遏制CEO薪酬暴涨的新主张

    当然，新税收减免的资金来源很难有保证，但CEO薪酬比本身却指明了一种可行的解决方案。

    目前，美国的税制漏洞使许多公司将业务转移到海外避税港，偷逃本应向美国国税局（IRS）缴纳的税款，导致美国财政部每年损失1,500亿美元收入。这些漏洞的受益者是有国际业务且掌握了隐秘的税收策略的大公司，而这些公司的CEO薪酬比往往也最高（354:1）。只要能修补其中一部分漏洞，美国政府就可轻而易举地根据在美国上市的3,687家公司的CEO薪酬比，利用税收减免来取代这些漏洞。

    如果可以利用税收减免来鼓励投资与创新，为什么不能同样地把它用来促进更有效的公司治理呢？（财富中文网）

    本文作者是政治和商业评论家。他曾在知名投行Lazard Freres和Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein就职，著有两本惊悚小说，其中一本名为《杀死华尔街》。

    译者：刘进龙/汪皓

    Of course, funding for a new tax credit is difficult to secure, but the CEO pay ratio itself points to a possible solution.

    Currently, tax loopholes that enable companies to shield money from the IRS by moving it to offshore havens cost the Treasury $150 billion every year. The beneficiaries of these loopholes are major corporations with international operations and the means to pursue esoteric tax strategies, but then these are the same companies with the highest CEO pay ratios (354:1). By closing even a portion of these loopholes, the government could easily and justifiably replace them with a tax credit based on the CEO pay ratio for the 3,687 companies traded publicly in the U.S. on regulated exchanges.

    If tax credits can be used to encourage investment and innovation, why should they not be used to promote better corporate governance and more hiring?