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斯科特·戴克斯特豪斯坚信自己的看法。或者这么说,在预测3英里以下的海底时,他向来信心满满。当年32岁的戴克斯特豪斯是埃克森美孚(Exxon Mobil)的地球科学家,他认为圭亚那海岸附近,大西洋与加勒比海交界处很可能蕴藏着大量石油。然而困难也正在于此。他不得不说服老板钻井证明自己的推测。“风险很高,”戴克斯特豪斯说,“但圭亚那这个赌场值得下注,因为一旦成功,利润会很高。”
2013年底,去圭亚那挖石油实在不是埃克森美孚的重点。在此之前公司在该地区已经钻出40多口干井。目标地层在一英里深的水下,起名为Liza,这是当地一种鱼的名字,钻探成本至少1.75亿美元。据戴克斯特豪斯估计,成功几率只有五分之一。但如果他赌对了,石油勘探的前沿将就此拓展,因为这能证明全世界储量最大的委内瑞拉储油地层延伸到了南美洲北海岸。埃克森美孚很多人没兴趣打赌,石油行业其他公司也兴趣不大。
如今,Liza已成为20多年来全球最大的石油勘探发现。埃克森美孚控制的地块有110亿桶可开采石油,按当前价格计算价值近1万亿美元。这一发现使圭亚那从南美洲最穷国摇身一变成为到2027年人均原油产量将超过沙特阿拉伯或科威特的国家。届时圭亚那石油产量有望排名南美第二,超过委内瑞拉仅次于巴西。
疫情之后,圭亚那变成德州石油巨头埃克森美孚复兴的基石。埃克森美孚掌握着圭亚那油田45%的份额,每桶生产成本低于35美元,是欧佩克以外利润最高的油田之一。目前原油交易价格为每桶85美元,即便从化石燃料转型导致需求崩溃价格减半,油田也会赚钱。
从圭亚那油井背后不为人知的故事,能看出一些关于石油过去和未来令人惊讶的真相,相关细节主要来自对十几位曾参与Liza油井勘探人士的采访,其中多数人后来已离开公司。从中可看出业内不少人高估了从石油到可再生能源转型的速度。就在三年前,埃克森美孚在董事会席位争夺战中还输给了激进投资者,对方认为埃克森美孚为转型做的准备很不够。埃克森美孚则坚持核心业务。“其他同行后退之际,我们却在前进,”埃克森美孚生产部门总裁利亚姆·马龙说。2019年底圭亚那生产启动以来,公司股价已翻了一番多,在同行巨头中回报率最高。
这段历史表明,依靠市场力量终结化石燃料非常困难。绿色环保运动曾希望更先进的技术能推动太阳能、风能和其他可再生能源取代勘探难度越发增加的石油。现在环保主义者担心,埃克森美孚利用能源转型放缓获得意外之财,而钻井对气候和圭亚那生态造成的损害都转嫁到其他公司头上。“埃克森美孚污染了海洋和大气,却不必付出代价,”从事国际环境保护工作的圭亚那律师梅琳达·扬基说。(埃克森美孚表示会投资环保技术,达到甚至超过了监管要求。)
埃克森美孚的竞争对手们显然痛心疾首。包括雪佛龙(Chevron)在内近30家其他公司放弃了投资圭亚那的机会。壳牌(Shell)曾持有50%份额,后来退出。雪佛龙以530亿美元收购了赫斯公司(Hess Corp.),因为该公司持有30%份额,是埃克森美孚在圭亚那的两个合作伙伴之一。今年埃克森美孚对赫斯收购案提起仲裁,声称对其股份有优先收购权。(赫斯公司表示,相关权利并不适用于收购。)
但圭亚那故事的关键并不是为获取巨大回报承担传奇风险。从实际情况来看,埃克森美孚既是石油勘探公司,也是金融工程公司。公司对冲了赌注,降低了风险敞口,还购买了期权,利用可能性很小的结果赚了一笔。
追溯战略缘起,还要看2013年一个关键时刻。当时埃克森美孚的顶尖地球科学家得出结论称,戴克斯特豪斯和同事们没能证明钻探Liza值得冒险。戴克斯特豪斯很沮丧。如果不钻探,埃克森美孚就得在几个月内将斯塔布鲁克区块或特许权(也就是该地区勘探和钻探的许可证)归还圭亚那政府。(斯塔布鲁克是圭亚那首都乔治敦的原名。)
会议结束后的走廊里,商业顾问鲁迪·迪斯穆克将一位地球科学家拉到一旁,问道:“如果钻井免费,你会支持Liza吗?” 这位地球科学家回答:“当然!”
