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从连续失败到参与创建百家企业:一位创业者的教训与启示

JAN SEDLACEK
2024-07-14

成功第一个关键因素是在对市场状况达成共识的基础上,对母公司的未来规划出清晰的愿景。

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Stryber创始人兼管理合伙人扬·塞德拉切克。图片来源:COURTESY OF STRYBER

我在职业生涯中曾多次失败。当然,我努力从每次失败中吸取教训,但就像电子游戏一样:随着不断进步,吸取的教训也越来越难付诸实践。后来,我在协助建立100多家新企业的过程中加以应用,避免其他领导者和公司落入同样的陷阱。接下来我将分享一些经验教训。

20世纪90年代中期,我在瑞士上高中时创办了第一家公司,业务是为小企业创建网站。之后,我加入了当时瑞士领先的网络中介公司,尝试了一些了不起的工作,比如为银行创建第一个在线房地产平台——我认为这是我人生第一个大项目。结果是彻底失败。没人想用房地产平台。从中我学到了宝贵教训:打造产品要从解决客户实际问题出发,而不是从企业想提供的业务出发。

从圣加仑大学(University of St)毕业后,我加入了位于苏黎世的战略咨询公司罗兰贝格(Roland Berger),也是重要的学习经历。然而,工作中构思的很多方案并没真正执行,让我这个年轻的顾问有点困惑。削减成本的命令很简单也能取得成效,然而实际上我们只是建议应该解雇多少人。另一方面,我觉得有些奇怪的是,大多数增长战略都没什么效果。

商业模式转型的神话

所以,我决定亲自加入战场,进入一家大公司当经理。我想学习如何把事情做好。碰巧我加入的当时瑞士最大也最负盛名的旅游公司Kuoni,是之前在咨询公司的客户,我们曾向其提供转型建议。

我和管理层都很清楚,随着在线旅行社出现以及酒店和航空公司直接预订份额增加,旅游业面临翻天覆地的变化,我们的市场份额和利润将被蚕食。因此,董事会委托我们为公司打造在线业务。战略只有三个字:“网络化”。但我们失败了。公司一蹶不振,后来被卖掉分崩离析。

那段经历中我学到了很多东西,后来我在欧洲工商管理学院还专门为之写了一篇案例研究。不过我学到最关键一点是,商业模式转型是虚假的方法,只不过是一种迷信。转型意味着整个价值链都要调整,根本无法做到,因为这意味着所有方面都要改。

2013年离开这家老牌旅游公司后,我加入了瑞士初创公司Everyglobe,公司目标是打造未来的旅行社。我们筹集到170万瑞士法郎,在当时种子轮算得上一大笔钱,募集的资金主要用于加强技术实力,实现变革性的客户体验。产品非常简单:一个搜索栏和四个旅行偏好滚动界面,如休闲或社交活动。该界面可针对去哪里和做什么实时提供旅行建议,可以立即预订。这项技术让人感觉很神奇。公司是真正数字化的旅行顾问。

实际上,预算只用掉了很小一部分,开发出的技术比之前旅行公司至少好10倍。公司还通过病毒式营销在用户增长方面大获成功,有时目标群体中有高达10%的人使用平台。问题是,尽管价格与其他在线平台相同,但人们不愿意在此下订单。原因很简单:我们是名不见经传的初创公司。一次旅行花费不菲,人们更喜欢在成熟公司下订单。后来公司没钱了,就这么黄了。

我学到的教训:将两个世界结合起来一定有可能。直到今天我还是确信,如果后面这家初创公司能拥有之前旅游公司的客户群和品牌信任,肯定能成功。我也相信,如果之前公司能利用其诸多宝贵资产打造新业务,不至于倒闭。

就在那时我开始相信,将两个世界结合起来可行,但必须采取明智方式克服大公司的局限性,而我同样受制于相关局限。这就是我为何创立专注战略增长咨询和企业风险投资的Stryber。

