商界人士如何参与建设新埃及

    埃及穆巴拉克政权垮台时，我在《财富》（Fortune）杂志上发表了专栏文章，提出商界人士不应持观望立场。相反，他们应该积极参与解决撕裂埃及社会结构的信任缺失问题。我认为，如果不培养信任，各种机构都将无法正常运转。

    当时，我那些来自埃及、并在埃及和其他地方生活的商界学生对他们所走上的道路进行了思考。他们大多为开罗解放广场（Tahrir Square）的热烈气氛感到欣喜若狂，因为它看起来似乎是民主的开端。对于他们而言，另一种情况似乎不太可能出现：即埃及在没有强权的情况下陷入混乱。不管是好是坏，过去穆巴拉克政权一手遮天，使得埃及各对立派别之间的斗争并未陷入失控境地。

    近两年后，解放广场已被重新占领。我再度遇上了我的学生。他们都显得急躁和失望。穆斯林兄弟会（Muslim Brotherhood）的穆尔西已当选总统，但他试图获取超过普通民众可接受范围内的权力。最近遭到穆尔西撤换的将领们正发出威胁的声音。法官们也感到很委屈，他们被指责为旧政权的走狗。此外，该国的贸易和投资活动也陷入停滞状态。

    不耐烦是可以理解的，因为他们的日常生活和生计都受到了威胁。作为一个企业家，我可以理解这种挫败感。在长达两年的时间里一直让金融家闲置资本、工人待业或工厂停工，确实难以接受。

    然而，作为一个学者，我唯一感到意外的是：最近发生的事件让所有人都感到惊讶。就重新安排权力坐席达成新协定——谁掌握什么样的权力以及如何问责——是一个混乱的过程。据我估计，这个过程需要耗时数年，甚至几十年。我无法想象新的安排在一年半内达成。

    我的一位口才颇佳的学生感叹到：“看到开罗的今天，我觉得就像是看到了喀布尔。”言下之意是，这个昔日阿拉伯世界知识分子聚集的中心应该做得更好。也许是这样吧，但把开罗比作喀布尔是过于悲观了。其他的比喻更适合些。

    例如，在最近的新闻头条中，另一个以伊斯兰教徒为主的国家——巴基斯坦也面临内部纷争。它的情况与埃及有些相似之处。军方和司法部门都自认为是国家的保护者。若平民政府无能，或者腐败程度超过军方容忍范围，巴基斯坦军队随时会介入干预。巴基斯坦司法部门保持了积极的姿态，因为背后有一部分巴基斯坦人的激励。这些人希望有人站出来，对权力机构说实话。但在其他人看来，司法部门在争取权力方面走过头了。正如穆尔西必须把重点放在埃及与以色列的关系上，巴基斯坦也在勉力与邻国阿富汗改善关系。巴基斯坦与阿富汗的国境线存在划分不清的问题。从巴基斯坦的经验来看，埃及前路漫长。

    When Hosni Mubarak's regime fell in Egypt, I wrote in a column for Fortune that businesspeople should not stand by the sidelines. Rather, they should actively combat the deficit of trust that had rent the Egyptian social fabric. Without nurturing trust, I argued, institutions would not function properly.

    At the time, my students -- businesspeople of Egyptian origin living within Egypt and elsewhere -- mused about the course they were on. Most were ecstatic over the heady atmosphere in Tahrir Square, which looked to them like the onset of democracy. The alternative seemed less likely to them: a collapse into chaos in the absence of the authoritarian hand that had, for better or worse, kept Egypt's contending factions in check.

    Almost two years later, Tahrir Square has been re-occupied. I caught up with my students again. They are all impatient and disillusioned. Morsi, of the Muslim Brotherhood, has been elected president but has tried to assume more power than the denizens of the street are willing to concede. The generals, emasculated by Morsi lately, are making threatening noises on the sidelines. The judges feel aggrieved, accused of being stooges of the old regime. And commerce and investment flows are in stasis.

    The impatience is understandable as daily lives, and livelihoods, are at stake. As an entrepreneur, I can relate to the frustration. Two years is a long time for a financier to keep capital un-deployed, or for workers to be in limbo, or production runs to be compromised.

    Yet, as a scholar, the only surprise is that anyone is surprised at the recent turn of events. Re-arranging an institutional deck of chairs -- reaching a new bargain about who wields what kinds of authority and how they will be held accountable -- is a messy process that, in my estimation, takes years, if not decades sometimes. I'm hard-pressed to imagine that a new arrangement could have been settled on in a year-and-a-half.

    One of my more articulate students lamented, "When I see Cairo today, it feels like Kabul," reflecting the view that the erstwhile intellectual center of the Arab world ought to do better. Maybe so, but comparisons to Kabul are overly pessimistic. Others are more apt.

    Pakistan, another majority Islamic country in the news today, also suffers from internal strife. It shares some similarities to Egypt. The military and the judiciary consider themselves protectors of the country. Pakistan's army is ready to step in if civilian incompetence or corruption exceeds tolerable (to them) bounds. The judiciary is an activist one, egged on by relieved Pakistanis eager to see someone speak truth to power, but, in others' views, over-reaching in its assumption of power. Just as Morsi must focus on his country's relationship with Israel, Pakistan struggles with Afghanistan along its poorly demarcated border. To the extent that the Pakistani experience has anything to say about Egypt's evolution, we're in for a long journey.