华为让美国人惊呼:狼来了!(下篇)
咫尺天涯 2001年情人节(Valentine's Day)这天,华为公司首次进入美国市场。当时,由公司高级副总裁陈朝晖领队,一小组公司员工来到了德克萨斯州的普莱诺市,成立了公司的第一个美国办事处。陈朝晖回忆道:“当时,我的英语说得很差,也不会开车。我们当时要先找住的地方,大约有四五个人吧。根本没有一点头绪。了解当地市场和确定策略都非常困难。” 大约三年之后,华为CEO任正非来到德克萨斯州,视察他的“先遣队”。陈朝晖表示,当时华为还没能与哪怕一家美国客户签订合同,几乎没有人知道它的名字。(当时公司在美国的注册名称是“Futurewei”,这原本是为了简单起见,但最后却适得其反。)任正非给员工提出了几点建议。陈朝晖称:“他当时说:‘我们要像针一样扎进来。把所有精力集中在一款产品和一个客户身上,然后寻找突破,一点一点打开知名度。’” |
So close and yet so far Huawei first came to America on Valentine's Day in 2001. That's when a small group of Huawei employees led by Charlie Chen, a senior VP, arrived in Plano, Texas, to establish the company's first U.S. office. "I couldn't speak good English, didn't know how to drive," recalls Chen. "We started from our apartment, maybe four or five people, and we had no clue. To understand the market, to set up a strategy, was very hard." Some three years later Huawei CEO Ren visited Texas to check on his emissaries. Huawei had yet to sign up a single U.S. customer, says Chen, and almost no one could pronounce its name. (The company had registered in the U.S. as "Futurewei" to make things easier, but that only caused confusion.) Ren had some advice for employees. "He said, 'We have to break through like a needle,'" says Chen. "'Put all the effort into one single product with one customer, break through, and then we can build up our recognition.'" |
从那一年开始,华为便开始不断向美国投入资源。目前,公司在普莱诺的办公室也已经扩大到100,000平方英尺的大楼,成为公司在北美地区的总部。华为还在美国成立了12家分支机构和7个研发中心,包括在加利福尼亚州圣克拉拉市新近成立的研发中心,目前在美国的员工人数超过1,100人,其中75%是美国人(华为在美国的公司中,只有200名中国籍员工)。因此,要成为美国电信行业主要参与者,华为已经具备了良好的基础。 竞争对手极力将华为排挤在大额合约的竞标之外的原因很现实:利润。尽管美国运营商在电信设备上的开支约占全球开支的15%,但他们的利润比却为25%。这是因为,美国电信设备的毛利润率为45%到50%。2004年底,华为进入欧洲市场之前,爱立信和阿尔卡特-朗讯的毛利润率也能达到这个比例。但德国汉堡贝伦贝格银行(Berenberg Bank)分析师的一份名为《中国式水刑》(Chinese Water Torture)的报告显示,在华为进入欧洲市场并强力竞标之后,他们的利润率迅速下降到30%到35%。而新技术的推出则使它成为更加可怕的竞争对手,因为这项技术可以为消费者大幅降低成本。例如,华为推出的SingleRAN设备可以处理多种信号类型——2G、3G、WiMax、CDMA、GSM等,这一切仅仅需要一套设备,运营商不必针对不同信号建立单独的网络。 据业内人士称,去年秋天,当斯普林特公司为升级网络进行招标时,华为公司开出的条件能让运营商在运行的第一年就可在目前成本的基础上节省8亿美元。但在亚利桑那州共和党人、参议院乔恩•科尔的带领下,部分国会议员发起了一场“上书活动”,要求斯普林特公司拒绝华为的投标。而且,据报道时任美国商务部部长的骆家辉致电斯普林特公司CEO丹•汉斯,表达了自己对国家安全的“深切担忧”。最终,价值50亿美元的招标被爱立信、阿尔卡特-朗讯和三星公司(Samsung)瓜分。科尔和骆家辉均拒绝对此事发表评论。 最终做出合同决定的是斯普林特公司负责网络事务的高级副总裁鲍勃•阿兹,他甚至否认华为曾参与过竞标。他说,进行网络升级需要考虑多方面的成本和因素——包括像新技术的过渡——但商务部的警告并不包括在内。他坚决表示:“没有人告诉我该怎么做。我们自己根据当时的商业环境进行决策,这是我们的底线。我们自己确定成本;我们自己确定利益。就是这么回事。” 华为团队倍受打击——他们一直信心满满,认为他们可以说服斯普林特与他们签署在美国的第一个一级合同。为了提高成算,华为甚至与一家名为Amerilink Telecom的公司建立了合作伙伴关系。该公司由美国参谋长联席会议(Joint Chiefs of Staff)副主席、海军上将比尔•欧文斯领导。他也曾在北电网络公司担任过CEO。欧文斯表示:“在我看来,美国拒绝(让斯普林特同意华为获得该业务)是一个严重的错误。华为向斯普林特、美国政府,向所有人都公开了公司的源代码。如果是北电,我绝不会向任何人,尤其是美国政府公开源代码。这件最终以这样的结局收场绝对是大错特错。” 机会依然存在 或许华为还没有获得美国大型运营商的信任,但在中等规模电信公司中,它的销售势头却异常迅猛——销售的产品从核心基础设施到消费设备。去年,华为在北美地区的收入达到7.65亿美元,比前一年的总收入翻了一番还多。其中一个重要的客户是Leap公司,该公司从高通公司(Qualcomm)分拆出来,目前是美国第七大无线运营商。2006年,Leap公司首次购买了华为的3G设备,2007年又购入了基站,2010年采购了调制解调器。目前,该公司在销售华为出产的价格低廉的Ascend安卓系统智能手机。T-Mobile公司也在出售华为的Ascend手机。华为推出的名为IDEOS S7的7寸安卓系统平板电脑也开始在百思买集团(Best Buy)销售。该款平板电脑售价不到300美元,颇受部分消费者的青睐,毕竟他们不想花昂贵的价钱购买一台iPad。 其中部分新业务的达成路径为颇耐人寻味。比如,华为的另外一个大客户是无线互联网提供商科维公司(Clearwire),而颇具讽刺意味的是,斯普林特公司在科维公司拥有多数股权。此外,科维公司与斯普林特公司达成了合作协议,负责斯普林特公司的4G业务,而最终采用的设备又恰恰是由华为生产的。科维公开承认华为之前便是其WiMAX供应商,目前是其4G网络供应商,除此之外,并未发表其他评论。 华为的另外一个客户是Level3通信公司,该公司负责美国200多个政府部门的安全信道通信,也是美国的国防承包商,推出了跨越美国和西欧的互联网转接网络,该网络被称为互联网的主干网络。尽管Level3公司与华为均未透露有关交易的任何内容,但业内人士和分析师均确认,Level3采购了华为的设备。一位业内人士称:“采购的产品是基站,核心交换设备——都是那种能让人提心吊胆、夜不能寐的设备。”Level3回应称,为客户保密是公司的首要任务,但对于“网络安全问题,公司没有发表评论。” 或许是由于网络安全问题,因此华为公司的大部分客户都对华为的事情讳莫如深。但有一家客户却非常乐意发表自己的意见,他便是东北无线网络公司(Northeast Wireless Networks)的创始人兼CEO罗伯特•帕斯洛。该公司正在为缅因州和俄勒冈州等偏远地区安装设备,以提供更高效的蜂窝接入和无线宽带。他说,华为的SingleRAN产品能够处理斯普林特的CDMA和AT&T的GSM技术,以及加拿大的微波互联接入技术。对于这一点,他给与了高度赞扬。帕斯洛曾在朗讯任职,他说:“这是最优秀的解决方案,也是我为什么对华为设备如此着迷的原因。单从技术来看,他们的确称得上是目前行业中的真正领袖。” 但在决定采购之前,根据所了解到的一些信息,他也对安全问题产生过担忧。所以帕斯洛去了华盛顿,从1月到3月,有两个半月时间,他每周去一次。他说:“我在华盛顿的国会山拜访了许多参议院和国会议员,我还去了安全机构。我绝不能做出任何可能危害国家安全的决定。”但华盛顿之行听到的说辞都无法使他相信华为的设备会带来威胁。他说道:“我对议员和安全机构的走访非常满意,并根据走访的结果做出了最终的决定。” 对于华为来说,让人们改变态度并非易事。但公司愿意继续艰难前行,实现自己的长期目标。华为北美区总裁查尔斯•丁称:“我们需要有足够的耐心。”华为计划进军云计算和企业空间,并与甲骨文(Oracle)、亚美亚(Avaya)、惠普(Hewlett-Packard)、思科和亚马逊(Amazon)等公司展开竞争。据华为预测,截至2020年其全球收入将增长三倍,达到1,000亿美元——这是一个宏伟的目标。不过,如果华为无法赢得美国的顶级客户,一切都是空谈;如果华为能够让华盛顿的大多数人相信,它的目的非常单纯,那它或许能够如愿。 (翻译 刘进龙) |