为此,一小群中低层员工想出了免费钻井的方法。或者可以说接近免费。
跟很多地球科学家一样,罗德·林伯特一直很清楚在大西洋深处,委内瑞拉石油的源岩,也就是拉卢纳地层一直延伸到圭亚那、苏里南和法属圭亚那的海洋领土。20世纪60年代,苏里南村民在校园里钻井时意外发现了一个储量十亿桶的油田,这位心直口快的澳大利亚人立刻着了迷。
林伯特认为,校园里的石油起源于圭亚那大陆架,而且在数百万年的时间里向陆地迁移了100多英里。1997年年中,他向负责勘探新盆地的埃克森美孚团队提出了这一想法。“演讲结束时团队只得到一张大拇指向下的照片,”林伯特说。但他还是联系了圭亚那政府争取钻井权。“我没有告诉任何人,”他说。
1997年,圭亚那仍然深陷于强人福布斯·伯纳姆的社会主义和孤立主义政策,是南美洲最贫穷的国家之一。1966年圭亚那脱离英国独立后不久,伯纳姆便上台执政。林伯特和两名同事从休斯顿飞往乔治敦,获取旧的钻井记录,与圭亚那地质和矿业委员会讨论争取钻探权的可能。“那里的一层真就是最底层,”伯纳姆说,“我的意思是桌子和椅子在土里。”
埃克森美孚团队还会见了圭亚那总统塞缪尔·辛德斯,他只喜欢谈圭亚那流行的板球。“我没急着谈生意,因为我没权力做事,”林伯特说。返回德州提供新数据后,林伯特获得授权开始谈判勘探权合同。
林伯特举出大量油井勘探失败的例子,推动并最终签下了条件非常有利的合同。埃克森美孚获得的斯塔布鲁克地块比墨西哥湾石油地块平均面积大1000多倍。合同规定不用预付款,如果埃克森美孚真的开采出石油,可在扣除成本后保留50%的利润。公司只用向政府支付1%的特许权使用费。后来圭亚那政府因这份合同受到严厉批评。“一段时间以来,我一直在扪心自问,但觉得自己没有做错,”林伯特说,“按照当时我们了解的情况以及未知状况来说,合同并无不妥。”
另一方面,这笔交易确实帮助了政府。圭亚那与东边的苏里南和西边的委内瑞拉都存在严重的边界争端。与埃克森美孚结盟意味着与圭亚那为敌就是与全世界最强大的石油公司为敌。
圭亚那的担心也不无道理。苏里南炮舰曾将另一家石油勘探公司驱离两国有争议的水域。有八年时间,埃克森美孚无法在该地块勘探。2007年苏里南冲突快要解决时,埃克森美孚的高管们才发现还要出资研究地震才能满足合同要求。高管们建议放弃该地块,腾出现金给巴西、墨西哥湾和美国新兴页岩盆地更重要的勘探工作。
工程师迪斯穆克曾在德州接受教育,当时担任埃克森美孚西半球商业顾问,看到与圭亚那签署的合同后他简直不敢相信自己的眼睛。林伯特谈判达成的协议对公司非常有利。迪斯穆克和同事提出了一项外包协议,将部分地块转给愿意为地震研究付费的公司。埃克森美孚的管理层批准了,2008年将斯塔布鲁克25%的份额卖给了壳牌。接下来三年里埃克森美孚和壳牌解读了从地下岩层反弹的地震波从而了解当地的地质情况。初步获得的数据很乐观,迹象显示存在化石燃料。
但数据也证实了很多地球科学家最担心的问题:完全没有构造圈闭。构造圈闭是指地质断层或非常坚固的岩石带,就像大坝一样,石油经过数百万年渗入沉积层时可将其捕获。如果没有坚固的圈闭层,石油就无法大量积聚,也就没有商业价值。圭亚那只有地层圈闭,对石油勘探来说在所有地质构造中风险最大。虽然地层圈闭很安全,但不容易发现,很难在地震图上分析。而且这种构造通常包含所谓的 "盗油区",石油可能从中漏出。
到了2000年代末期,石油行业开始热衷勘探地层圈闭。当时原油价格超过每桶100美元,如果能有大发现就意味着巨额利润。技术也在不断进步。壳牌决定将在斯塔布鲁克地块的份额增加到 50%。大约同一时间,休斯顿一家小型勘探公司APA(当时还叫阿帕奇)两位地球科学家也在密切关注着相关消息。 上世纪90年代蒂姆·奇索姆曾在埃克森美孚研究过委内瑞拉,而巴勃罗·艾斯纳在西班牙雷普索尔工作时曾常驻该地区。两人都想去斯塔布鲁克分一杯羹,发现没机会后,就带阿帕奇公司进入了苏里南。
还没来得及钻井,阿帕奇公司管理层改变主意裁撤了勘探团队。不到半小时奇索姆和艾斯纳就遭解雇。奇索姆去了赫斯,艾斯纳则加入了中海油。两人都感觉有工作没做完。
2013年,员工人数达7.5万的埃克森美孚只有一位地球科学家全职负责圭亚那。壳牌资助的地震研究提供了大量数据。埃克森请澳大利亚地球科学家戴克斯特豪斯协助解读。他说,大学时就很热爱这一学科,因为 "涵盖了所有科学领域",包括地震建模物理学和研究数百万年前生物的古生物学。"最后研究石油和天然气,就会面临真金白银的决策,"他说。
从墨尔本抵达休斯顿后不久,戴克斯特豪斯就要做决策了。彼时埃克森美孚持有斯塔布鲁克十多年,为了要不要在面积堪比马萨诸塞州的某处打下直径8英寸的钻孔已纠结数月。
种种迹象显示没必要。埃克森更重视已发现石油的地方,而壳牌在法属圭亚那钻探失败后,对当地也兴趣渐失。戴克斯特豪斯开始分析约五年前获得的二维地震数据。一处名叫Liza的勘探区引起了注意。从数据来看存在流体。是什么流体?是水还是石油?他的上司就不确定性不断提出挑战。
通过复杂的计算机建模,戴克斯特豪斯综合了300多张三维地震图像,认为很可能是水面上的石油。"研究越多,我越是觉得'那里有东西',”戴克斯特豪斯说。2013年底,他和两位同事向埃克森十多位顶级地球科学家展示了发现。
好消息是,Liza有90米(295英尺)厚的 "含油层",里面布满了多孔的沙子,流体很容易通过。他们估计可能石油含量可能有8.9亿桶,当时价值近10亿美元。预测上限是这一数字的两倍。坏消息是成功几率只有22%,主要原因是Liza是地层圈闭。老板并未认可,三人只得铩羽而归。
会上坐在后排的迪斯穆克看法有所不同。“我当时想,如果圈闭勘探成功,按照条件非常有利的合同还能继续勘探600万英亩的地块,”他说。他制定了跟2008年类似的计划,即寻找愿意为油井勘探支付大量资金换取份额的合作伙伴,从而降低财务损失。当然,如果埃克森美孚没把风险分出去,现在赚得只会得多。埃克森美孚石油生产主管马龙表示,公司机会很多,没必要在一口井上押数亿美元。“不能光说不练,”他说,“到底是对还是错?都是基于当时了解的情况做的决定。”
