拷问微软接班人遴选进程

    你们已经敲定新任首席执行官的绩效指标，采取无合同政策并找到谈判最合算薪酬奖金方案的办法了吗？

    如果董事会已经准备好了管用的职位描述，董事就能让首席执行官候选人知道自己的绩效将会如何衡量。比如，董事会希望首席执行官操纵股价或营收吗？那么股东总回报（TSR，total shareholder return）和每股收益（EPS，earnings per share）就是合理的指标。如果他们想要更高的目标，就应该就与这些期望相关的衡量标准进行沟通。

    董事会应该制订“首席执行官无合同”政策，这是高盛公司（Goldman Sachs）董事会成员比尔•乔治首创的。在经济形势急转直下的时期，“首席执行官无合同”能使重新谈判薪酬的难度大为降低，解雇首席执行官时也无需支付未经承诺的额外赔偿。想想当年惠普前任首席执行官马克•赫德和老东家不欢而散时拿到手的巨额分手费吧。不过当董事会心急火燎地要找到新管家时，不管打着口哨的牛仔（也就是首席执行官候选人）提出多高的薪资要求，它常常身不由己地照付不误，对各种疯狂的薪酬方案都会一口答应。

    福特公司（Ford）的首席执行官艾伦•穆拉利一直都被认为是鲍尔默的潜在接班人之一。穆拉利在福特享有极为丰厚的待遇，微软最好不要原样照搬这套方案。据CNN金融频道（CNNMoney）今年三月的一个报道称，尽管没有“实现为高管支薪设定的众多内部绩效目标”，他2012年还是赚了2100万美元并“在其领导福特的六年时间里积累了价值超过3亿美元的福特股票”。

    股东们还应该问问，对于一心想从公司钱袋子里大捞特捞的首席执行官候选人，是否应该取消其参选资格。同时为了鼓励公司内部有一批能持续参选的候选人，董事会是否考虑过制定相关规定，比如向其支付的薪酬不超过鲍尔默直接下属的20%？

    董事会发现，如果选的是内部候选人，薪酬谈判就要容易得多。不过有些董事会也已成功地在战略上运用商业情报让外来者的薪酬要求降了一个台阶。股东们应该感到好奇的是，董事们对自己的弱点有多清楚，以及他们是否会出于自己的利益考虑要求某人进入或离开董事会。可以想想美国证券交易委员会（SEC）前主席理查德•布雷登当年作为世通公司的独立监察员时扮演的角色，那时他掌握着世通公司新高管薪酬方案的最终审批权。

    你们向首席执行官候选人解释过他们是不能进入董事会的吗？

    当然，微软董事对新任首席执行官的意见会非常重视。但是他会参加董事会——他不需要投票权。美国公司董事联合会（National Association of Corporate Directors）创始人兼名誉退休主席约翰•M.纳什表示：“首席执行官不应该进入董事会。”（独家披露：纳什曾在本人的公司效力。）

    这可能是所有建议中最触及根本的了。不过如果股东白白地让提出这个建议的机会溜掉有什么好处呢？如果股东们希望微软董事会做出明智的选择并走上正确的方向，那11月19日他们就需要明确表态：董事们必须首先齐心协力、行动一致——然后再向新任首席执行官明确表示，独立董事将会执掌大局。

    就算董事会在本次会议前就宣布了新任首席执行官的人选，股东们也应该不依不饶地抛出这些问题。毕竟，一个在错误条件下聘用的新任首席执行官可能很快就会证明是个不当人选。（财富中文网）

    埃莉诺•布洛克斯汉姆是价值联盟及公司治理联盟公司（The Value Alliance and Corporate Governance Alliance，http://thevaluealliance.com）的首席执行官，这个企业主要提供董事会培训及咨询服务。

    译者：清远

    Have you identified the new CEO's performance metrics, adopted a no contracts policy, and figured out ways to negotiate the most cost-effective salary and bonus package?

    If the board has developed an effective job description, the directors will be able to let CEO candidates know how their performance will be measured. For example, does the board want the CEO to manipulate stock price or earnings? Then TSR (total shareholder return) and EPS (earnings per share) are reasonable metrics. If they are seeking loftier goals, they should communicate measures tied to those expectations.

    Boards should establish a "no CEO contracts" policy, something Goldman Sachs (GS) board member Bill George has championed. No CEO contracts make it much easier to renegotiate pay when the bloom has gone off the rose and fire a CEO without unwarranted obligations. Consider the huge payout given to former HP CEO Mark Hurd upon his unsavory exit. But when a board has a gun to its head to find a new hire, it often caves into paying whatever the whistling cowboy (a.k.a. the CEO candidate) dictates and agreeing to all kinds of crazy compensation arrangements.

    Ford's CEO Alan Mulally has been suggested as a potential candidate to replace Ballmer. Mulally has had a sweet deal at Ford (F) that Microsoft should not seek to replicate. Despite falling "well short of numerous internal performance targets used to set pay for top executives," according to a CNNMoney report from March, he earned $21 million in 2012 and has "accumulated Ford stock worth more than $300 million in the six-plus years he has led Ford."

    Shareholders ought to ask whether a focus on extracting as much moolah from the corporate coffers as possible will disqualify a CEO candidate. And to encourage a strong pool of internal candidates who can step in on an ongoing basis, has the board considered guidelines, such as not paying more than 20% above what Ballmer's current direct reports earn?

    Boards find pay negotiation a lot easier if they choose an internal candidate. But some boards have been successful in using information strategically to ratchet down an outsider's package. Shareholders should be curious about how cognizant the directors are about their own weaknesses and whether they plan to ask someone on or off the board to act on behalf of their interests. Think about the role former SEC chair Richard Breeden played as independent monitor of WorldCom when he had final signoff on new executive hire pay packages.

    Have you explained to CEO candidates that they won't be sitting on the board?

    Of course, the Microsoft board will be keenly interested in the new CEO's opinions. But she'll be in the board meetings -- she doesn't need a vote. "The CEO should not sit on the board," says John M. Nash, founder and president emeritus of the National Association of Corporate Directors. (Full disclosure: Nash has worked for my company.)

    This may be the most radical suggestion of all. But what good will it do shareholders to let this opportunity pass? If shareholders want the Microsoft board to make a good choice and get off on the right foot, on November 19 they need to send a clear message that directors need to first get their act together -- and then make clear to the new CEO that independent board members will be calling the shots.

    Even if the board announces the new CEO before the meeting, shareholders should aggressively pursue these questions. After all, a new CEO hired under the wrong conditions may prove unsuitable very quickly.