结合两个世界说来容易做起来难。若要实现,公司必须解决几乎无法克服的内部问题,我在大公司架构中都遇到过。要克服典型的分析瘫痪症并采取行动,要从首席执行官获得强力的战略授权,还要争取股东支持。问题要解决,事情要去做,不要害怕失败。避开噪音、最新趋势还有救世承诺,在选择影响力战略以及信任谁去执行方面,要格外谨慎。

为解决诸多问题,各种路径都有所尝试。我们试了企业风险投资,开放式创新创业合作、内部创意竞赛以及加速器和内部创业计划。结论既简单又发人深省:相关种种都不适合打造新业务。

自行建立还是收购

在Stryber,我们发现打造新业务只有两种方法有效:要么自行建立,要么收购。就这么简单。数据显示,尽管价格高昂,但在开创新业务线时,收购具备规模公司或者至少在增长后期的公司是主流选择。是的,我们敏锐地意识到并购的陷阱。不过并购战略的风险并不在于合并后整合失败,而是10次有9次根本找不到合适的收购目标。通常只剩下一个战略可选:尽管存在各种内部陷阱,公司必须自行建立新业务模式。这就是我所说合理的“企业风险投资”,别无选择。

多年来,我和公司代表大公司并与大公司合作建立了100多家新企业。以下是我们与大型银行、零售商、保险公司、卫生组织、食品公司、私募股权公司和主权财富基金合作得出的经验教训。

成功和失败的根本原因与创新或创业过程本身无关。成功第一个关键因素是在对市场状况达成共识的基础上,对母公司的未来规划出清晰的愿景,而不是制定新的商业计划。要支持这一愿景,必须有明确的财务目标。高管层与股东对未来看法保持一致是关键。此举有助于讲好股权故事,领导层要认同并做出承诺,股东则要注入现金或放弃分红表达支持。

同样重要的是适当的治理。很多管理者严重低估了这一方面,因为在正常业务中,现有的公司治理运作良好。但如果与核心业务采取相同治理方式,新业务可能失去成功的机会。针对新业务,要给予更大自由度——而且往往完全独立,这样新企业才能找到成功之路。

另一个教训是:创意不值钱。正如分析所示,即使进入市场后,最有前景的初创公司当中有89%也无法顺利扩大规模。从漏斗最上方的系统性市场分析、创意筛选和交易寻找到规模化企业,我们发现最终失败率高达97%。所以痴迷于创意并在发展早期超支,是非常可怕的做法。只有企业适应产品市场之后,才应该开始积极追加投资,推动新企业壮大规模。这时继续发展会非常烧钱,也是为何刚开始需要股东大力授权,因为股东要在新业务增长阶段提供资金直到发展成熟。

努力打造新业务的大公司其实只有一个选择:在并购和风险投资方面采取系统和有计划的行动。如果当初我能掌握现在的知识,相信老牌旅游公司和旅游初创公司都能顺利活下来。(财富中文网)

扬·塞德拉切克是总部位于瑞士的战略增长咨询公司Stryber创始人和管理合伙人。

Fortune.com上评论文章中表达的观点仅代表作者个人观点,并不代表《财富》杂志的观点和立场。

译者:梁宇

审校:夏林

我在职业生涯中曾多次失败。当然,我努力从每次失败中吸取教训,但就像电子游戏一样:随着不断进步,吸取的教训也越来越难付诸实践。后来,我在协助建立100多家新企业的过程中加以应用,避免其他领导者和公司落入同样的陷阱。接下来我将分享一些经验教训。

20世纪90年代中期,我在瑞士上高中时创办了第一家公司,业务是为小企业创建网站。之后,我加入了当时瑞士领先的网络中介公司,尝试了一些了不起的工作,比如为银行创建第一个在线房地产平台——我认为这是我人生第一个大项目。结果是彻底失败。没人想用房地产平台。从中我学到了宝贵教训:打造产品要从解决客户实际问题出发,而不是从企业想提供的业务出发。

从圣加仑大学(University of St)毕业后,我加入了位于苏黎世的战略咨询公司罗兰贝格(Roland Berger),也是重要的学习经历。然而,工作中构思的很多方案并没真正执行,让我这个年轻的顾问有点困惑。削减成本的命令很简单也能取得成效,然而实际上我们只是建议应该解雇多少人。另一方面,我觉得有些奇怪的是,大多数增长战略都没什么效果。