管理层批准后,埃克森美孚迅速在休斯顿的Greenspoint办公室成立数据室,邀请了约30家石油公司,大概20家出席。各利益相关方的地球科学家坐了整整一天听埃克森美孚团队介绍,第二天又分析了数据。赫斯最后一个表示赞成。奇索姆盘问了戴克斯特豪斯两个多小时。“他做得很好,没有夸大其词,”2020年奇泽姆在的一次演讲中提到,“对我来说,这一点非常重要。他真的充满热情。”
2014年年中,赫斯正考虑投资该地块时,壳牌抛出了重磅炸弹:为地震数据支付了六年费用后,这家超级巨头想退出。壳牌回答提问时表示,做出这一决定是因为“对前沿勘探资产采取了广泛审查”。此时埃克森美孚拥有斯塔布鲁克100%的份额,距离通知圭亚那政府钻探与否只剩下几周时间。
在赫斯内部,投资圭亚那的决定很难推动,但最终该公司同意持有30%。“我把职业生涯都赌上了,”奇索姆说,“如果没成功,我肯定会被炒鱿鱼。”
早在阿帕奇与奇索姆共事时,艾斯纳就对圭亚那垂涎三尺,此时他已加入中海油。"各方都有机会投资斯塔布鲁克,但需要见解独特且头脑灵活的地质学家拍板,甚至把桌子砸了喊'赞成',"他说。“在中海油,我就是这样的角色。”艾斯纳说服了老板,中海油买下25% 的份额。埃克森在斯塔布鲁克的份额降到45%,但关键的是,两家新加入的公司同意承担油井大部分成本。由于埃克森美孚资金安全无虞,管理层同意钻探Liza。
这口油井耗资2.25亿美元。尽管到最后埃克森将在圭亚那项目的投资达250多亿美元,但熟悉内情的人士称,埃克森最初的支出,也就是确保对该重大发现享有控制权的支出与2013年相信圭亚那潜力的一群人提出的零支出非常接近,只花了不到1亿美元。实际可能还不到这个数字。
埃克森请了泛洋钻探设备公司(Transocean Ltd.)的 "深水冠军 "钻井平台。这台高规格的钻机长度堪比两个足球场,可装载10卡车的水泥和泥浆,钻井深度超过7英里。直升机机组和支援船只随时待命,所以油井每天成本很快就超过100万美元。
在埃克森内部,这口油井被称为 "地狱之井"。一段管道卡住没法上下移动,影响了整座油井。钻井工人只得切断钻头,用水泥填满井底。过程中损失了价值超过1500万美元的设备。但钻探人员打出一个侧钻孔,挽救了整个项目。在 Liza正式开钻前一天晚上,戴克斯特豪斯和同事在埃克森新建的休斯顿园区两间会议室里席地而睡。
2015年5月5日,钻头扎进Liza,休斯顿的实时油井数据显示岩石密度出现突变。这意味着Liza井下有大量化石燃料。但当时还不清楚是石油还是天然气。要想真正成功,必须是石油。
几个小时后,“深水冠军“钻井平台的甲板上泥浆循环,不断把石头甩到传送带上。戴克斯特豪斯的老板,也是资深地球科学家凯里·莫兰德突然在咸咸的海风中闻到一股熟悉的气息。“有点像加油站的味道,”她说。她戴上手套,捡起了一些石头。石头上,乌黑的石油滴滴滑落。(财富中文网)
译者:梁宇
审校:夏林
斯科特·戴克斯特豪斯坚信自己的看法。或者这么说,在预测3英里以下的海底时,他向来信心满满。当年32岁的戴克斯特豪斯是埃克森美孚(Exxon Mobil)的地球科学家,他认为圭亚那海岸附近,大西洋与加勒比海交界处很可能蕴藏着大量石油。然而困难也正在于此。他不得不说服老板钻井证明自己的推测。“风险很高,”戴克斯特豪斯说,“但圭亚那这个赌场值得下注,因为一旦成功,利润会很高。”
2013年底,去圭亚那挖石油实在不是埃克森美孚的重点。在此之前公司在该地区已经钻出40多口干井。目标地层在一英里深的水下,起名为Liza,这是当地一种鱼的名字,钻探成本至少1.75亿美元。据戴克斯特豪斯估计,成功几率只有五分之一。但如果他赌对了,石油勘探的前沿将就此拓展,因为这能证明全世界储量最大的委内瑞拉储油地层延伸到了南美洲北海岸。埃克森美孚很多人没兴趣打赌,石油行业其他公司也兴趣不大。
如今,Liza已成为20多年来全球最大的石油勘探发现。埃克森美孚控制的地块有110亿桶可开采石油,按当前价格计算价值近1万亿美元。这一发现使圭亚那从南美洲最穷国摇身一变成为到2027年人均原油产量将超过沙特阿拉伯或科威特的国家。届时圭亚那石油产量有望排名南美第二,超过委内瑞拉仅次于巴西。
疫情之后,圭亚那变成德州石油巨头埃克森美孚复兴的基石。埃克森美孚掌握着圭亚那油田45%的份额,每桶生产成本低于35美元,是欧佩克以外利润最高的油田之一。目前原油交易价格为每桶85美元,即便从化石燃料转型导致需求崩溃价格减半,油田也会赚钱。
从圭亚那油井背后不为人知的故事,能看出一些关于石油过去和未来令人惊讶的真相,相关细节主要来自对十几位曾参与Liza油井勘探人士的采访,其中多数人后来已离开公司。从中可看出业内不少人高估了从石油到可再生能源转型的速度。就在三年前,埃克森美孚在董事会席位争夺战中还输给了激进投资者,对方认为埃克森美孚为转型做的准备很不够。埃克森美孚则坚持核心业务。“其他同行后退之际,我们却在前进,”埃克森美孚生产部门总裁利亚姆·马龙说。2019年底圭亚那生产启动以来,公司股价已翻了一番多,在同行巨头中回报率最高。
这段历史表明,依靠市场力量终结化石燃料非常困难。绿色环保运动曾希望更先进的技术能推动太阳能、风能和其他可再生能源取代勘探难度越发增加的石油。现在环保主义者担心,埃克森美孚利用能源转型放缓获得意外之财,而钻井对气候和圭亚那生态造成的损害都转嫁到其他公司头上。“埃克森美孚污染了海洋和大气,却不必付出代价,”从事国际环境保护工作的圭亚那律师梅琳达·扬基说。(埃克森美孚表示会投资环保技术,达到甚至超过了监管要求。)
埃克森美孚的竞争对手们显然痛心疾首。包括雪佛龙(Chevron)在内近30家其他公司放弃了投资圭亚那的机会。壳牌(Shell)曾持有50%份额,后来退出。雪佛龙以530亿美元收购了赫斯公司(Hess Corp.),因为该公司持有30%份额,是埃克森美孚在圭亚那的两个合作伙伴之一。今年埃克森美孚对赫斯收购案提起仲裁,声称对其股份有优先收购权。(赫斯公司表示,相关权利并不适用于收购。)
