Facebook下周将进行IPO，对于风险投资基金Accel Partners而言，这将是收获累累硕果的时刻。后者在马克•扎克伯格2005年筹建Facebook时提供过初始资金，现在仍是Facebook的最大外部投资者。Accel Partners的成功验证了一个定理：最成功的风险投资基金往往是小型风投。

    近年来，风险投资基金流年不利，Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation最近发布报告指出，“在我们的投资组合中，没有哪只规模超过5亿美元的基金，在扣除相关费用后，能带来我们投入资本两倍以上的收益。”无独有偶，另一位风投家最近给我发来了一份未经公开的白皮书，该报告引用汤森路透（Thomson Reuters）的数据，一针见血地指出，“在超过7.5亿美元的风险投资基金中，没有一笔能为有限合伙人投资者带来两倍以上的收益。”

    让我们来回顾一下Accel：早在2002年，该公司陷入困境。当时，该公司Accel Partners VIII基金的规模达到16亿美元，这支基金募集于互联网泡沫的巅峰时期，但随后的失败意味着Accel的资金已经超出它能合理投资的范围。这是风险投资公司当时普遍面临的问题，很多公司都向投资者表示，他们不会调用承诺资本的40%或50%。

    然而，Accel尝试了一种不同的战略——分裂。我当时撰文写道：

    Accel希望保存已经受托的16亿美元，将这些资金分散到Fund VIII以及全新的Fund IX这两只基金中。如此一来，Accel将能够锁定其30%的附带收益结构，并显著延长其投资跑道。

    不过，Accel的投资者们认为自己上当受骗了。他们拒绝了这项提议，最终，Accel不得不将基金规模削减至大约7.7亿美元（通过两次削减）。

    随后两年，Accel一蹶不振，不断亏钱。在目睹Accel的悲惨境地及其少得可怜的回报后，许多有限合伙人决定与其分道扬镳。哈佛大学、麻省理工学院和普林斯顿大学决定不再向Accel Partners IX投资，后者最终仅仅筹集到4.4亿美元。

    事实证明，这些学校所犯的错误堪称昂贵。因为Accel Partners IX目前持有大约1.495亿股Facebook股票。Facebook将其IPO发行价定在28至35美元区间，如果最终价格取中间值的话，Acce所持有的股票将价值超过47亿美元。我们还未将Accel此前在二级市场售出的Facebook股票计算在内，有人声称仅仅通过之前的这些交易，Accel就已经收回了对Facebook的全部投资。

    现在看来，Accel完全可能在2005年时通过其“分裂”的16亿美元基金投资Facebook。但情况并非如此。在手握16亿美元时，Accel的风投基金是失败者。在仅剩4.4亿美元后，它极有希望成为有史以来效益最好的风投基金——尤其是将Accel投资的Glam Media等公司计算在内的话。

    “风投基金越袖珍越好”，Accel堪称这一论点最新也是最强有力的证据。

    译者：项航

    When Facebook goes public next week, it will mean a massive payday for Accel Partners -- the venture capital firm that originally backed Mark Zuckerberg in 2005 and remains the company's largest outside investor. It also could help support an argument that the most successful VC funds are small VC funds.

    In a recent report on the sad stage of venture capital, the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation wrote: "We have no funds in our portfolio that raised more than $500 million and returned more than two times our invested capital after fees." More broadly speaking a venture capitalist recently sent me an unpublished white paper (dated March 2011) that uses Thomson Reuters data to claim that "no venture fund larger than $750 million has ever returned more than 2.0x to its limited partner investors."

    This brings us to Accel: Back in 2002, the firm was in trouble. It was investing out of a $1.6 billion fund (Accel Partners VIII) that had been raised at the height of the dotcom bubble, but the resulting bust meant that Accel had more money than it could reasonably invest. It was a common problem in VC-land, with many firms simply telling investors that they wouldn't call down 40% or 50% of committed capital.

    Accel, however, tried a different strategy -- split. From a story I wrote at the time:

    Accel, on the other hand, wants to maintain the $1.6 billion already committed by spreading it over the life of both Fund VIII and a brand new Fund IX. By doing so, Accel would be able to lock in its 30% carried interest structure and significantly lengthen its investment runway.

    Accel's investors, however, thought they smelled a shell game. They rejected the proposal, and Accel ultimately agreed to slash the fund size down to around $770 million (via a pair of cuts).

    When Accel went back out for money two years later, it learned that the episode -- plus poor returns -- had burned bridges with a number of limited partners. Longtime investors like Harvard, MIT and Princeton decided not to come back for Accel Partners IX, which closed on just $440 million.

    It has proven to be a costly mistake for the Ivys, because Accel Partners IX currently holds around 149.5 million shares of Facebook stock. If the social network prices its IPO in the middle of its proposed $28-$35 range, the position would be worth more than $4.7 billion. And that doesn't even include the Facebook shares Accel already has sold on the secondary market, which some say may have already returned the entire fund.

    Now it's entirely possible that Accel would have funded Facebook in 2005 through its "split" $1.6 billion fund. But that's not what happened. At $1.6 billion, Accel's fund was a loser. At $440 million, it likely will become the best-performing venture capital fund of all time -- particularly once other portfolio companies like Glam Media get factored in.

    Consider it just the latest, and largest, data point to support the "smaller VC funds are better" argument.