近来舆论界似乎有种普遍看法：获得风投撑腰的那些热门初创企业烧钱太多了。部分钱被用来租下高价写字楼，里面尽是花哨的设施；而大多数钱正被用来提升收入，因为大部分创业者发现，收入对自己公司未来估值（无论是私下还是公开估值）的影响，要比利润大得多。

    上个月，风投资本家比尔•格利接受《华尔街日报》（Wall Street Journal）采访时提到“烧钱速度”问题，引起了人们的重视。上周，他又在消费者新闻与财经电视频道（CNBC）上称这种思路为“不惜一切代价来实现增长”，这是一个疯狂的循环过程，“公司花的钱越多，就必须筹集更多资金，而后又必须花掉更多的钱。”

    我同意格利的看法。这可能是因为我们俩在这个行当待的时间够长，还记得上次曲终人散时的情形。基于此，我想给出一个推论，总体而言，风投资本家也存在“烧钱速度”问题。

    风投的融资周期已经开始缩短，特别是对许多大型风投公司而言。举例来说，老虎环球基金（Tiger Global）正忙于为一只15亿美元的新基金募资，离上次他们这么做还不到一年时间。安德森-霍罗维茨风投公司（Andreessen Horowitz）今年3月份结束了一只15亿美元基金的募集工作，距离上一只基金完成募集只有两年。凯鹏华盈（Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers）在融资方面也只间隔了两年，贝恩资本风险投资公司（Bain Capital Ventures）则隔了两年半。

    这些融资活动像连珠炮一样，主要原因就是风投公司加快了投资步伐，尤其是为“独角兽”式的公司进行大规模融资。如果想在这些估值超过10亿美元的“独角兽”公司持有一定股份，最好大把投钱。而且这样的投资对象越多越好。

    有些风投公司烧的一直是自有资金，而且觉得后续融资轻而易举，这种环境难道不会对它们产生不利影响吗？如果回报率停滞不前甚至倒退，或风投基金的有限合伙人自己也可能出现了流动性问题时，他们需要再次筹集资金。没错，风投公司随时可以压缩融资规模预期，但许多大型风投公司已经建立了庞大的基础体系，而这些体系高度依赖大型基金的手续费[格利的基准资本（Benchmark）显然是个例]。这些体系包括内部公关部门、招聘机构、项目活动甚至准媒体组织。

    风投资本家警告创业者勿“引火烧身”，这是对的。但风投界也应该自我审视一番，因为他们中的许多人都积极参与了类似的循环，不停地投资-融资-再投资。（财富中文网）

    译者：Charlie

    审校：Lina

    There seems to be an emerging consensus that popular venture-backed startups are burning too much cash. Some of it is spent on high-rent offices will all sorts of extraneous amenities. Most of it is spent on growing top-line financials, as most entrepreneurs have figured out that future valuations (whether private or public) are tied much more closely to revenue than they are to profit.

    The “burn rate” issue was brought to the forefront last month by venture capitalist Bill Gurley in an interview with The Wall Street Journal. Last week on CNBC, he called it a “growth at all costs mentality” — a fiery cycle in which companies spend more so they must raise more so they must spend more.”

    I agree with Gurley, perhaps because we both have been around long enough to remember what happened the last time the music stopped. And, with that in mind, I’d like to offer a corollary: Venture capitalists, by and large, also have a burn rate problem.

    The venture capital fundraising cycle has compressed, particularly for many of the industry’s largest firms. Tiger Global, for example, is raising a new $1.5 billion fund less than a year after raising its last $1.5 billion fund. Andreessen Horowitz closed its own $1.5 billion fund back in March, just two years after its predecessor. Kleiner Perkins Caufield& Byers also waited just two years, while Bain Capital Ventures held out for 2.5 years.

    One big reason for these rapid-fire fundraises are that firms have quickened their investment paces, particularly when it comes to participating in large rounds for so-called unicorns. If you want to own a meaningful stake in a company that’s already valued at $1 billion, then you had better write a big check. And the more such portfolio companies the better.

    d many of those cash-burning startups? Wouldn’t the same environment adversely affect the VC firms that have been “burning” their own cash, under the presumption of an easy follow-on fundraise? Limited partners would be asked to re-up at a time when returns have flatten/fallen, and when they may have their own liquidity troubles. Yes, VC firms could always scale back new fund expectations, but many of the larger ones have built up giant infrastructures that are heavily reliant on fees that come with giant funds (Gurley’s Benchmark is a notable exception here). In-house PR, recruiters, events and even quasi-media organizations.

    Venture capitalists are right to warn entrepreneurs of getting caught with their pants singed. But VCs also should look in the mirror, because many of them are active participants in a similar cycle of spend/raise/spend.