但圭亚那故事的关键并不是为获取巨大回报承担传奇风险。从实际情况来看,埃克森美孚既是石油勘探公司,也是金融工程公司。公司对冲了赌注,降低了风险敞口,还购买了期权,利用可能性很小的结果赚了一笔。
追溯战略缘起,还要看2013年一个关键时刻。当时埃克森美孚的顶尖地球科学家得出结论称,戴克斯特豪斯和同事们没能证明钻探Liza值得冒险。戴克斯特豪斯很沮丧。如果不钻探,埃克森美孚就得在几个月内将斯塔布鲁克区块或特许权(也就是该地区勘探和钻探的许可证)归还圭亚那政府。(斯塔布鲁克是圭亚那首都乔治敦的原名。)
会议结束后的走廊里,商业顾问鲁迪·迪斯穆克将一位地球科学家拉到一旁,问道:“如果钻井免费,你会支持Liza吗?” 这位地球科学家回答:“当然!”
为此,一小群中低层员工想出了免费钻井的方法。或者可以说接近免费。
跟很多地球科学家一样,罗德·林伯特一直很清楚在大西洋深处,委内瑞拉石油的源岩,也就是拉卢纳地层一直延伸到圭亚那、苏里南和法属圭亚那的海洋领土。20世纪60年代,苏里南村民在校园里钻井时意外发现了一个储量十亿桶的油田,这位心直口快的澳大利亚人立刻着了迷。
林伯特认为,校园里的石油起源于圭亚那大陆架,而且在数百万年的时间里向陆地迁移了100多英里。1997年年中,他向负责勘探新盆地的埃克森美孚团队提出了这一想法。“演讲结束时团队只得到一张大拇指向下的照片,”林伯特说。但他还是联系了圭亚那政府争取钻井权。“我没有告诉任何人,”他说。
1997年,圭亚那仍然深陷于强人福布斯·伯纳姆的社会主义和孤立主义政策,是南美洲最贫穷的国家之一。1966年圭亚那脱离英国独立后不久,伯纳姆便上台执政。林伯特和两名同事从休斯顿飞往乔治敦,获取旧的钻井记录,与圭亚那地质和矿业委员会讨论争取钻探权的可能。“那里的一层真就是最底层,”伯纳姆说,“我的意思是桌子和椅子在土里。”
埃克森美孚团队还会见了圭亚那总统塞缪尔·辛德斯,他只喜欢谈圭亚那流行的板球。“我没急着谈生意,因为我没权力做事,”林伯特说。返回德州提供新数据后,林伯特获得授权开始谈判勘探权合同。
林伯特举出大量油井勘探失败的例子,推动并最终签下了条件非常有利的合同。埃克森美孚获得的斯塔布鲁克地块比墨西哥湾石油地块平均面积大1000多倍。合同规定不用预付款,如果埃克森美孚真的开采出石油,可在扣除成本后保留50%的利润。公司只用向政府支付1%的特许权使用费。后来圭亚那政府因这份合同受到严厉批评。“一段时间以来,我一直在扪心自问,但觉得自己没有做错,”林伯特说,“按照当时我们了解的情况以及未知状况来说,合同并无不妥。”
另一方面,这笔交易确实帮助了政府。圭亚那与东边的苏里南和西边的委内瑞拉都存在严重的边界争端。与埃克森美孚结盟意味着与圭亚那为敌就是与全世界最强大的石油公司为敌。
圭亚那的担心也不无道理。苏里南炮舰曾将另一家石油勘探公司驱离两国有争议的水域。有八年时间,埃克森美孚无法在该地块勘探。2007年苏里南冲突快要解决时,埃克森美孚的高管们才发现还要出资研究地震才能满足合同要求。高管们建议放弃该地块,腾出现金给巴西、墨西哥湾和美国新兴页岩盆地更重要的勘探工作。
工程师迪斯穆克曾在德州接受教育,当时担任埃克森美孚西半球商业顾问,看到与圭亚那签署的合同后他简直不敢相信自己的眼睛。林伯特谈判达成的协议对公司非常有利。迪斯穆克和同事提出了一项外包协议,将部分地块转给愿意为地震研究付费的公司。埃克森美孚的管理层批准了,2008年将斯塔布鲁克25%的份额卖给了壳牌。接下来三年里埃克森美孚和壳牌解读了从地下岩层反弹的地震波从而了解当地的地质情况。初步获得的数据很乐观,迹象显示存在化石燃料。
但数据也证实了很多地球科学家最担心的问题:完全没有构造圈闭。构造圈闭是指地质断层或非常坚固的岩石带,就像大坝一样,石油经过数百万年渗入沉积层时可将其捕获。如果没有坚固的圈闭层,石油就无法大量积聚,也就没有商业价值。圭亚那只有地层圈闭,对石油勘探来说在所有地质构造中风险最大。虽然地层圈闭很安全,但不容易发现,很难在地震图上分析。而且这种构造通常包含所谓的 "盗油区",石油可能从中漏出。
到了2000年代末期,石油行业开始热衷勘探地层圈闭。当时原油价格超过每桶100美元,如果能有大发现就意味着巨额利润。技术也在不断进步。壳牌决定将在斯塔布鲁克地块的份额增加到 50%。大约同一时间,休斯顿一家小型勘探公司APA(当时还叫阿帕奇)两位地球科学家也在密切关注着相关消息。 上世纪90年代蒂姆·奇索姆曾在埃克森美孚研究过委内瑞拉,而巴勃罗·艾斯纳在西班牙雷普索尔工作时曾常驻该地区。两人都想去斯塔布鲁克分一杯羹,发现没机会后,就带阿帕奇公司进入了苏里南。
还没来得及钻井,阿帕奇公司管理层改变主意裁撤了勘探团队。不到半小时奇索姆和艾斯纳就遭解雇。奇索姆去了赫斯,艾斯纳则加入了中海油。两人都感觉有工作没做完。
2013年,员工人数达7.5万的埃克森美孚只有一位地球科学家全职负责圭亚那。壳牌资助的地震研究提供了大量数据。埃克森请澳大利亚地球科学家戴克斯特豪斯协助解读。他说,大学时就很热爱这一学科,因为 "涵盖了所有科学领域",包括地震建模物理学和研究数百万年前生物的古生物学。"最后研究石油和天然气,就会面临真金白银的决策,"他说。
从墨尔本抵达休斯顿后不久,戴克斯特豪斯就要做决策了。彼时埃克森美孚持有斯塔布鲁克十多年,为了要不要在面积堪比马萨诸塞州的某处打下直径8英寸的钻孔已纠结数月。
种种迹象显示没必要。埃克森更重视已发现石油的地方,而壳牌在法属圭亚那钻探失败后,对当地也兴趣渐失。戴克斯特豪斯开始分析约五年前获得的二维地震数据。一处名叫Liza的勘探区引起了注意。从数据来看存在流体。是什么流体?是水还是石油?他的上司就不确定性不断提出挑战。
通过复杂的计算机建模,戴克斯特豪斯综合了300多张三维地震图像,认为很可能是水面上的石油。"研究越多,我越是觉得'那里有东西',”戴克斯特豪斯说。2013年底,他和两位同事向埃克森十多位顶级地球科学家展示了发现。
