4家赴美上市中国公司资金通道成谜

    最近有几家中国公司申请在美国首发上市。其中，500彩票网（500.com）是一家体育彩票网络公司。58同城（58.com）是一家分类信息网站，或者说中国版的Craigslist。久邦数码（Sungy Mobile ）是一家手机网站，主要制作手机游戏。去哪儿（Qunar Cayman Islands）是一家旅游服务网站，类似于Kayak。

    这些公司的审计机构是：

    500彩票网 安永

    58同城 普华永道

    久邦数码 毕马威

    去哪儿 安永

    德勤（Deloitte）没有从中获得任何业务。不过，按客户数量计算，此前德勤的市场份额最大。一些私募人士告诉我，他们一直在避开德勤，因为他们担心后者在美国证监会（SEC）那里惹上的麻烦会妨碍这些公司及时上市。四大会计师事务所和SEC的问题包含了大量的风险因素。其中三家事务所已经表示，如果SEC对它们的中国业务采取行动，它们将无法提交财务报告，还有可能被注销资格。我很高兴地看到，在久邦数码的审计报告上签字的是毕马威的中国大陆成员公司，打破了以前此类报告由毕马威香港成员公司签字的惯例。实际审计工作由该大陆成员公司完成，它就需要在报告上签字。

    这几家公司都采用可变利益实体（VIE）结构。自从今年上演了和信超媒体案和龚如心案后，我就一直在分析相关文件，目的是了解采用VIE结构以及信息披露方面的情况（特别提醒：我还没有提到过这些案例）。过几天我将以此为题专门写一篇博文。

    本文的焦点是募集资金用途。这几家公司都有很大的资金缺口，鉴于它们都是初创型公司，这一点并不让人意外。其中三家仍在亏损。它们在提交的文件中表示，IPO所得资金不可能进入VIE。虽然这些公司可以把募集资金转移或转借给它们的外商独资公司（WFOE），但WFOE不能向中国公司转移资金，也不可以向后者提供贷款。同时，也不允许WFOE将这些转移或转借的资金用于委托贷款。委托贷款是指由一家中国的银行在贷款人和借款人之间充当中介，它已经成为中国公司规避发行商业票据禁令的捷径。WFOE不能把已经兑换成人民币的资金用于委托贷款，所以无法通过这种方式将首发募集资金借给VIE。

    当然，这是一个巨大的风险因素。如果不能用IPO所得资金来弥补VIE的亏损，这些公司怎么生存下去呢？看样子，去哪儿公司的VIE没有出现重大亏损（它的的亏损似乎来自WFOE）；500彩票网处于盈利状态；久邦数码和58同城提交的文件则没有说明它们打算怎样将人民币资金转移到VIE中以弥补经营亏损。

    此外，这些公司都没有说明它们将如何用募集资金来填补VIE的前期亏损。去哪儿的投资方是百度公司（Baidu）。另外三家公司在起步阶段都得到了大量海外私募资金。这些私募资金是怎么进入VIE的呢？它们买了这些公司的开曼群岛（Cayman Islands）母公司的优先股。这样就有可能让这些资金通过转移或转借进入WFOE并兑换成人民币。但WFOE不能向VIE贷款，也不能向VIE转移资金，那么这些资金是怎么进入VIE的呢？显然是通过借贷，原因是每家公司的VIE都有一笔应付贷款，贷款人是一家已经在整合中消失的关联公司。这样的贷款怎么会合法呢？如果不合法，为什么这些公司没有在文件中做出说明呢？

    我能想到很多办法把人民币资金转移到VIE，但没有一种途径是合法的。当然，打算在美国上市的公司并没有参与洗钱。我希望SEC的调查足够深入，能把事情彻底搞清楚。（财富中文网）

    译者：Charlie    

    We have had several Chinese companies file for IPOs in the US recently.500.com is an online sports lottery company.58.com is China’s copy of Craigslist. Sungy Mobile is mobile internet, mostly games. Qunar Cayman Islands is similar to Kayak.

    Auditors of these companies are:

    500.com EY

    58.com PwC

    Sungy Mobile KPMG

    Qunar EY

    Deloitte won none of these engagements although it previously had the largest market share by number of companies. Some private equity people have told me that they have been avoiding Deloitte for fear that their SEC problems might get in the way of a timely offering. The problems that the Big Four are having with the SEC get extensive coverage in the risk factors, with three of them saying that if the SEC acts against the China Big Four, they will not be able to file financial statements and may be delisted. I was pleased to see that KPMG signed Sungy’s report using its mainland affiliate, breaking from its former practice of signing these reports in Hong Kong. The mainland affiliate does the audits; it needs to sign the reports.

    All of these companies use the VIE structure, and I have been analyzing the filings to see what is happening in VIE structuring and disclosures since thefireworks this year in the Gigamedia and Nina Wang cases (spoiler alert: they are not mentioned). I will be putting up a post on this in the next few days.

    This post focuses on the use of proceeds. All of these companies have large deficits, which is not surprising since they are startups. Three are still losing money. The filings explain that it is impossible to get the IPO proceeds into the VIE. While the company can contribute or loan the funds to its WFOE, the WFOE cannot contribute to the capital of a Chinese company and it is not permitted to loan funds to a Chinese company. The WFOE is also not permitted to use capital contributions or loans to make an entrust loan. Entrust loans involve a Chinese bank serving as an intermediary between a lender and borrower and have developed as a way for Chinese companies to get around the rule that forbids them from issuing commercial paper. WFOEs cannot make entrust loans with funds that have been converted into RMB, so the WFOE cannot make a loan of IPO proceeds to the VIE in this way.

    This, of course, is a huge risk factor. If companies cannot use the IPO proceeds to fund losses in the VIE, how is the business going to survive? Qunar does not appear to have big losses in the VIE (apparently its losses are in its WFOE), and 500.com is profitable, but there is no explanation in the filings on how Sungy Mobile and 58.com expect to get RMB into their VIEs to fund operating losses.

    Furthermore, none of the companies explain how they got funds into the VIEs to fund the prior losses. Qunar has investment from Baidu. The others all got big investments from foreign private equity to fund their startup. How did these private equity funds get to the VIE? The private equity fund buys preferred stock in the Cayman Islands parent company. It is possible to then transfer those funds to the WFOE through capital contributions and loans and to convert them into RMB. But the WFOE cannot make a loan to the VIE, and it cannot make a capital contribution to the VIE, so how did the funds get into the VIE? It is quite clear that they were loaned to the VIE, since each of these companies show a loan payable by the VIE to a related company that is eliminated in consolidation. How was this loan legal? And if it is not legal, why isn’t it explained in the document?

    I can think of a number of ways to get RMB into a VIE, although none of them are legal. Certainly companies planning to list in the U.S. have not been involved in money laundering. I hope the SEC asks enough questions to get to the bottom of this.