商业模式转型的神话

所以,我决定亲自加入战场,进入一家大公司当经理。我想学习如何把事情做好。碰巧我加入的当时瑞士最大也最负盛名的旅游公司Kuoni,是之前在咨询公司的客户,我们曾向其提供转型建议。

我和管理层都很清楚,随着在线旅行社出现以及酒店和航空公司直接预订份额增加,旅游业面临翻天覆地的变化,我们的市场份额和利润将被蚕食。因此,董事会委托我们为公司打造在线业务。战略只有三个字:“网络化”。但我们失败了。公司一蹶不振,后来被卖掉分崩离析。

那段经历中我学到了很多东西,后来我在欧洲工商管理学院还专门为之写了一篇案例研究。不过我学到最关键一点是,商业模式转型是虚假的方法,只不过是一种迷信。转型意味着整个价值链都要调整,根本无法做到,因为这意味着所有方面都要改。

2013年离开这家老牌旅游公司后,我加入了瑞士初创公司Everyglobe,公司目标是打造未来的旅行社。我们筹集到170万瑞士法郎,在当时种子轮算得上一大笔钱,募集的资金主要用于加强技术实力,实现变革性的客户体验。产品非常简单:一个搜索栏和四个旅行偏好滚动界面,如休闲或社交活动。该界面可针对去哪里和做什么实时提供旅行建议,可以立即预订。这项技术让人感觉很神奇。公司是真正数字化的旅行顾问。

实际上,预算只用掉了很小一部分,开发出的技术比之前旅行公司至少好10倍。公司还通过病毒式营销在用户增长方面大获成功,有时目标群体中有高达10%的人使用平台。问题是,尽管价格与其他在线平台相同,但人们不愿意在此下订单。原因很简单:我们是名不见经传的初创公司。一次旅行花费不菲,人们更喜欢在成熟公司下订单。后来公司没钱了,就这么黄了。

我学到的教训:将两个世界结合起来一定有可能。直到今天我还是确信,如果后面这家初创公司能拥有之前旅游公司的客户群和品牌信任,肯定能成功。我也相信,如果之前公司能利用其诸多宝贵资产打造新业务,不至于倒闭。

就在那时我开始相信,将两个世界结合起来可行,但必须采取明智方式克服大公司的局限性,而我同样受制于相关局限。这就是我为何创立专注战略增长咨询和企业风险投资的Stryber。

结合两个世界说来容易做起来难。若要实现,公司必须解决几乎无法克服的内部问题,我在大公司架构中都遇到过。要克服典型的分析瘫痪症并采取行动,要从首席执行官获得强力的战略授权,还要争取股东支持。问题要解决,事情要去做,不要害怕失败。避开噪音、最新趋势还有救世承诺,在选择影响力战略以及信任谁去执行方面,要格外谨慎。

为解决诸多问题,各种路径都有所尝试。我们试了企业风险投资,开放式创新创业合作、内部创意竞赛以及加速器和内部创业计划。结论既简单又发人深省:相关种种都不适合打造新业务。

自行建立还是收购

在Stryber,我们发现打造新业务只有两种方法有效:要么自行建立,要么收购。就这么简单。数据显示,尽管价格高昂,但在开创新业务线时,收购具备规模公司或者至少在增长后期的公司是主流选择。是的,我们敏锐地意识到并购的陷阱。不过并购战略的风险并不在于合并后整合失败,而是10次有9次根本找不到合适的收购目标。通常只剩下一个战略可选:尽管存在各种内部陷阱,公司必须自行建立新业务模式。这就是我所说合理的“企业风险投资”,别无选择。

多年来,我和公司代表大公司并与大公司合作建立了100多家新企业。以下是我们与大型银行、零售商、保险公司、卫生组织、食品公司、私募股权公司和主权财富基金合作得出的经验教训。