好消息是,Liza有90米(295英尺)厚的 "含油层",里面布满了多孔的沙子,流体很容易通过。他们估计可能石油含量可能有8.9亿桶,当时价值近10亿美元。预测上限是这一数字的两倍。坏消息是成功几率只有22%,主要原因是Liza是地层圈闭。老板并未认可,三人只得铩羽而归。
会上坐在后排的迪斯穆克看法有所不同。“我当时想,如果圈闭勘探成功,按照条件非常有利的合同还能继续勘探600万英亩的地块,”他说。他制定了跟2008年类似的计划,即寻找愿意为油井勘探支付大量资金换取份额的合作伙伴,从而降低财务损失。当然,如果埃克森美孚没把风险分出去,现在赚得只会得多。埃克森美孚石油生产主管马龙表示,公司机会很多,没必要在一口井上押数亿美元。“不能光说不练,”他说,“到底是对还是错?都是基于当时了解的情况做的决定。”
管理层批准后,埃克森美孚迅速在休斯顿的Greenspoint办公室成立数据室,邀请了约30家石油公司,大概20家出席。各利益相关方的地球科学家坐了整整一天听埃克森美孚团队介绍,第二天又分析了数据。赫斯最后一个表示赞成。奇索姆盘问了戴克斯特豪斯两个多小时。“他做得很好,没有夸大其词,”2020年奇泽姆在的一次演讲中提到,“对我来说,这一点非常重要。他真的充满热情。”
2014年年中,赫斯正考虑投资该地块时,壳牌抛出了重磅炸弹:为地震数据支付了六年费用后,这家超级巨头想退出。壳牌回答提问时表示,做出这一决定是因为“对前沿勘探资产采取了广泛审查”。此时埃克森美孚拥有斯塔布鲁克100%的份额,距离通知圭亚那政府钻探与否只剩下几周时间。
在赫斯内部,投资圭亚那的决定很难推动,但最终该公司同意持有30%。“我把职业生涯都赌上了,”奇索姆说,“如果没成功,我肯定会被炒鱿鱼。”
早在阿帕奇与奇索姆共事时,艾斯纳就对圭亚那垂涎三尺,此时他已加入中海油。"各方都有机会投资斯塔布鲁克,但需要见解独特且头脑灵活的地质学家拍板,甚至把桌子砸了喊'赞成',"他说。“在中海油,我就是这样的角色。”艾斯纳说服了老板,中海油买下25% 的份额。埃克森在斯塔布鲁克的份额降到45%,但关键的是,两家新加入的公司同意承担油井大部分成本。由于埃克森美孚资金安全无虞,管理层同意钻探Liza。
这口油井耗资2.25亿美元。尽管到最后埃克森将在圭亚那项目的投资达250多亿美元,但熟悉内情的人士称,埃克森最初的支出,也就是确保对该重大发现享有控制权的支出与2013年相信圭亚那潜力的一群人提出的零支出非常接近,只花了不到1亿美元。实际可能还不到这个数字。
埃克森请了泛洋钻探设备公司(Transocean Ltd.)的 "深水冠军 "钻井平台。这台高规格的钻机长度堪比两个足球场,可装载10卡车的水泥和泥浆,钻井深度超过7英里。直升机机组和支援船只随时待命,所以油井每天成本很快就超过100万美元。
在埃克森内部,这口油井被称为 "地狱之井"。一段管道卡住没法上下移动,影响了整座油井。钻井工人只得切断钻头,用水泥填满井底。过程中损失了价值超过1500万美元的设备。但钻探人员打出一个侧钻孔,挽救了整个项目。在 Liza正式开钻前一天晚上,戴克斯特豪斯和同事在埃克森新建的休斯顿园区两间会议室里席地而睡。
2015年5月5日,钻头扎进Liza,休斯顿的实时油井数据显示岩石密度出现突变。这意味着Liza井下有大量化石燃料。但当时还不清楚是石油还是天然气。要想真正成功,必须是石油。
几个小时后,“深水冠军“钻井平台的甲板上泥浆循环,不断把石头甩到传送带上。戴克斯特豪斯的老板,也是资深地球科学家凯里·莫兰德突然在咸咸的海风中闻到一股熟悉的气息。“有点像加油站的味道,”她说。她戴上手套,捡起了一些石头。石头上,乌黑的石油滴滴滑落。(财富中文网)
译者:梁宇
审校:夏林
Scott Dyksterhuis was convinced. Or as convinced as you can be when predicting what lies more than 3 miles beneath the seabed. The then 32-year-old geoscientist for Exxon Mobil Corp. figured there was a good chance a vast trove of oil lay buried off the coast of Guyana, near where the Atlantic Ocean meets the Caribbean Sea. Now came the hard part. He had to persuade his bosses to drill a well that would prove it. “It was high-risk,” -Dyksterhuis says. “But Guyana was a casino you wanted to play in because when you win, the profits are so high.”
In late 2013 hunting for oil in Guyana was among Exxon’s lowest priorities. Companies had drilled more than 40 dry holes in the region. The target formation—named Liza, after a local fish—was under a mile of water, and drilling it would cost at least $175 million. Even Dyksterhuis estimated there was only a 1 in 5 chance of success. But if he was right, it would open an oil frontier, proving a theory that the same geology behind Venezuela’s reserves, the world’s largest, extended across the north coast of South America. Many at Exxon had no interest in making that bet. Neither did much of the rest of the oil industry.
