听到这里，我第二次被羊角面包噎住了。大多数经济学家都会同意这位朋友刚刚所说的话；但他似乎没有看到（可能性不大）或压根就不关心（这种可能性更大）事情的另一面。以欧洲第三大经济体意大利为例，这个有着庞大的现代化工业基地的国家正遭遇货币（欧元）之伤——欧元汇率高于意大利里拉在当前情况下应有的汇率。但欧元区成员身份意味着意大利不能实行本币贬值来缓解出口商压力。

    我委婉地反驳。我说，我担心的不是希腊，是意大利，全球第三大债券市场。周二早间，意大利债券收益率再度上行，突破7% （之后欧洲央行再度干预压低收益率）。大到不能倒，大到救不了。意大利的政府，即便是在新总理领导下，会推动实施足够的紧缩政策以避免违约吗？

    这时那位顾问开腔了，说出了他眼中的、可能令人不快的真相。这位顾问说，不行也得行，因为“粗俗点讲，我们捏住了【希腊人和意大利人的】 命根子。”

    没错——这就是当前欧洲危机的本质。德国，当然还有欧洲央行，相信 （或者更准确地说是希望），出任意大利和希腊新任总理的两位技术型官员——前欧盟委员马里奥•蒙蒂（意大利）和曾就读于麻省理工学院（MIT）的经济学家卢卡斯•帕帕季莫斯（希腊总理）将撇开政治考量，迫使愤怒的两国民众不管喜不喜欢，都要吞下他们开出的药丸。因为这是为了意大利和希腊好。而且，“我们捏住了他们的命根子。他们必须得按我们说的做。”

    还是让我们来看看几个重要事实吧：欧洲金融稳定基金（European Financial Stability Facility，简称EFSF）的资金仍然严重不足（有人听到“补充弹药”的呼声吗？）；由于葡萄牙、意大利、爱尔兰和希腊（PIIG）四国的主权债务敞口，欧洲银行业的资本金严重不足（根据一项保守估算，我看到仅最大的20家银行就需要3,700亿欧元的新股本）。而且就在周一，德国央行（Bundesbank）行长延斯•魏德曼告诉《金融时报》（Financial Times），欧洲央行无论如何都不会戴上“直升机伯南克”的螺旋桨帽子，充当“最后贷款人”。

    真相总是让人警醒，而与我谈话的两位先生所说的这些很大程度上代表了德国人对当前欧洲政治现实的看法。我们捏住了他们的命根子。

    我点点头，然后又一次尽可能礼貌地说，从欧洲历史来看，不管是近些年，还是再早一些，政治“现实”似乎总是“易燃易爆品”。

    说完我们互致午安。在这个孟买的炎热午后，这场谈话让人猛然清醒，欧元区的现实状况益发清晰了：这场危机的经济形势已经够恶劣了，而政治形势却有过之而无不及。

    Here was my 'choking on my croissant' moment number two. Most economists would agree with what my friend at the meeting had said; but he seemed either oblivious (not likely) or simply unconcerned (more likely) with the flip side of what he had just uttered. Italy, to take the third-largest economy in Europe, one with a sizeable and modern industrial base, is stuck with a currency -- the euro -- which is stronger than the old lira would be under current circumstances. But membership in the euro zone means Italy can't devalue to bring some relief to its exporters.

    I pushed back politely. Look, I said, it's not Greece I'm worried about. It's Italy. Third-biggest bond market in the world. Bond spreads this morning again heading over 7% (before the ECB intervened this to push them back down again.) Too big to fail, too big to save. Is the government, even one under a new Prime Minister, going to push through sufficient austerity to avoid a default?

    Now the consultant perked up, speaking what he too believes to be the unvarnished truth. They have to, he said, because "to be blunt about it, we have them [both the Greeks and the Italians] by the balls."

    And make no mistake – that, in essence, is where the European crisis stands. The Germans -- and the ECB along with them -- believe (perhaps hope is the better word) that two new technocratic prime ministers, former EU commissioner Mario Monti in Italy and MIT-trained economist Lucas Papademos in Greece, will cast politics aside and force angry populations in both countries to take their medicine, whether they like it or not. Because it's for their own good, you understand. And besides, "we have them by the balls. They have to do what we say."

    Let's set aside, for the moment, a couple of important facts: the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) remains woefully underfunded (anyone hear the sound of the 'bazooka?'); the European banks are vastly undercapitalized given their exposure to PIIG sovereign debt (the top 20 banks, according to one conservative estimate, I've seen need 370 billion euros of new equity.) And just yesterday, Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann told the Financial Times that under no circumstances would the ECB don its Helicopter Ben propeller hat and act as "lender of last resort."

    Clarity is always refreshing, and what my interlocutor had said is very much the German perception of current political reality in Europe. We have them by the balls.

    I nodded and, again as politely as I could, said that given European history, both recent and not so recent, that "reality" seemed "politically combustible.''

    With that we bade each other good afternoon, a central point about the euro zone reinforced with a thud on a hot afternoon in Mumbai: The economics of this crisis are bad enough. The politics are worse.