成功和失败的根本原因与创新或创业过程本身无关。成功第一个关键因素是在对市场状况达成共识的基础上,对母公司的未来规划出清晰的愿景,而不是制定新的商业计划。要支持这一愿景,必须有明确的财务目标。高管层与股东对未来看法保持一致是关键。此举有助于讲好股权故事,领导层要认同并做出承诺,股东则要注入现金或放弃分红表达支持。

同样重要的是适当的治理。很多管理者严重低估了这一方面,因为在正常业务中,现有的公司治理运作良好。但如果与核心业务采取相同治理方式,新业务可能失去成功的机会。针对新业务,要给予更大自由度——而且往往完全独立,这样新企业才能找到成功之路。

另一个教训是:创意不值钱。正如分析所示,即使进入市场后,最有前景的初创公司当中有89%也无法顺利扩大规模。从漏斗最上方的系统性市场分析、创意筛选和交易寻找到规模化企业,我们发现最终失败率高达97%。所以痴迷于创意并在发展早期超支,是非常可怕的做法。只有企业适应产品市场之后,才应该开始积极追加投资,推动新企业壮大规模。这时继续发展会非常烧钱,也是为何刚开始需要股东大力授权,因为股东要在新业务增长阶段提供资金直到发展成熟。

努力打造新业务的大公司其实只有一个选择:在并购和风险投资方面采取系统和有计划的行动。如果当初我能掌握现在的知识,相信老牌旅游公司和旅游初创公司都能顺利活下来。(财富中文网)

扬·塞德拉切克是总部位于瑞士的战略增长咨询公司Stryber创始人和管理合伙人。

Fortune.com上评论文章中表达的观点仅代表作者个人观点,并不代表《财富》杂志的观点和立场。

译者:梁宇

审校:夏林

I experienced failure first-hand multiple times throughout my career. Of course, I tried to learn from each failure, but it was like in a video game: As I progressed, the lessons became increasingly difficult and harder to put into practice. Ultimately, I applied them by helping to build more than 100 new business ventures, ensuring other leaders and their companies did not fall into the same traps. Allow me to share some of those lessons.

I started my first company while in high school in Switzerland in the mid-1990s, creating websites for small businesses. Afterwards, I joined the leading web agency in the nation at the time, and I could do some amazing things there, like creating the first online real estate platform for a bank—which I regard as my first big project. It failed miserably. No one wanted a real estate platform. I learned a valuable lesson there: You must build products that solve actual customer problems, as opposed to building what you want to offer as a business.

I joined a strategy consultancy, Roland Berger, in Zurich after graduating from the University of St. Gallen, and this was another big learning curve. What puzzled me as a young consultant, though, was how much of what we conceptualized never got executed properly. While cost-cutting mandates were straightforward and delivered results, all we really did was recommend how many people should get fired. But on the other side, and somewhat strangely to me at the time, most growth strategies failed to achieve impact.

The myth of business-model transformation

So, I decided to get into the trenches and become a manager at a large company. I wanted to learn how to get things done. I happened to join Kuoni, the largest and most prestigious travel company in Switzerland at the time—a client of my previous consulting firm, whom we had advised on a transformation program.

It was clear to me and the whole management that travel would change forever, with the emergence of online travel agencies and increasing shares of direct bookings at hotels and airlines eating away our market share and margins. Consequently, we were tasked by the board to create new online business for the company. The strategy consisted of two words: “Go online.” But we failed miserably. The company went down and eventually was sold off and ripped apart.

There was a plethora of learning in that experience, so much so that I wrote a case study on it with Insead. But the key point I learned was that business-model transformation is a falsified approach, nothing more than a myth. It would mean transforming a whole value chain. You simply cannot do that, as it would mean changing everything.

After leaving the established travel company in 2013, I joined Everyglobe, a Swiss startup that aimed to become the travel agency of the future. We raised 1.7 million CHF, a lot of money for a seed round back then, which we used to build the technology for a transformative customer experience. Our product was very simple: a search field and four sliders for travel preferences, such as relaxation or social activities. The interface would in real time customize travel recommendations on where to go and what to do, and you could immediately book the trip. The technology felt like magic. We were a truly digitized travel advisory.