Today, Liza is the world’s biggest oil discovery in a generation. Exxon controls a block that holds 11 billion barrels of recoverable oil, worth nearly $1 trillion at current prices. The find has transformed Guyana from one of South America’s poorest countries into one that will pump more crude per person than Saudi Arabia or Kuwait by 2027. Guyana is on track to overtake Venezuela as South America’s second-¬largest oil producer, after Brazil.
Guyana has become the bedrock of Exxon’s post-Covid corporate revival. The Texas oil giant has a 45% share of a field that costs less than $35 a barrel to produce, making it one of the most profitable outside of OPEC. With crude currently trading at $85 a barrel, the oil field would make money even if the transition from fossil fuels caused demand to collapse and prices dropped by half.
The untold story of the Guyana find’s origins—based on interviews with more than a dozen people involved in the Liza well, most of whom have since left Exxon—reveals some surprising truths about oil’s past and future. It shows how others in the business overestimated the shift from oil to renewables. Only three years ago, Exxon lost a battle over board seats with activist investors who argued it wasn’t doing enough to prepare for the transition. Exxon stuck to its core business. “When everyone else was pulling back, we were leaning in,” says , president of Exxon’s production division. Since Guyana production began at the end of 2019, the company’s shares have more than doubled, the highest return among its supermajor peers.
This history suggests the difficulty of relying on market forces to usher in the end of fossil fuels. The Green movement had hoped that improved technology would help solar, wind and other renewables supplant increasingly hard-to-find oil. Environmentalists now worry that Exxon will earn a windfall from a slower energy transition, while others bear the cost of drilling’s harm to the climate and Guyana’s ecology. “Exxon is polluting the ocean and atmosphere without having to pay for the damage,” says Melinda Janki, a Guyanese lawyer who’s worked on international environmental protection. (Exxon says it invests in technology to protect the environment and meets or exceeds regulatory requirements.)
