还有第三种可能：考夫曼在二级市场上的时机把握不佳。2007年底，我获悉考夫曼协议以97折出售约1/3的投资组合（该交易于2008年年中完成）。干得不错。不幸的是此后随着二级市场的折扣越来越大，考夫曼还在出售。例如，它以约4折的价格出售NEA组合——回顾来看并不是太好卖。更重要的是，考夫曼只有这些过往基金截至出售时（近期IPO回暖前或Groupon、Fusion-io等NEA组合公司创造巨大价值前的市场底部）的数据。要澄清的是我不是在批评考夫曼的研究人员——我只是在想，它的数据组在当前形势下有多少代表性。

    话虽如此，但考夫曼指出，对于很多有限合伙人而言，风投这整个资产类别的表现并不是最好，这句话没错。随着最好的企业家寻找“最好的”风投家，风投行业分化严重，而且这股趋势还将延续下去。如果你不能找到一些最优秀的一般合伙人——包括前景看好的经理——次优选择或许是投资公开市场指数，而不是二线基金（所有二线，我指的是“最高的10%以下”）。

    考夫曼关于一般合伙人/有限合伙人并存的基金结构做出的第二点结论也恰如其分。正如它所问，风险投资会给组合公司CEO与有限合伙人一样的条款吗？（提示：答案是“绝无可能”）。

    比如，有限合伙人应能获得基金的财务信息。如果在一家有很多新星的公司里，两位高级合伙人获得大部分利润分成，这是有限合伙人决策时应了解的关键信息。更重要的是，2%的一价制管理费——而不是基于预算的费用——不利于募集更大规模的基金，即便市场机会看好（别忘了，考夫曼认为大基金表现落后）。风险投资怎能对自己的交易优选出售，但在有限合伙人协议中往往反对最低回报率条款呢？

    要知道，在一般合伙人/有限合伙人失衡问题上，考夫曼批评的并非贪婪的一般合伙人。它批评的是有限合伙人——报告标题就是《我们遇到了敌人，他就是我们》——拒绝推动或接受结构性创新的有限合伙人。总体而言，它相信投资委员会在最小化风投风险时，要么不够有经验，要么太惯于以往方式：

    “一个有经验的一般合伙人筹集自己的首个基金时称，管理费基于预算，并根据绩效接受可调整的利润分成（比如，2倍以上为25%）。但感觉这样有违行业惯例，会让潜在的有限合伙人认为，这支基金急于吸引新的投资者，因此提供独特优厚的条款。”

    或者以收购领域为例。贝恩资本（Bain Capital）最近的亚洲基金为投资者提供了1/30（1%的年管理费和30%的收益分成——译注）或2/20（2%的管理费和20%的收益分成——译注）的选择权。投资者的选择大约各半，很多选择2/20的投资者解释称，投资委员会对2/20毫无异议，问了很多1/30的问题。

    不过，考夫曼推动此类事宜，有点出乎意料。几年前，考夫曼退出了机构有限合伙人协会（ILPA）——该协会或许是唯一一家有足够影响力来真正实现一些改变的组织。由有限合伙人要求实施基于预算的费用或一些条款？看起来有点难，更别提范围更广的结构性变革了。在我看来，如果考夫曼能冰释前嫌，它的这番努力就能赢得一位积极同盟者。

    Then, a third option: Kauffman did a lousy job timing the secondary market. At the end of 2007, I'm told that the Foundation agreed to sell approximately 1/3 of its portfolio at 97 cents on the dollar (deal actually closed in middle of 2008). That was well done. Unfortunately, it continued selling after that as secondary discounts got deeper and deeper. For example, it dumped its NEA positions for around 40 cents on the dollar – which doesn't look too hot in retrospect. More importantly, Kauffman only has data for these legacy funds as of the time of sale (i.e., a market bottom that came before the recent IPO resurgence, or the big value creation of an NEA portfolio company like Groupon or Fusion-io). To be clear, I'm not disparaging the Kauffman researchers – I'm simply wondering how representative its data set is to current conditions.

    All of this said, however, Kauffman is correct in arguing that, for many LPs, venture capital may not work best as a dedicated asset class. The industry stratification is severe, and becoming self-perpetuating as the best entrepreneurs seek out the "best" venture capitalists. If you can't get into a few dozen of the best GPs – including emerging managers -- perhaps the next-best option is a public index rather than a second-tier fund (and by second-tier, I probably mean "below top-decile").

    Kauffman is also on target in its second point, about the ridiculous fund structures vis-à-vis GP/LP alignment. As it asks, would VCs ever give portfolio company CEOs the same deal they ask for from limited partners? (hint: the answer is "no way in hell).

    For example, LPs should have information about underlying fund economics. If two senior partners get most of the carry in a firm with young stars, then that is pertinent information LPs should have when making a decision. More importantly, 2% flat management fees – as opposed to budget-based fees – create a perverse incentive to keep raising larger and larger funds, even if not merited by the market opportunity (and, remember, Kauffman believes larger funds underperform). And how come VCs put liquidation preferences on their own transaction, but generally oppose hurdle rates or waterfalls on their LP agreements?

    But, remember, Kauffman doesn't really blame greedy GPs for the misalignment. It blames LPs – the report's title is "We have met the enemy, and he is us" – for refusing to advocate for, or accept, structural innovations. Mainly it believes that investment committees are either too unsophisticated or too set in their ways to minimize their own VC risk:

    "One experienced GP raising his own first-time fund said he offered a budget-based management fee, and was open to a sliding carry based on performance (e.g., 25 percent above 2x), but felt that such a departure from industry practice sent the message to prospective LPs that the fund was desperate to attract new investors by offering unique and better-aligned economic terms."

    Or take an example from the buyout world, when Bain Capital recently offered investors in its Asia fund the option of 1/30 or 2/20. About half took each deal, with many of the latter explaining that investment committees don't blink at 2/20 but ask lots of questions about 1/30.

    There is, however, a bit of irony in Kauffman being the one to push for such things. Several years ago, the Foundation dropped out of membership in ILPA – perhaps the only organization with enough collective clout to actually effectuate change. The idea of individual LPs asking for budget-base fees or underlying economics – let alone broader structural alterations – is daunting. It seems, to me, that Kauffman has a willing partner in its fight, if only it would mend some fences.