Huawei has continued to pour resources into the U.S. in the years since. The Plano office is now a 100,000-square-foot building and is the North American headquarters. Huawei has set up 12 branch offices and seven R&D centers in the U.S., including a brand-new research center in Santa Clara, Calif., and now employs more than 1,100 people in the U.S., 75% of them Americans (some 200 Huawei employees in the U.S. have come from China). Huawei has the infrastructure to be a major telecom player in America. But competitors have a compelling reason to shut Huawei out of the bidding for big contracts: margins. While U.S. operators do an estimated 15% of the global spending on telecom equipment, they account for up to 25% of the profit. That's because gross margins for telecom equipment in the U.S. are 45% to 50%. Before Huawei entered Europe in late 2004, margins for Ericsson and Alcatel-Lucent were that high too. But they fell to 30% to 35% immediately after Huawei arrived and began bidding aggressively, according to a report titled "Chinese Water Torture" by analysts at Berenberg Bank in Hamburg. The gearmaker's new technology makes it an even more formidable competitor because it can create significant cost savings for customers. Its SingleRAN equipment, for example, can handle multiple types of signals -- 2G, 3G, WiMax, CDMA, GSM -- on one box, freeing a carrier from building separate networks. Last fall when Sprint Nextel solicited bids for a network upgrade, Huawei offered a deal that would have saved the carrier at least $800 million from its existing costs in its first year of operation alone, according to several industry sources. But members of Congress, led by Sen. Jon Kyl, Republican from Arizona, launched a letter-writing campaign urging Sprint not to include Huawei. And Commerce Secretary Locke reportedly called CEO Dan Hesse to convey his "very deep concerns" about national security. The $5 billion prize was split among Ericsson, Alcatel-Lucent, and Samsung. Kyl and Locke declined to comment on the matter. Sprint's senior vice president of network, Bob Azzi, who made the contract decision, wouldn't acknowledge that Huawei had been a bidder. He says there are many costs to consider in an upgrade -- including transitioning to a new technology -- but that a warning from the Secretary of Commerce wasn't one of them. "I was not told what to do," he insists. "The bottom line is we made the choice in the business context we had. We decide on the costs; we decide on the benefits. Period." The Huawei team was crushed -- having been almost sure it was going to nail Sprint as its first Tier 1 contract in the U.S. To boost its chances, Huawei had formed a partnership with a company called Amerilink Telecom, headed by the former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Bill Owens, who also was once CEO of Nortel Networks. "In my view it was a serious mistake for America not to [have had Sprint award Huawei the business]," says Owens. "They're opening all their source code to Sprint, to the U.S. government, to everyone. At Nortel, I never would have opened the source code to anyone, especially not the U.S. government. This is so compellingly wrong in the way this has happened." Not a total shutout It may not have broken through to big U.S. carriers yet, but Huawei has begun to pick up serious momentum selling to mid-tier telecoms -- from