Exxon’s rivals no doubt have aching regret. Almost 30 other companies, including Chevron Corp., passed up the chance to buy into the Guyana discovery. Shell Plc, previously a 50% partner, walked away. Chevron is now paying $53 billion for Hess Corp., one of Exxon’s two partners in Guyana, which has a 30% stake in the project. Exxon this year filed an arbitration case against Hess, claiming it has a right of first refusal over the stake. (Hess says that right doesn’t apply in a merger.)
But the tale of the Guyana discovery isn’t about taking swashbuckling risks for a huge payoff. Exxon, it turns out, is as much a financial engineering company as an oil explorer. It hedged its bets, reduced its exposure and bought itself an option to make a fortune on an unlikely outcome.
That strategy dates to a key moment in 2013. Exxon’s top geoscientists concluded that Dyksterhuis and his colleagues hadn’t made the case that drilling Liza was worth the risk. Dyksterhuis was downbeat. If it didn’t drill, Exxon would have to hand the Stabroek block, or concession—its license to explore and drill the territory—back to Guyana’s government within months. (Stabroek was the former name of Guyana’s capital, Georgetown.)
In the hallway after a meeting, Rudy Dismuke, a ¬commercial adviser, pulled one of the geoscientists aside. “Would you support Liza if we could drill it for free?” he asked. “Of course,” the geoscientist replied.
And so a small group of lower- and midlevel employees figured out a way to drill for nothing. Or close to it.
Like many geoscientists Rod Limbert knew that the source rock for Venezuela’s oil—the La Luna formation—extended under the Atlantic into maritime territory held by Guyana, Suriname and French Guiana. The straight-talking Australian became fascinated with an onshore discovery in Suriname in the 1960s, when villagers accidentally found what became a billion-barrel oil field while drilling for water in a schoolyard.
Limbert thought the schoolyard’s oil had originated off Guyana’s continental shelf and migrated more than 100 miles onshore over millions of years. He took the idea to the Exxon team responsible for entering new basins in mid-1997. “They had a picture of a downward-pointing thumb at the end of their presentation,” Limbert says. He contacted Guyana’s government about acquiring drilling rights anyway. “I just didn’t tell anyone,” he says.
In 1997, Guyana was one of the poorest countries in South America, still suffering from the socialist and isolationist policies of strongman Forbes Burnham, who rose to power soon after independence from the UK in 1966. Limbert and two colleagues flew from Houston to Georgetown, to acquire old well logs and discuss the potential for drilling rights with the Guyana Geology and Mines Commission. “The ground floor was literally the ground floor,” Limbert says. “By that I mean the desks and chairs were on the dirt.”
The Exxon team also met Samuel Hinds, Guyana’s president, who talked mostly about cricket, Guyana’s national pastime. “I wasn’t in any particular hurry to talk about business, because I had no authority to do anything,” Limbert says. On returning to Texas and armed with fresh data, Limbert won permission to begin contract negotiations for exploration rights.
Citing the legions of failed wells, Limbert pushed for and won a highly favorable deal. The Stabroek block offered to Exxon was more than 1,000 times bigger than the average oil block in the Gulf of Mexico. It required no upfront payment, and if Exxon struck oil, the company would keep 50% of the profit after deducting costs. It would pay the ¬government a royalty of only 1%. Guyana later received heavy criticism for the contract. “I have examined my conscience about it over a period of time, but I don’t feel bad about it,” Limbert says. “It was a complete fit for what we knew and what we didn’t know.”
The deal helped the government in another way. Guyana faced serious border disputes both with Suriname to the east and Venezuela to the west. Aligning with Exxon would mean anyone picking a fight with Guyana would also be picking a fight with the world’s most powerful oil company.
Guyana’s concerns proved valid. Suriname gunboats forced a different oil explorer out of disputed waters between the two countries. Exxon couldn’t work on the block for eight years. When the Suriname conflict was nearing resolution in 2007, Exxon executives realized they’d need to spend money on seismic studies to meet work requirements under the contract. They suggested giving up the block to free up cash for -higher-priority explorations in Brazil, the Gulf of Mexico and emerging US shale basins.
Dismuke, a Texas-schooled engineer who was Exxon’s Western Hemisphere commercial adviser at the time, took one look at the contract with Guyana and couldn’t believe his eyes. The deal Limbert negotiated had a huge upside. Dismuke and a colleague suggested a farm-out deal that would hand a portion of the block to a company willing to pay for the seismic study. Exxon’s management approved the idea and sold 25% of Stabroek to Shell in 2008. Exxon and Shell spent the next three years interpreting the seismic waves bounced off underground rock layers to understand the region’s geology. The early data was promising, showing indications of fossil fuels.
But this data also confirmed many geoscientists’ worst fear: a complete absence of structural traps. These formations are geological faults or impenetrable bands of rock that act like dams, capturing oil as it seeps through layers of sediment over millions of years. Without a solid trap, oil can’t accumulate in large enough quantities to be commercially viable. Guyana instead had stratigraphic traps, the most risky of all geological formations for an oil explorer. Although they can be secure, stratigraphic traps are subtle and very difficult to analyze on seismic charts. They often contain what’s known as a “thief zone” from which oil can escape.
By the late 2000s, however, the oil industry was warming to such formations. Crude was trading for more than $100 a barrel, so big discoveries meant big profits. Technology was improving. Shell decided to raise its stake in the Stabroek block to 50%. Around the same time, two geoscientists at APA Corp., a small explorer in Houston then called Apache, were watching closely. Tim Chisholm studied Venezuela for Exxon in the 1990s, and Pablo Eisner had worked the region for Repsol SA. The pair wanted a slice of Stabroek, but when that wasn’t an option, they led Apache into Suriname instead.
Before they could drill a well, Apache management had a change of heart and cut its exploration team. Chisholm and Eisner were laid off within a half-hour of each other. Chisholm went to Hess and Eisner joined CNOOC. Each says they believed they had unfinished business.