On what effectively was a tiny budget, we built technology that was at least 10 times better than the kind used by my old travel company. We also achieved great traction in terms of user growth through viral marketing campaigns, at times having up to 10% of our whole target group engaging on our platform. The problem was that people were reluctant to book with us, even though we had the same prices as other online platforms. The reason was simple: We were an unknown startup. After all, a trip costs a lot of money, and people preferred to do the actual bookings with more established companies. We ran out of cash, and that was it.

What I took away: It must be possible to combine both worlds. To this day, I’m convinced that our travel startup would have taken off if it could have benefited from my old travel company’s customer reach and brand trust. I’m also convinced that my old company would still be around if it had managed to leverage its many valuable assets to create new business.

That’s when I came to believe that it’s in fact possible to combine both worlds, but it had to be done in a smart way to overcome large companies’ limitations, which I was subject to myself. That is why I founded Stryber, a strategic growth consultancy and a corporate venture builder.

Combining these two worlds is far easier said than done. An organization must overcome almost insurmountable internal problems, which I had encountered myself being part of the large corporate structure. You need to have a very strong strategic mandate, owned by the CEO and backed by the shareholders, to overcome the typical analysis paralysis and move to action. Problems need to be solved and things need to get done, without fear of failure. You need to cut through the noise, the latest trends, the promises of salvation, and be extremely careful with how you select your strategies for impact and whom you trust to execute on them.

To solve these problems, we have tried many different routes. We tried corporate venture capital, open innovation startup collaborations, internal ideation contests, and accelerator and intrapreneurship programs. My conclusion is as simple as it is sobering: None of this works for new business creation.

Build it or buy it

At Stryber, we have found only two effective ways to create new business: build it or buy it. It’s as simple as that. Our data suggests that a proper acquisition of a company at scale, or at least in a late growth stage, is the dominant option to create a new line of business, albeit at a hefty price. And yes, we are acutely aware of the pitfalls of M&A. But the risk of an M&A strategy is not the post-merger integration failures, which need to be considered, but that in 9 out of 10 cases there is simply not the right target to be acquired. This often leaves only one strategy available: Companies must build new business models themselves, despite all the internal pitfalls. That’s what I call proper “corporate venture building,” and it’s without alternative.

Over the years, my company and I have built well over 100 new business ventures on behalf of and in cooperation with large organizations. Below are the learnings we’ve uncovered through working with large banks, retailers, insurers, health groups, food companies, private equity firms, and sovereign wealth funds.

The root causes for both success and failure have nothing to do with innovation or the venturing process itself. The first key success factor is having a clear vision for the parent company’s future, not the new business initiative, based on a common understanding of the market dynamics at large. To support that vision, a clear financial ambition must exist. Building up a common view of the future among both senior management and the shareholders is key. This helps to create the equity story, which leadership must buy into and commit to, and shareholders literally must buy, by either injecting cash or forgoing dividends.

Equally important is setting up the proper governance. Many managers wildly underestimate this aspect, because in their normal business the existing corporate governance is working perfectly fine. But operating a new business in the same governance as your core business means stripping it of any chance of success. For new business, you must create many degrees of freedom—and often complete independence for the venture to find its way.

Another lesson: Ideas come a dime a dozen. Even after launching in the market, 89% of even the most promising startups never make it to scale, as our analysis has shown. From the earliest funnel stage of systematic market analysis, idea screening, and deal sourcing to a venture that scales, we see a total loss rate of 97% along the way. That’s why falling in love with your ideas, and overspending in early stages of development, is a terrible idea. Only after a venture has made it to product-market fit should you start to aggressively double down with follow-on investment, until the new business venture reaches scale. This is also when it gets really expensive and is why you need the strong shareholder mandate in the first place, because they will need to fund the new business through its growth stage, until it’s mature itself.

A large organization that seeks to create new business has only one choice: to act systematically and programmatically on both M&A and venture building. Had we known—and applied—what I know now, I am convinced that both the old travel company and my travel startup would still be around.

Jan Sedlacek is founder and managing partner of Stryber, a strategic growth consultancy headquartered in Switzerland.

The opinions expressed in Fortune.com commentary pieces are solely the views of their authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and beliefs of Fortune.

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