core infrastructure to consumer devices. Last year Huawei tallied $765 million in revenue in North America, more than double its total from the year before. One important customer is Leap (LEAP), a spinoff from Qualcomm (QCOM) whose Cricket is the seventh-largest U.S. wireless operator. Leap first purchased Huawei's 3G equipment in 2006, then base stations in 2007, and modems in 2010. Currently it sells Huawei's affordable Android-based smartphone, the Ascend. T-Mobile offers the Huawei Ascend as well. And Best Buy (BBY) sells a seven-inch Android-based tablet from Huawei called the IDEOS S7, which at under $300 is aimed at consumers who don't want to splurge for an iPad. Some of that new business has led down surprising paths. For instance, another large customer is Internet wireless provider Clearwire, which, ironically, is majority-owned by Sprint. And Clearwire has a partnership deal to carry Sprint's 4G traffic -- on Huawei's equipment, as it turns out. Clearwire declined to comment except to confirm that Huawei was previously its WiMAX supplier and is now a supplier for its 4G network. Then there's Level3 Communications (LVLT) -- which operates secure-channel communications for over 200 government agencies, is a U.S. defense contractor, and forms what is called the backbone of the Internet, an IP transit network across the U.S. and Western Europe. That Level3 has purchased Huawei equipment is confirmed by industry sources and analysts, even though neither company has ever announced any deals. "It's base stations, core switching equipment -- the kind of stuff that really ought to keep people up at night," one source says. Level3 responds that customer confidentiality is its highest priority, but that it does not "comment further on network security" issues. Perhaps because of the cybersecurity issue, most of Huawei's customers decline to be interviewed about the company. One customer happy to talk was Robert Parsloe, founder and CEO of the new Northeast Wireless Networks, which is installing equipment to provide better cellular access and wireless broadband in remote places like Maine and Oregon. He raves that Huawei's SingleRAN box can handle both Sprint's CDMA and AT&T's GSM technologies -- along with microwave Internet connections from Canada. "That's the winning solution out here, and why I got so hooked on the Huawei equipment," says Parsloe, an ex-Lucent employee. "They're really industry leaders by far on the technology side." Before he made the purchase, though, he worried about security concerns based on what he had read. So Parsloe went to Washington -- once a week for 2 1/2 months from January through March. "I had meetings in D.C., on the Hill with senators and congressmen, and I went to the security agencies," he says. "I was not about to make a decision that might impair our national security." But he heard nothing that convinced him that equipment from Huawei would constitute any kind of threat. "I walked away feeling very comfortable making the decision based on my meetings and the agencies I met," he says. Winning converts has not been easy for Huawei. But the company is willing to keep slogging away to reach its long-term goals. "We just have to be patient," says Charles Ding, head of Huawei North America. Huawei's plans call for moving into cloud computing and the enterprise space -- bringing it into competition with the likes of Oracle (ORCL), Avaya, Hewlett-Packard (HPQ), Cisco, and Amazon (AMZN). Worldwide, Huawei forecasts that its revenue will triple by 2020, to more than $100 billion -- an ambitious goal and one it's unlikely to reach unless it can land top-tier customers in America. But if Huawei can convince enough people in Washington that its intentions are pure, it just might succeed. |