At Exxon in 2013 one geoscientist in a company of 75,000 people worked full time on Guyana. A trove of data was coming from the Shell-financed seismic studies. Exxon turned to Dyksterhuis, the Australian geoscientist, to help interpret it. He was drawn to the subject in college because it had “every single field of science in it,” including the physics of seismic modeling and the biology of creatures that had died millions of years ago, he says. “And then you go into oil and gas, you’ve got, like, big-dollar decision-making.”
One such decision came soon after Dyksterhuis arrived in Houston from Melbourne. Exxon, which by then had held Stabroek for more than a decade, had a matter of months to decide whether to drill an 8-inch-diameter hole somewhere in an area the size of Massachusetts.
Signs pointed to no. Exxon was more focused on established oil provinces, and Shell was souring on the region after drilling in French Guiana didn’t pan out. Dyksterhuis started analyzing two-dimensional seismic data shot about five years earlier. One prospect, Liza, stood out. The readings showed fluid. But what kind? Water or oil? The uncertainty prompted constant challenges from his bosses.
Using complex computer modeling, Dyksterhuis combined more than 300 3D seismic images to determine it was likely oil sitting on top of water. “The more I worked it, the more I was, like, ‘There’s something going on here,’ ” Dyksterhuis says. Toward the end of 2013, he and two colleagues presented their findings to more than a dozen of Exxon’s top geoscientists.
The good news was that Liza had a “pay zone” 90 meters (295 feet) thick packed with porous sand that fluids could move through very easily. They estimated it could contain 890 million barrels of recoverable oil, worth almost $1 billion at the time. Their high-side estimate was twice as big. The bad news was there was only a 22% chance of success, mainly because Liza was a stratigraphic trap. It wasn’t enough to win the bosses’ approval, and the trio left discouraged.
Dismuke, who sat at the back of the meeting, saw it differently. “I thought, if this hits and the trap holds, then I’ve got 6 million more acres to explore under a very good contract,” he says. He made a plan similar to the approach in 2008: reduce the financial downside by finding partners who would disproportionately pay for the well, in return for a stake in the block. Of course, Exxon would now be far richer if it hadn’t laid off that risk. Mallon, the Exxon oil production chief, says it would have been inappropriate to bet hundreds of millions of dollars on a single well, given the company’s many other opportunities. “You can’t sit as an armchair quarter¬back,” he says. “Was it right or wrong? It was the decision based on what we knew at the time.”
Management approved, and Exxon quickly set up a data room at its Greenspoint office in Houston, inviting about 30 oil companies. Only about 20 showed up. Geoscientists from each interested party got a daylong presentation from the Exxon team and a second day to analyze the data. Hess was the last to come through. Chisholm grilled Dyksterhuis for more than two hours. “He did a very good job of, I would say, not overselling it,” Chisholm said in a 2020 lecture. “That was very critical to me believing. He had passion for what it was.”
In mid-2014, as Hess was considering entering the block, Shell dropped a bombshell: After six years of paying for seismic data, the Anglo-Dutch supermajor wanted out. The decision was “part of a broader groupwide review of our frontier exploration portfolio,” the company said in response to questions. Exxon now had 100% of Stabroek and only weeks before it had to inform the Guyana government whether or not it planned to drill.
Within Hess, Guyana was a tough sell, but the company agreed to take a 30% stake. “I bet my career on it,” Chisholm says. “I would have definitely been fired if it had not worked.”
Eisner, who’d coveted Guyana since working with Chisholm at Apache, was now working at CNOOC. “Everybody was offered Stabroek, but you need a maverick, big-headed geologist banging the table, even breaking the table to say, ‘This is good,’ ” he says. “At CNOOC, that was me.” Eisner convinced his bosses, and CNOOC took a 25% stake. Exxon’s share of Stabroek was now 45%, but crucially, the two newcomers agreed to fund most of the well cost. With Exxon’s own money now largely protected, management gave the go-ahead to drill Liza.
The well cost $225 million. Though Exxon will end up investing more than $25 billion in the Guyana project, its initial outlay—the one that secured its control of the epic discovery—was pretty close to the zero that the small group of Guyana believers had mentioned back in 2013: less than $100 million, according to people familiar with the matter. Possibly much less.
Exxon hired Transocean Ltd.’s Deepwater Champion for the job. The high-spec drill rig was as long as two football fields, carried 10 truckloads of cement and mud, and could drill more than 7 miles deep. With helicopter crews and support vessels at the ready, the well was soon costing more than $1 million a day.
Inside Exxon it was dubbed “the well from hell.” A section of pipe got stuck, unable to move up or down, compromising the integrity of the entire well. Drillers sheared off the drill bit and filled the bottom section of the well with cement. They lost equipment worth more than $15 million. But the drillers made a side-track hole that saved the project. The night before Liza reached its target, Dyksterhuis and a colleague slept on the floor in separate meeting rooms at Exxon’s newly built Houston campus.
As soon as the drill bit hit Liza on May 5, 2015, real-time well data being fed back to Houston showed a sudden change in rock density. That meant Liza was stacked with fossil fuels. But it wasn’t immediately clear whether it was oil or gas. To really hit the big time, it had to be oil.
A few hours later, the Deepwater Champion circulated drilling mud on its deck and shook out rock cuttings onto a conveyor belt. Kerry Moreland, a senior geoscientist and Dyksterhuis’ boss, noticed a familiar smell in the salty sea air. “Maybe like a gas station,” she says. She put on gloves and picked up some of the rocks. They were dripping in oil.