    过去初创公司总是通过解雇高管来调整策略。这是一个重要的决定。你开掉了销售副总裁，开掉了营销副总裁，最后开掉了CEO。每次解雇都是一个关键转折，接任者不傻，他们不会实施同样的战略——他们会采用另外的战略。一旦我们将发生的事情联系起来，就容易理解关键转折，“实际上，我们摸索业务模式的过程中所做的就是改变战略。”但我认为，我们把它变得过于简单了。关键转折并不意味着在艰难的时候放弃。只是在尝试了所有可能之后，再掉转方向。关键转折并不意味着“我已经改变了主意。”关键转折不是创始人注意力缺失症的症状。如果这就是你现在正在做的，这可不是关键转折；事实上你是想不明白了。

    创业者给予客户关系的重视足够吗？

    不够。如果你是一位创业者，当你遇到麻烦，你很容易会说，“我们再增加一项功能吧，”或者“我做完后会和客户谈的。”放下手头的工作，与人对话，并不是本能行为。这部分创业内容即“客户发展”难度很大，它的难并不在于一些实际的困难有多难，而是创始人心理上很难接受。如果你是一位创业者，从第一天开始你就受到心中远景的驱动。为什么我要让别人来挑战这一远景的现实性？这是个伟大的点子。为什么我要让别人来告诉我，我信念所在的企业错了？这种事让人沮丧。但正是“我相信”和“我需要检验这一信仰”两种思想相辅相成才造就了成功的企业家。

    《初创企业家手册》是你的第二本书。这和你2005年的第一本书有何不同？

    当我写《四步顿悟》时，它还是异端邪说。我的意思是，当时我是唯一一个愿意谈论这一点的人——我没法告诉你这种深深的孤独感。想想我基本上是在说，每家风投和商学院企业教授讲得都是错的。我无意之中冒犯了两个行业。第一本书真的让我头痛。

    A daydream is (when) you have ideas, but you simply don't test them or figure out whether they're nothing more than guesses. One of the things that make entrepreneurs successful is they not only have a vision, they actually know how to get out and create. This act of creation is what separates the winners and losers. An epiphany is what happens when you've been working and collecting an enormous amount of data, but you haven't approached the problem in some analytical way. It just kind of came to you one day in a flash. Epiphanies are extremely rare; you don't get them by locking yourself in the building. It's usually because your head has been processing a (large) amount of data and it finally all snaps together one day. You can't engineer one, but you can certainly provide the right kind of circumstances for it.

    How important is it for young companies to remain flexible and understand what it means to 'pivot'?

    We used to change strategy in startups by firing executives. It's a big idea. You fire the VP of Sales. You fire the VP of Marketing. And then you finally fire the CEO, and each one of those would be a pivot because the replacement wouldn't be stupid and they wouldn't do the same strategy – they'd do another one. Once we began to articulate what was going on, pivot then made it easy to understand, 'Oh actually what we're doing in the search for a business model is changing strategy.' But I think we've made it a little too easy. A pivot does not mean giving up when things get tough. You only pivot after you've exhausted the series of possibilities. A pivot doesn't mean 'I've changed my mind.' A pivot isn't a symptom of a founder with an attention deficit disorder. If that's what you're doing, you're not pivoting; you're actually confused.

    Do entrepreneurs put enough focus on customer relationships?

    No. It's really easy when you get stuck if you are an entrepreneur to say, 'let me add another feature,' or 'I'll talk to customers when I'm done.' Getting out of the building to talk to people is kind of an unnatural act. This part of entrepreneurship called customer development is extremely difficult, not because it's physically hard, though it is, but because it's mentally hard. If you're a founder, you're driven by your vision from day one. Why on earth would I want anybody to challenge my version of reality? It's a big idea. Why would I want to go and have somebody tell me my faith-based enterprise is wrong? It's depressing. But it turns out it's that yin and yang of 'I believe' and 'I need to test that belief' (that) makes successful entrepreneurs.

    The Startup Owner's Manual is your second book. How was it different than your first book in 2005?

    When I wrote the "The Four Steps to the Epiphany," it was heretical. I mean, I was the only guy who could talk about this – I can't tell you how lonely it was. Think about it, I basically said that every VC and business school professor who teaches entrepreneurship is wrong. Implicitly, I was calling out two industries, and not on purpose. The first book truly made my head hurt.