董事会应该如何牵制维权投资者？

    限制任期年限，但不限制任期届数。

    这意味着建立相应机制，吸引具有部分技能组合的长期股东成为新董事，同时确立董事解聘机制，以便催生新思维、促进多元化、增加女性董事数量。

    对于解聘董事，维权投资者往往主张实行严格的任期限制。作为替代方案，许多公司通常是对董事设定退休年龄。我对这两种方案都不太赞同。为何要建立一个机制，迫使那些出色的董事让位？

    话又说回来，大多数董事会至少都有那么一位甚或好几位董事，创造的价值小于引入新董事可能带来的价值，导致了“机会成本”。一旦某人进入公司董事会，要想将其解聘决非易事，正所谓请神容易送神难。即便天时地利，炒朋友的鱿鱼都很难，在没有经济激励的情况下，更是难上加难。

    感情上，更容易的做法是“干等着”。而且，当首席执行官面对的董事会，成员全都是由前任首席执行官挑选并推荐，其技能组合不能满足企业新战略的需求时，事态将更加复杂。

    我认为，董事会应确立相应程序，明确规定新董事轮换机制，并确保该规定得到理解和执行。换言之，限制任期年限，但对任期届数不做统一限制。仅对新任董事适用上述改变，能有效规避来自于现任董事的阻力，从而使新规更易推行。

    我倾向于这样一个体系：每位新任董事都同意，每六至八年递交一次辞呈。如果有些董事在帮助首席执行官和企业创造价值方面，能发挥无可替代的作用，会被请求连任。至于那些没有突出作用的董事，将在企业对他们此前的服务表示感谢后，就此离开董事会。

    是否接受某位董事的辞呈，可由一位指定的董事，或其余董事绝对保密且具有约束力的多数票来决定。后一种做法可能更易实行。

    像维权投资者那样思考。

    董事们必须坚决要求企业管理层像维权投资者一样分析战略选择：审视在首席执行官推荐的战略之外，有何替代方案。这种做法十分罕见。通常的做法是，首席执行官在权衡各种战略后，仅向董事会介绍自己认为最好的战略。

    维权投资者主张的，必然是企业未采用的战略。因此，董事会必须提前分析所有替代方案。这意味着弄清与首席执行官推荐的战略相比，放弃业绩不佳的公司、分拆企业、评估测量和处理过剩现金的各种替代方案意味着什么。如果董事会没有讨论上述选择，将在阐明和捍卫自身战略方面准备不足。

    重要的是，分析显示某企业的拆分或私人交易价值大于其股票市值，并不表示企业必须出售。历史上，由于宏观经济环境或其他条件，导致当前股市和私人交易价值偏离企业内在价值的例子并不鲜见。董事会的职责，是提升企业内在价值，行使审慎职责，充分理解企业做出的战略决策，以及做出决策的理由。

    通过主动利用手中权力，积极配合创造长期股东价值，董事会可以帮助企业避免维权投资者的短期议程将带来的混乱。（财富中文网）

    Sue Decker是伯克希尔哈撒韦、好市多以及英特尔公司的董事。她此前曾担任雅虎公司总裁兼首席财务官。本文节选自Sue的一篇博客文章，原文发表于她的博客deckposts.net。本文仅代表Sue的个人观点，并不代表她所任职的公司以及相关公司其他董事的观点。

    译者：Hunter

    审稿：李翔

    Limit terms, but don’t install terms limits.

    This means setting up a mechanism for both attracting new directors with some of the skill sets of long-term shareholders, as well as a mechanism for rotation off the board to create room for new thinking, more diversity, and women.

    For removing directors, the solution that activists primarily advocate is a hard term-limit. As an alternative, many companies instead opt for a retirement age. I am not a fan of either. Why create a system that force out good board members?

    Then again, most boards have at least one or maybe a few directors who are not adding as much value as a new member might bring and therefore represent an “opportunity cost.” Once directors are on a board, it can be extremely difficult to naturally rotate them off. Firing a friend is tough under the best conditions, and even more so because there is no economic incentive.

    It’s emotionally easier just to “wait it out.” This is even more complicated when a CEO inherits a board that was picked and groomed by her predecessor and doesn’t have the collective skills for her new strategy.

    My view is that boards would be well served to adopt a process that specifically outlines the rotation process and that is understood and implemented for new directors. In other words, limited terms, but not unified term-limits. By making this change for all new directors, it side-steps the issue of those already on the board, making it easier to implement on a go forward basis.

    I lean toward a system in which each new member of the board agrees to hand in their resignation every six to eight years, with the idea being that some directors will be asked to serve multiple terms it they are uniquely qualified to help the CEO and company build value, but many will be thanked for their service and move on after that time frame.

    The decision regarding whose resignations to keep, or whose to accept, could be made either by an appointed director, or by an absolutely confidential and binding majority vote of the other board members. This latter approach might be easier socially.

    Think like an activist.

    Directors must insist on asking management to analyze strategic choices as an activist would: by looking at alternatives to the strategies the CEO is recommending. This is not typical. The more common pattern is for the CEO to consider options and present only the recommended one to the board.

    The road not taken is the one the activist will surface so the board must have analyzed these alternatives. This means understanding what it would mean to get out of underperforming operations, split up the company and evaluate varying alternatives for measuring and handling excess cash versus the ones being recommended. If these choices are not discussed, the board will be poorly prepared to articulate and defend its alternative course.

    Importantly, an analysis of the break-up or private transaction value of a company that shows a higher value than where the stock is trading does not oblige a company to make a sale. There have been many times in history where macro-economic or other conditions have made the current stock market and private transaction values poor indicators of intrinsic value. The board’s duty is to enhance the latter, exercising its duty of care, by fully understanding what strategic choices the company is making and why.

    By proactively using their power to align with long-term shareholder value creation, boards can help companies avoid the disruption that a shorter-term activist agenda will bring.

    Sue Decker serves on the boards of Berkshire Hathaway, Costco and Intel. She previously served as president and chief financial officer at Yahoo. This article is an excerpt from a more detailed version published on Sue’s blog, deckposts.net. The opinions expressed are her own and not necessarily those of the companies on whose boards she serves or her colleagues on those boards.